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Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic creatednot only a public health crisis but also an
insurance coverage imbroglio, prompting near-immediate business interruption
claims by policyholders impacted by government restrictionsordered in response to
the pandemic. Insurers and their representatives "presponded" to the looming
coverage claims by quickly moving to denigrate argumentsfor coverage, engaging
in a pre-emptive strike that has largely worked to date, inducing too many courts to
rush tojudgment by declaring-asa matter of law-that policy terms such as "direct
physical loss or damage" do not even arguablyencompass the business shutdowns
resultingfrom COVID-19. Our closer examination of the term and of other key
coverage questions suggests that policyholders have a much stronger case than
suggested by the initial-and often superficial and conclusory-conventional
wisdom flowing from the first wave ofjudicial decisions. Only a few courts have
analyzed the COVID coverage debate with the type of reflective care, judicial
humility, and respect for the trial process one would hope to see. The "early
returns" in these coverage wars have been analytically disappointing, creating risk
of an unfortunate path dependency or cascade of cases excessively narrowing the
meaning of key terms such as "loss" and "damage," and diminishing the quality of
future coverage decisions.

* Respectively, Professor of Law, Queens University-Canada and Doris S. & Theodore
B. Lee Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas.
Thanks to Bill Boyd, Jay Feimnan, Chris French, Dan Hamilton, Yong Han, Helmut Heiss,
the late Doris Lee, Ted Lee, Randy Maniloff, David McClure, Ann McGinley, our colleagues
in the American College of Coverage Counsel and the Project Group for the Principles of
Reinsurance Law (PRICL), and the ALI Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance
process. The opinions expressed in this article are of course our own and should not be
attributed to any of those we cite or thank. ©2020 Erik S. Knutsen and Jeffrey W. Stempel.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

COVID-19 AND COVERAGE CONTROVERSY

As the world now knows, a variant of the SARS coronavirus emerged in
Asia in late 20191 creating a severe concentration of infections in Wuhan, China that
spread rapidly throughout the world reaching the United States perhaps as early as
December 2019.2 By February 2020, the new virus named COVID-19 3 was a
"SARS" (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) is the name given to a class of
particularly dangerous virus that causes respiratory problems but often adversely affect other
organs. Julia Ries, Here's How COVID-19 Comparesto Past Outbreaks, HEALTHLINE (Mar.
12,
2020),
https://www.healthline.com/health-news/how-deadly-is-the-coronaviruscompared-to-past-outbreaks. SARS viruses are common in animals and only occasionally
cross over to humans-with dangerous results. Id. The SARS-1 virus, which spread rapidly
between 2002 and 2004, infected many and caused an estimated 774 deaths worldwide
(though none in the United States). Id. See generally Center for Disease Control and
Prevention, CDC.GOv, https://www.cdc.gov (providing range of information regarding the
SARS virus and COVID-19 in particular).
2 See CDC.GOV, supra note 1 (noting that as of January 1, 2021, COVID-19 surpassed
twenty million cases and 341,199 deaths in the United States). Accord, Johns Hopkins
Coronavirus Resource Center, https://www.coronavirus.jhu.edu.
3 COVID-19 is "a mild to severe respiratory illness that is caused by a coronavirus
(Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 of the genus Betacoronavirus)"
transmitted chiefly by contact with infectious material (such as respiratory droplets) or with
objects or surfaces contaminated by the causative virus, and is characterized especially be
fever cough, and shortness of breath and may progress to pneumonia and respiratory failure."
See COVID-19, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2020), https://www.meniamwebster.com/dictionary/COVID-19.
The term coronavirus derived from the crown-like spikes of the virus that appear when
it is viewed by microscope. Kathy Katella, Our New COVID-19 Vocabulary-What Does it
All Mean?, YALE MEDICINE (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.yalemedicine.org/stories/covid-191
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widely acknowledged serious problem 4 that was deemed a "pandemic" by March
11, 2020.5 Beginning in March 2020, state and local governments began issuing
glossary/. It is a relative of the SARS-CoV (often referred to as "SARS" or Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome) that caused substantial injury and death in a 2002-2003 worldwide
outbreak. Id. Coronaviruses of various types can cause common colds as well as SARS and
Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). Id. The variant emerging in 2019 "is believed to
have started in animals and spread to humans. Id. Animal-to-person spread was suspected
after the initial outbreak in December among people who had a link to a large seafood and
live animal market in Wuahn, China." Id.
COVID-19 is thus the name for the disease resulting from infection by the virus with
the letters COVI standing for coronavirus, the D for disease, and the number 19 in the name
resulting because this particular strain of the virus emerged in Wuhan in November 2019
Because the name is derived from initials, it is frequently abbreviated as "COVID-19" in
capital letters.
4 See Christopher C. French, COVID-19 Business InterruptionInsurance Losses: The
Casesfor and Against Coverage, 27 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2020) (acknowledging that COVID19 infections were presenting serious problem). As is not common knowledge, governments
exhibited a range of reactions to the COVID-19 problem. Some (e.g., Canada, New Zealand,
Hawaii), ordered substantial comprehensive "lockdowns" as a means of retarding the spread
of the disease. See, e.g., Lauren Vogel, COVID-19: A Timeline of Canada's First-wave
Response,
CAN.
MED.
ASS'N
J.
NEWS
(June
12,
2020),
https://cmajnews.com/2020/06/12/coronavirus-1095847; Alexis Robert, Lessons from New
Zealand's COVID-19 Outbreak Response, THE LANCET (November 1, 2020),
https://www.thelancet.com/joumals/lanpub/article/PII52468-2667(20)30237-1/fulltext;
Alejandro de la Garza, HawaiiIs Riding Out the COVID-19 Storm. But GeographicIsolation
Isn't the Blessing it May Seem,
TIE
(Nov.
25, 2020
10:07 AM),
https://time.com/5915084/hawaii-covid-coronavirus/. Others, such as Sweden, adopted a
system of modified restrictions that varied among states. Mariam Claeson & Stefan Hanson,
COVID-19 and the Swedish Enigma, THE LANCET
(January 23, 2021),
https://www.thelancet.com/joumals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)32750-1/fulltext.
5 The World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic on March 11,
2020. See WHO Characterizes COVID-19 as a Pandemic, WHO (Mar. 11, 2020),
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/events-as-they-happen
(providing a timeline of COVID-19 developments and quoting WHO Director-General that
the organization has "made the assessment that COVID-19 can be characterized as a
pandemic" and is "the first pandemic caused by a coronavirus. And we have never before
seen a pandemic that can be controlled, at the same time."). See also Natasha
Frost, Coronavirus, QAnon, Trump: Your Monday Briefing, N.Y. TimEs (Oct. 11,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/11/briefing/coronavirus-qanon-trump-yourmonday-briefing.html ("More than six months since the start of the pandemic, European
countries such as France, Spain and Britain are reporting daily infection numbers comparable
to-and sometimes far beyond-those of their first peaks.").
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closure orders barring access to and operation of many facilities deemed
insufficiently essential.6
The governmental orders varied, of course. Some demanded a stronger or
more comprehensive shutdown than others. But many, if not most, precluded normal
operation of "nonessential" business functions, perhaps most prominently indoor
dining and entertainment, under pain of punishment for violation.' Within days of
government recognition (now widely seen as belated) that COVID was highly
contagious and dangerous,' insurance claims for business interruption were widely
anticipated with additional anticipated coverage controversy involving other
insurance products. The insurance coverage community was abuzz about the topic
throughout Spring 2020, attention that continues only slightly abated today. 9
Lawsuits followed relatively quickly, numbering more than 1,000 by Fall 2020.1'

to

6 See French, supra note 4; Terry Spencer & Teresa Crawford, US Moves Nearer
Shutdown Amid Coronavirus Fears, AP (Mar. 16, 2020), apnews.com/article/

1510caddee80ea2d73363fab76d55967

("Officials across the country curtailed many

elements of American life to fight the coronavirus outbreak... Governors and mayors closed
restaurants, bars, and schools as the nation sank deeper into chaos.").
' See infra Part I(B) and Part II.
8See Death Rates from Coronavirus (COVID-19) in the United States as of December
22, 2020, by State, STATISTA (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/
1109011/coronavisure-covidl9-death-rates-by-state (noting that, as of December 22, 2020,
more than 319,000 American deaths were attributed to COVID-19 from a total of more than
20 million infections). Visible case studies of COVID-19 dangers were chronicled in often
heart-wrenching news reports, see, e.g., Those We've Lost, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/obituaries/people-died-coronavirusobituaries.html (discussing as a regular feature in the Times since the onset of the pandemic),
as well as being demonstrated rather dramatically and contemporaneously when President
Donald Trump, three US Senators, White House employees, and Secret Service agents were
afflicted during late September and early October 2020. The President was treated by a large
team of physicians utilizing an array of antibiotics, steroids, and supplemental oxygen during
the President's 3-day hospitalization, with continuing treatment after discharge. See Katie
Thomas & Denise Grady, Trump Returns Home After Downplaying Disease, but Doctor
Says He Isn't 'Out of the Woods, 'N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 7, 2020, 1:38 AM),
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/10/05/world/covid-trump; Maggie Haberman & Annie
Karni, Trump's Return Leaves White House in Disarrayas Infections Jolt West Wing, N.Y.
TimES (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/06/us/politics/white-housecoronavirus.html.
9 See infra Part II.
10 See Tom Baker, COVID Coverage Litigation Tracker,
cclt.law.upenn.edu/author/tombaker/ (last visited December 31, 2020).
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In the early spring days of the pandemic, the insurance industry began a
remarkable media campaign to make known its position on the issue of coverage for
virus-related losses: there is no coverage. In insurance industry publications, in
lawyers' news media, and even in the news media consumed by the general public,
the message of "no coverage for pandemic losses" was repeated again and again.
This lies in stark contrast to the treatment of coverage for COVID-related losses in
other jurisdictions such as Western Europe. But in America, however, the insurance
industry repeated the mantra.
Policyholders only had to open a newspaper to see how the industry was
advancing their views that claims would be denied, imposing motions to dismiss, at
least before presumably favorable tribuinals. And insurers began to win. Those wins
were reported and highlighted in the media. This anti-coverage public relations
media blitz forms a curious backdrop to what actually occurred in courts across the
United States deciding COVID-related claims. In short, as this article discusses
below, courts often fell short in their analyses in these coverage cases, ignoring timetested principles of insurance policy interpretation and even of basic civil litigation
rules. The spectre of the anti-coverage media blitz may well have primed the
judiciary for the results to come.
By January 2021, roughly seventy-five of these cases had some sort of
substantive court decision, most commonly the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, particularly the latter, pro-insurer result." Insurers
prevailed in sixty-seven of the seventy-five cases, with courts granting Rule 12(b)(6)
(or its state equivalent) dismissal on the basis of a lack of sufficiently triggering
damage, a virus exclusion that ousts coverage, or both.1 2 The speed of these
decisions and the success of insurers should be regarded-at least on the triggering
damage question-as surprising and erroneous.1 3 Although insurers have a
significant array of arguments against coverage, we find them considerably less
powerful than suggested by insurers and accepted by many judges to date."
" Id. In what might be termed the "first wave" of COVID-19 property insurance and
business interruption cases, the majority have been brought by policyholders as plaintiffs
rather than by insurers seeking a declaratory judgment of no coverage. For clarity, this
article will generally use the term "policyholders" to include both named insureds and all
other insureds under a policy unless insured status is important to determination of a
coverage issue.
12 See Baker, supra note 10.
"3 See infra Part IV.
's See infra Part III. This is not to say that insurers deserve none of these early victories.
Where policies contain a sufficiently broad virus exclusion, the facts of many cases will
likely make the exclusion applicable and support a finding of no coverage. As Professor
Baker has noted:
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In our view, each insurance coverage case needs to be decided based upon
not only its particular factual context but also according to the specific policy at
issue. Some policies contain a virus exclusion (which of course makes a stronger,
perhaps even irrefutable, case for no coverage)" while many others lack any such
limitation on coverage-a factor strongly favoring policyholders.16 But the "early
returns" point toward excessively impulsive and overbroad (in our view) embrace

Of the seven cases in which a merits-based motion to dismiss has been
denied, four involve insurance policies without any virus exclusion, one
involves the Hartford's Endorsement for Limited Fungi, Bacteria, or Virus
Coverage (which contains a virus exclusion that could be read to apply
only to losses involving defective materials), and two have virus
exclusions that apply to sickness or disease.
By contrast, of the eighteen cases in which a court has granted a
merits-based motion to dismiss, only two don't have virus exclusions.
This matters, among other reasons because the presence of a virus
exclusion inhibits policyholders from pleading their cases in ways that
would help them meet the requirement that their business income losses
result from "physical loss of or damage to" the premises in question.
Bottom line [as of Oct. 7, 2020]: insurers are winning,
overwhelmingly, when their polices have virus exclusions. But they are
losing, at least at the motion to dismiss stage, when their policies do not
have virus exclusions.
Baker, supra note 10. We are, as discussed in Part IV, nonetheless disturbed by many of
these early insurer victory cases because of their superficial and weak reasoning taking an
excessively narrow view of what constitutes "physical loss or damage," which may have
negative implications for future coverage disputes.
15 See infra Part
V.
16 If nothing else, the presence of an exclusion implies, sometimes strongly in
light of
the language of the insuring agreement, that in the absence of an exclusion, a claim or loss
is covered. As discussed in Part IV, the virus exclusion was developed to avoid potential
coverage pursuant to standard issue policies. If the insuring agreement or other exclusions in
those policies had sufficiently precluded coverage, there logically would have been no need
for a specific virus exclusion. We appreciate that insurers may want a "belt and suspenders"
approach to policy drafting and that exclusions in some cases may be added simply to solidify
widely accepted understandings and to foreclose unrepresentative judicial construction of
policies. But courts should also appreciate that just as often (or perhaps more frequently),
exclusions are added to policies because the policies provide coverage in the absence of such
exclusions.
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of an insurer-sponsored conventional wisdom that COVID claims are simply not
insured. 7
In particular, we are unimpressed with insurer arguments that COVID and
attendant government closure orders do not-as a matter of law-constitute "direct
physical loss or damage" to covered property. To date, the majority ofjudges hearing
COVID cases disagree. Although their views are positive law and ours are not, we
remain disappointed in the quality of analysis applied in many of the COVID
coverage cases, which has often been reductionist, simplistic, crabbed, and
overconfident regarding textual analysis, as well as insufficiently sensitive to the
value of trial proceedings for resolving these disputes.18
Judges granting dismissal motions without any opportunity for discovery,
and denying any possibility of coverage at the metaphorical starting gate, have
undermined the traditional American commitment to jury trials as well as widely
accepted legal principles of insurance policy construction such as interpreting
ambiguous terms against the drafter and considering policyholder reasonable
expectations.19 Where the issue is solely whether sufficient "loss" or "damage" has
taken place, standard property insurance policy language is simply not as conclusive
as purported by these courts. Although other defenses such as a virus exclusion may
carry the day for some insurers, insurers have to date gotten much more mileage out
of very weak "no-loss/no-damage" arguments than should be the case if trial judges
were consistently doing a thorough job.

'7
Consistent with discussion in Part II of this article regarding the (in our view)
successful public relations efforts of insurers to paint COVID-19 business interruption
claims as (to use a favorite phrase of the former President Trump) losers, the legal and
insurance trade press has tended to under-report policyholder victories while giving
significant attention to insurer victories, emphasizing judicial statements labeling
policyholder coverage arguments as meritless. Having followed the legal and trade press
thoroughly the pandemic, we were surprised upon reading Professor Baker's COVID
Coverage Litigation Tracker to find that policyholders had "prevailed" on as many dismissal
motions as they have (which is still a tiny fraction of the total number of motions). Baker,
supra note 10. We put the term "prevailed" in scare quotes to emphasize that that surviving
a motion to dismiss is not the equivalent of obtaining coverage-and certainly does not
reflect payments that small business policyholders state they desperately need to survive. By
contrast, when an insurer obtains a Rule 12 dismissal, it really has won something. In all
eighteen cases where insurers have to date prevailed on dismissal motions, the court has
dismissed the entire case with prejudice, leaving the policyholder with the unattractive
options of appeal or accepting defeat.
18 See infra Part IV.
19 See infra id.
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Potentially aiding and abetting this judicial failure has been substandard
briefing and advocacy by policyholder counsel, many of whom are not insurance
specialists but tort lawyers prosecuting coverage cases with perhaps relatively little
experience or expertise about the nuances of insurance coverage law. 20 In many of
the cases with outcomes we criticize, insurers have been served by better advocacy,
an important factor in cases where judges also lack insurance expertise. In some
other cases, a judge's background formerly representing insurers may also
foreshadow pro-insurer rulings. 2 1 But we also posit that the bench was probably
affected by widespread insurer efforts to "poison the well" against COVID-19
coverage claims through an early onslaught of pro-insurer, anti-coverage
commentary in the legal press, the insurance trade press, and in mass circulation
media. 2 2
A more extensive and nuanced analysis of COVID coverage issues suggests
to us that policyholders should be winning most of these dismissal motion casesat least on the loss and damage issues-and proceeding further in the adjudication
process. Notwithstanding some shining exceptions, 23 the first wave of decisions in
these cases has been largely disappointing and reflects poorly on the legal and hypertextual analysis of the bench. If this trend continues, the insurance industry will have
Insurers have taken the rare step of filing memoranda opposing amicus participation
in Covid coverage cases, presumably because they wish the court not to have the benefit of
analysis by more seasoned coverage counsel. See, e.g., Defendant's Opposition to United
Policyholders, National Independent Venue Association, and Washington Hospitality
Association's Motion for Leave to Appear as Amici Curiae, Vita Coffee, LLC v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., No. 2:20-cv-01079-JCC-DWC (W.D. Wash. 2020) (noted insurer side law
firm opposes, inter alia, submission of United Policyholders amicus brief authored by
Covington & Burling partner David Goodwin, a prominent policyholder coverage attorney).
21 See, e.g., Franklin EWC, Inc. v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., No. 20-cv-04434 JSC, 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174010 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2020) (granting of an insurer's dismissal
motion by Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley, formerly at DLA Piper, a firm known
for representing insurers that has been involved in COVID coverage litigation, sufficiently
aggressively that it has opposed judicial consideration of a proffered amicus brief by United
Policyholders. See also infra Part II.
22 By legal press, we refer to media directed primarily at lawyers, such as US Law
Week, Law 360 and the like. By insurance trade press, we refer to periodicals such
as Insurance Journal, Business Insurance, National Underwriter, Best's Review and
electronic newsletters, bulletins, and blogs (e.g., Randy Maniloff's Coverage Opinions or
the Hunton & Williams newsletters). General circulation media is aimed primarily at
laypersons and runs the gamut from individual blogs or websites to major newspapers of
record.
20

23

See infra Part IV(A) (discussing well-reasoned cases finding sufficient allegations of

physical loss or damage for coverage claim to proceed).
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obtained an undeserved victory that is inconsistent with the extent of coverage it
promised to policyholders, particularly small businesses.
The remainder of this part of the article examines the risk management and
insurability issues presented by pandemic claims and identifies the principal types
of first-party property insurance that could be implicated. Part II recaps the
remarkable public relations campaign of insurers designed to influence both judicial
and lay perception of insurance coverage for COVID-related losses. Part III
examines the crucial coverage issues of whether there has been direct physical loss
or damage sufficient to create coverage, acknowledging that coverage may be taken
away by certain virus exclusions or other aspects of the policy or situation. Part IV
briefly raises the virus exclusion contained in many policies and some challenges
with it.
We conclude with concerns regarding the success of a tightly packaged,
insidiously executed, and albeit factually and legally incorrect adversarial position
put forth in insurance media may well have affected the initial outcomes of COVIDrelated coverage litigation. While we of course hope that to be untrue, when one
begins to stack together some of the bizarre and frankly un-judicial goings on in
these early COVID coverage cases, one has to wonder whether and to what degree
concerted insurer-directed media infected the judicial outcomes. If true, that lays a
haunting precedent over future coverage litigation for insurance matters both about
pandemic-related losses and beyond.
B.

CONSIDERING

COVID

COVERAGE

DISPUTES

IN

THE

BROADER

CONTEXT OF THE INSURABILITY OF PANDEMIC-RELATED LOSSES

A pandemic is a "clash event," 24 like a war or nuclear accident. Losses
flowing from this event are large, uniformly repeated amongst many policyholders,
and simultaneously cut across multiple insurance product lines. Insurance is built as
a risk-based product, designed to buffer chance happenings of loss-related events by
pooling collective risk in a pool while knowing that not all policyholders in that risk
pool will experience a loss at exactly the same time.
With a pandemic, "chance" may be frustrated in that the precise manner in
which risks become losses may not be fully expected (or rather modelled) by
insurers. This makes it difficult for the insurer to spread risk amongst the risk pool
or even amongst various lines of insurance products. While some industries in a
24 Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance,
93
GEO. L.J. 783, 784 (2004) (dubbing "clash events" those large-scale losses like earthquakes
and nuclear disasters that affect many policyholders at once and cut across multiple insurance
lines).
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pandemic can be severely affected (like the travel and hospitality industries in the
current COVID-19 pandemic), and most at least significantly affected (such as
retailers and services), there will be some industries that actually thrive in a
pandemic (such as online retailers and delivery services). It may be fair to argue that
it is the job of insurers to predict and price their insurance products accordingly, as
part of building a solvent insurance framework. A failure to incorrectly build and
price insurance in the wake of a clash event can leave only two outcomes: financial
decimation for either the policyholder or the insurer. The stakes are high.
In a pandemic situation like that with COVID-19, a downturn in commercial
activity is also often related to a resulting downturn in the financial markets. This
challenges an insurer's ability to capitalize on investment returns for its retained
insurance premium funds. The differential between premiums obtained and losses
paid out-the spread-becomes tougher to profitably manage, because the financial
markets unexpected reacted as a result of the very factor causing the losses insured.
But losses realized in a pandemic are not, by nature, impossible to insure.
The difficulty is with estimating the correct pricing of the insurance products that
tracks the realistic risks of payouts while still maintaining a profitable baseline for
the insurer.
Anything that is fortuitous can be insured, in principle. The pandemic is an
unexpected event. Whether insurers choose to insure pandemic-related losses as a
matter of commercial choice is, of course, itself another matter.
Pandemic-relating losses are insurable in theory because the timing of the
pandemic itself is a fortuitous event. We do not know when-or if-one will strike.
But even in the wake of a full-blown pandemic, there are still fortuitous aspects
making insurance a potentially profitable financial product to sell. Because, as noted
above, not all industries will be affected at the same time and to the same degree,
insurers may still be able to structure and price insurance profitably, even during a
full-blown pandemic. This is because the degree and extent of loss experienced
amongst individual policyholders is fortuitous. In fact, some policyholders may
profit from the pandemic in their specific industries and may have no loss at all.
An insurer's ability to properly price an insurance product that appropriately
accounts for pandemic-related losses based on the underwriting risk involves three
factors:
a) can the insurer properly rate the risk?
b) is the premium for the risk affordable to policyholders?
c) will the premium (along with investment income) exceed the
loss?
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As has probably occurred with COVID, insurance products were likely
priced with the foresight of only a slight possibility of a pandemic. The insurer model
may not have accounted for the various kinds of losses amongst policyholders (i.e.
largely business interruption losses from governmental orders either closing
businesses or telling customers to shelter at home to quell the spread of the virus).
Insurers cannot claim that the pandemic was completely unforeseen as an
event. The world has seen its share of rising health epidemics in the recent decades,
from Ebola to SARS to HIN1, swine flu, Zika, MERS, and HIV/AIDS. In fact, the
insurance industry had a virus and bacteria exclusion approved by regulators for
inclusion in property insurance policies in 2006, in direct response to the SARS virus
(though this exclusion is not featured in all property policies). 25 The insurance
industry also marketed specific insurance for pandemic-related losses, a product still
available at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020.26
However, most insurers began the COVID-19 pandemic with blanket
coverage denials for policyholders' COVID-related claims. And insurers did this not
on the basis of the virus exclusion most logically relevant to the issue, but instead
on the argument that the policyholder has suffered no physical loss or damage.
The insurance denials prompted some governments to propose legislation to
mandate either government reinsurance for pandemic-related losses, 27 or insist that
insurers cover such losses, even despite actual policy coverage wording. 28 In

25

INSURANCE SERVICE OFFICE, ISO FORM CP

01

40

07 06

- EXCLUSION OF LOSS DUE

TO VIRUS OR BACTERIA (July 6, 2006) [hereinafter ISO VIRUS EXCLUSION],
https://www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw.com/files/2020/03/ISO-Circular-LI-CF-2006175-Virus.pdf (mentioning specifically SARS, avian flu, and influenza, as well as anthrax).
26
See, e.g., PathogenRX An Innovative Solution for Pandemic and Epidemic Risks,
MARSH, https://www.marsh.com/us/campaigns/pathogenrx.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2021)
(which had almost no take-up prior to COVID-19); Stuart Collins, Insurers Wary ofMeeting
Growing Demand for Specialist Pandemic Cover, COM. RISK ONLINE (Apr. 9,
2020), https://www.commercialriskonline.com/insurers-wary-meeting-growing-demandGreg Niehaus & Joseph
specialist-pandemic-cover/; see also Robert Hartwig,
Qiu, Insurancefor Economic Losses Caused by Pandemics, 45 GENEVA RISK & INS. REV.
134, 138 (2020) (discussing the failed PathogenRX market).
27 See, e.g., Pandemic Risk Insurance Act of 2020, H.R. 6983, 116th Cong.
(2020).
28 Various state governments in New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Ohio,
Massachusetts, and South Carolina all proposed bills mandating that insurers cover COVID19 pandemic-related losses. See, e.g., The Gen. Assemb. of Pa., H.B. 2372, 2020 Sess. (Pa.
2020) ("Business Interruption Insurance Act"); State of N.Y. Assemb., A. 10226-B, 2020
Assemb. (N.Y. 2020) ("An Act in relation to requiring certain perils be covered under
business interruption insurance during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic"); State of N.Y. Senate, S. 8178, 2020 S. (N.Y. 2020) ("An Act in relation to
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response, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) warned in
correspondence to the U.S. House Committee on Small Business that such
legislation requiring insurers to cover COVID-19 related losses would financially
decimate the insurance industry. 29 The Insurance Commissioners argued that most
insurance products were not designed or priced to provide coverage for pandemicrelated losses. They also contended that "virtually every policyholder suffers
significant losses at the same time." But pandemic-related losses themselves are not
uninsurable in principle. Insurers may just not have properly estimated how the
particular losses of this pandemic have played out and may not have priced their
products accordingly. Or, perhaps, the insurance products were not designed to
cover pandemic-related losses at all.
C.

INSURANCE IMPLICATED IN A PANDEMIC

A pandemic such as the COVID crisis can result in insurance claims across a
variety of insurance product lines, including:
a) property insurance, especially for contamination losses and
business interruption losses, as well as losses arising from civil
authority 'stay at home' orders or forced business closure
orders;
b) liability insurance, in the event an employee or customer takes
legal action against the policyholder for injury suffered as a
result of failure to take reasonable health precautions;
c) workers compensation and employment insurance, for the
sickness or quarantining or isolation of employees;
d) directors and officers insurance, for any liability visited by
corporate decisions as a result of the pandemic; and
e) event cancellation insurance, triggered if a major event is
cancelled (such as a sporting event or concert or film
production).

requiring certain perils be covered under business interruption insurance during the
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic"). These bills are currently winding their
way through the legislative processes.
29 Letter from Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs and the Cntr for Ins. Pol'y & Rsch to The
Honorable Nydia M. Veliquez, Chairwoman, U.S. House Committee on Small Business
(May 20, 2020), https://naic.org/documents/governmentrelations_200521.pdf.
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Business Interruption Coverage

The most active area for insurance coverage issues at this stage of the
COVID-19 pandemic has been litigation arising from business losses by commercial
entities, as a result of policyholder claims for losses under business interruption and
civil authority insurance provisions. This has triggered interpretive debates in the
courts over the meaning of business interruption and civil authority coverage
contained in commercial property policies. These types of insurance products are
additional coverages to the standard all-risk commercial property insurance policy.30
The standard commercial property policy provides coverage for losses
arising from all risks to the policyholder's commercial property, save and except
those risks that are specifically excluded in the policy. As a separate add-on, usually
as an endorsement and for additional premiums, the policyholder can augment its
property policy with various types of insurance coverage for other potential
business-related losses. 31
One such potential business-related loss is the interruption of a business'
potential to generate income. This type of coverage is designed to protect the earning
stream of the business in the event the business' capacity to earn income is
interrupted as a result of a covered cause of loss. The coverage indemnifies the
policyholder for income lost while the building restores its operations. 32
The coverage clause in the standard property policy typically covers "direct
physical loss of or damage to" insured property. 33 The business interruption
coverage clause typically dictates that the insurer will pay for the loss of business
income "due to the necessary suspension or delay of operations caused by direct
physical loss of or damage to property." To determine insurance coverage, the
policyholder must prove it suffered some "direct physical loss of or damage to
property." The archetypal scenario for triggering business interruption insurance is
the fire at a commercial establishment. The fire damages the storefront and the

30

See French, supra note 4, at 17-20; MARK S. DORFMAN & DAVID A.
CATHER,

INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 346-47 (10th ed. 2013); EMMETT J.
VAUGHAN & THERESE M. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 563-65

(11th ed. 2013).
31 See French, supra note 4, at 21-30; DORFMAN & CATHER, supra note 30, at 346-47;
VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 30, at 563-65.
32 See French, supra note 4, at 21-30; DORFMAN & CATHER, supra note 30, at 346-47;
VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 30, at 563-65.
33 See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL & ERIK S. KNUTSEN, STEMPEL

COVERAGE §15.01[D] (4th ed. 2015 & Supp. 2020).
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business is unable to earn income until such time as the business can repair the firedamaged storefront.
In a pandemic situation like COVID, however, the place of business is not
physically destroyed but contaminated by virus, making use of the business property
unsafe. Alternatively, access to the business' property may be curtailed due to
governmental orders designed to curb the spread of the disease. For example, many
restaurants have been ordered closed to dine-in customers and could only operate
via take-out or delivery for a period of time. The question becomes whether the
policyholder has suffered a "direct physical loss of or damage to" its commercial
property by either contamination by virus or by a governmental order restricting
property access or use.
Insurers will likely stress that commercial property policies are designed to
cover physical damage to tangible property-like fire damage. One way of looking
at the issue is that any loss of business income should be tied to the necessary
interruption of a business' income stream as a result of something that harms the
property in a way that would interfere with a policyholder using its property as a
place to earn income. If the property itself is not damaged, the coverage should not
be triggered.34
Policyholders, however, likely believe that they purchased business
interruption insurance as an add-on to their property coverage in order to insure a
capital asset-the income-earning power of their business (hence the name
"business interruption insurance"). If that income stream is interrupted due to an
interference with their use of their property-whether by virus contamination or by
orders of government-their reasonable expectation would be that the business
interruption portion of their policy would cover such losses. The property policy is,
after all, "all-risk" property insurance, and the business interruption coverage is tied
to that "all-risk" concept. Policyholders who purchased business interruption
insurance would expect coverage for an inability to use their property to earn
business income.35
2.

Civil Authority Coverage

A common extension to the business interruption coverage in a commercial
property policy is civil authority coverage. Under this coverage, a policyholder can
insure its lost business income stream if access to its property is impaired or
prohibited due to the order of some civil authority (i.e. a government). Some
wordings of this coverage specifically require that the civil authority's order is due
34
35

See French, supra note 4, at 51.
See French, supra note 4, at 68-71.

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

200

Vol. 27

to the direct physical loss of or damage to property adjacent to the policyholder's
insured property as a result of a covered cause. A common coverage clause for civil
authority insurance states: " . . . if an order of civil or military authority limits,
restricts or prohibits partial or total access . . provided such order is the direct result
of physical damage of the type insured."36 The classic example is the burned
warehouse that sits next to the policyholder's place of business. To keep people in
the adjacent properties safe, a civil authority could ban access to a policyholder's
property simply because it is close to another property exhibiting unsafe
characteristics (like the unstable structure after a fire).
Business interruption insurance claims due to COVID have arisen under the
civil authority coverage provisions, resulting from losses due to state or municipal
"shelter in place" orders or the closure of non-essential businesses or the
modification of the use of businesses, such as eliminating indoor dining at
restaurants. The risk of COVID with its airborne and highly contagious quality
prompted many civil authorities to issue various orders in an attempt to contain the
disease.
Courts examining civil authority coverage tend to look to causation
arguments: was the order the result of directly physical loss of or damage to
property? If so, is such a covered cause of loss? Policyholders have argued that they
suffered loss of use or loss of functionality of their property due to the civil authority
orders, and that constitutes a direct physical loss of property. However, insurers have
argued that the language of most coverage grants demands that policyholders must
also prove that alleged property damage to some property adjacent to the
policyholder's place of business actually led to the civil authority making the order.
3.

Contingent Business Interruption Coverage

Contingent business interruption coverage is similar to business interruption
coverage except that the policyholder's income stream is affected by loss or damage
to a related business' property, and not the property of the policyholder. This
coverage is commonly implicated in a manufacturer setting, where a supplier suffers
a loss and the manufacturer cannot obtain a needed component in a timely fashion
and suffers a business interruption. 37
For example, if a tire manufacturer suffers a fire at the tire plant and is
unable to ship its tires to auto makers because of fire damage to the plant, the auto
makers will likely have a business interruption loss due to the inability to get tires
36

See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 33, at §28.04.

37 See French, supra note 4, at 21-30; Dorfman & Cather, supra note 30, at 346-47;

Vaughan & Vaughan, supra note 30, at 563-65.
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in a timely manner from their supplier. The auto maker can then make a contingent
business interruption claim in that, although it did not suffer the loss itself on its own
property, its supplier did, and that loss to the supplier affected the policyholder's
own business income stream. The key to coverage for contingent business
interruption insurance is that, like business interruption insurance, the supplier must
have suffered some "direct physical loss of or damage to" property as a result of a
cause covered by the policyholder's all-risk insurance.
4.

Ingress/Egress Coverage

Ingress/egress coverage is also sub-coverage that may be included in
business interruption coverage. It provides coverage for losses arising if access to a
policyholder's property is impeded through some reason other than by a civil
authority order (i.e. blocked due to construction debris). To date, this coverage has
not yet been implicated in any court decisions deciding COVID pandemic-related
coverage issues. This makes sense as it was civil authority orders that largely
affected property access for policyholders.
II.

INSURER PUBLIC RELATIONS BLITZ: INSURERS PUSH THEIR
ANTI-COVERAGE MESSAGE

As previously noted, COVID-19 became recognized as a major public
health issue likely to adversely impact commerce in early March 2020. It was fairly
clear at the outset, particularly when citizens began to stockpile supplies and stay
indoors and when governments issued closure orders, that COVID would have a
serious negative impact on many businesses, particularly entertainment, dining, and
tourism. 38
1-3; Why Are Markets Collapsing? How
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/why-are-the-markets-collapsing-how-badwill-covid-19-really-be ("markets are acting as if we are going to encounter the worst-case
scenario") (italics removed). The actual downturn in these areas of commerce has perhaps
been even worse than anticipated due to the difficulty in containing COVID, resulting in a
quilted cycle of closures and declining customer patronage that has perhaps lasted even
longer than predicted. See Zoe Wood, How the Cineworld Closures Could Turn Leisure
Parks into a Disaster Movie, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2020 03:00 EDT),
https://www.theguardian. com/business/2020/oct/10/how-the-cineworld-closures-couldturn-leisure-parks-into-a-disaster-movie (describing massive movie theatre closures and
layoffs and ripple effect on bars, restaurants, and shops that benefitted from entertainment
traffic). Accord Julian Kozlowski, Laura Veldkamp, & Venky Venkateswaran,
38

Bad

See French,

Will

supra note 4, at

COVID-19 Really Be?,
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In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, insurers quickly took control of the
insurance coverage message in the media: there will be no coverage for COVID-19
related losses. 39 Typical of the industry line were statements by insurance executives
that "[p]andemics are not insurable because they are too widespread, severe, and
unpredictable to underwrite" and that "[c]ommercial-property insurance policies
that include business-interruption coverage generally are not intended to cover
disease- or pandemic-related losses." 40
Another prominent insurer executive claimed to "see very minimal loss
exposure from this" due to the addition of coverage-restricting language in policies

-

Scarring Body and Mind: The Long-Term Belief-Scarring Effects of COVID-19 (Nat'l
Bureau
of
Econ.
Rsch.,
Working
Paper
No.
27439,
June
2020),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/workingpapers/w27439/w27439.pdf
(finding
that
"long-run costs for the U.S. economy" from adverse psychological impact of pandemic will
be "many times higher than the estimates of the short-run losses in output. This suggests
that, even if a vaccine cures everyone in a year, the COVID-19 crisis will leave its mark on
the US economic for many years to come.").
39 See, e.g., Caroline Glen, Insurers Are Telling Businesses Their Policies Don't Cover
Coronavirus Shutdown. John Morgan Attorneys Say They're Wrong, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (May 4, 2020), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/coronavirus/jobs-economy/osbz-coronavirus-insurance-denials-morgan-lawsuits-20200504pbrpq6z7ofbevau67cpgg4nzqi-story.html; Ellen Ioanes, Does My Business-Interruption
Insurance Cover Closing Because of COVID-19?, BARRON'S (June 17, 2020 5:30
AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/does-my-business-interruption-insurance-coverclosing-because-of-covid-19-51592386201; Leslie Scism, Companies Hit by COVID-19
Want Insurance Payouts. InsurersSay No., WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2020 10:24 AM),
https://www.wsj. com/articles/companies-hit-by-covid- 19-want-insurance-payouts-insurerssay-no-11593527047. See also INS. INFO. INST., Insurance Industry ProvidesInteractive
'Explainer'to Help Navigate Business InterruptionInsurance, zii (Oct. 16, 2020),
https://www. iii.org/pres-release/insurance-industry-porovides-interactive-explainer-tohelp-navigate-business-interruption-insurance-101620.
The navigation tends to leave
policyholders on the shoals of no coverage as the III Explainer consistently takes a narrow
view of the scope of coverage and, in particular, contends that most all COVID-related
coverage is not covered. Accord Business InterruptionInsurance: An Interactive Explainer
Outlining the Case for a Federal Solution to Pandemic Relief, FUTURE
REINSURANCE,
https://fairinsure.org/business-interruptionOF
AM.
INS.
&
insurance/?utm_source=Board+of+Directors&utm_campaign=5ca 103 85b4
EMAILCAMPAIGN_2018_08_15_11_45_COPY_01&utmmedium=email&utmterm=

0_0934a86008-5ca10385b4-122588685.
40 See Ioanes, supra note 39 (quoting David Sampson, president and CEO of the
American Property Casualty Insurance Association (APCIA)).
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because of "past pandemics and/or partial pandemics." 4 ' Swinging into attack mode,
this industry leader also took the by-now almost obligatory insurer swipe at plaintiff
counsel and made it clear that seeking coverage would not be for the faint of heart:
"Lawyers and the trial bar will attempt to torture the language on standard industry
forms and try to prove something exists that actually doesn't exist . . . ." "The
industry will fight this tooth and nail. We will pay what we owe. "42
Whether this evolved to be the message over a short period of time, or
whether it was a concerted industry effort (likely the latter), we believe it made an
impact on the subsequent insurance coverage court decisions about COVID-related
claims. It provides an interesting example of insurers seizing the messaging
opportunity to potentially affect legal decisions. Making use of extra-legal media
messaging to impact the legal sphere is a useful tactic for prospective litigants and
insurers seem to be good at it.

41 See Leslie Scism, U.S. Businesses Gear Up for Legal Disputes with Insurers
Over Coronavirus Claims, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2020 10:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/u-s-businesses-gear-up-for-legal-disputes-with-insurers-over-coronavirus-claims11583465668 (quoting Chubb Ltd. CEO Evan Greenberg, however "Chubb declined to
comment further" on the issue when asked by the Journal reporter). See also Maria Sassian,
Triple-I CEO Tells U.S. House-GlobalPandemics are Uninsurable, INS. INFO. INST. (May
21, 2020), https://www.iii.org/insuranceindustryblog/triple-i-ceo-tells-u-s-house-globalpandemics-are-uninsurable/ ("'An event like a global pandemic is uninsurable [said the
executive.] Unlike a typical covered catastrophe, which is limited in terms of geography and
time, pandemics have the potential to impact everywhere, all at once .... As such, this type
of magnitude requires government resources to step in and provide support.").
42 See Scism, supra note 39 (quoting Chubb Ltd. CEO Evan Greenberg).
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Media targets included both the legal press, 43 the insurance trade press44 as well as
the business press, 45 and even the mainstream lay press read by the average public 46
43 See,
e.g., Larry P. Schiffer, Does the Novel Coronavirus Cause Direct
Physical Loss of or Damage to Property?, NAT'L L. REV. (July 13, 2020),
https://www.natllawreview.com/article (concluding that "[b]ased on the case law and the
nature of the novel coronavirus, it appears unlikely that courts will conclude that viral
contamination causes 'direct physical loss."'); Insurers' COVID-19 Notepad:
What You Need to Know Now, CROWELL MORING (June 9, 2020),
https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/all/Insurers-COVID-19-NotepadWhat-You-Need-to-Know-Now-Week-of-June-8 (suggesting that coverage unlikely for
COVID-related claims); Lauraann Wood, Insurer Says Policy Isn't Triggered
in
COVID-19
Coverage Suit,
LAw360
(July
14,
2020
3:56
PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1291736/insurer-says-policy-isn-t-triggered-in-covid-19coverage-suit.

Even if the virus had been present on the covered businesses'
properties, it wouldn't constitute direct physical loss or damage because it
doesn't cause 'a tangible change to the physical characteristics of
property,' [the insurer argued]. COVID-19 isn't incorporated into their
properties' physical structure, doesn't require a building's physical
alteration for removal 'and does not render the building unfit for use,' it
said.
'Rather, the coronavirus can be removed from surfaces with soap and
water and rendered inert with various common household disinfectants,
including bleach,' [said the insurer.] '[The insureds'] alleged losses are at
most economic losses, not a direct physical loss or damage.'
The businesses also aren't entitled to coverage under the civil authority
provision for additional coverage under their policies, which 'has a very
specific set of terms and conditions that must be met,' [the insurer
represented to the court.]
Wood, supra.
44 See, e.g., Jeff Dunsavage, COVID-19 Wrap-up: BI Coverage Continues
to Make Headlines, TRIPLE-I BLOG (May 21, 2020),
https://www.iii.org/
insuranceindustryblog/covid-19-wrap-upbi-coverage-continues-to-make-headlines
("The
Post interviewed Triple-I CEO Sean Kevelighan and Triple-I non-resident scholar Michael
Menapace, who explained why the suits are unreasonable and threaten the insurance
industry's solvency. 'The insurance business works by spreading risk around so the industry
isn't hit all at once with claims,' Kevelighan says. 'A pandemic disrupts business far and
wide, with no end date in sight."'); Focus on Facts, Not Media Misinformation: Berkley,
CARRIER MGMT (June 7, 2020), https://www.carriennanagement.com/news/2020/06/07/
207575.htm?print ("Arguing that the media has been fed misinformation by
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the plaintiffs bar, the chief executive officer of a property/casualty insurer said facts will win
out on debates over business interruption coverage disputes related to COVID-19
shutdowns.") (referring to W. Robert Berkley, Jr., president and CEO of WR Berkley);
Stephan Kahl, Munich Re to Stop Selling Pandemic Business Coverage, INS. J. (Sept. 11,
2020),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2020/09/11/582141.htm;
Beazley Hikes Estimatefor COVID-19 Related Claims Amid Resurgence in Virus, SHARES
MAG.
(Sept.
22,
2020 07:30),
https://www.sharesmagazine.co.uk/news/market/
7092096/Beazley-hikes-estimate-for-Covid-19-related-claims-amid-resurgence-in-virus
(estimating range of exposure from $170 to $350 million net of reinsurance).
5 See, e.g., Leslie Scism, U.S. Businesses Gear Up for Legal Disputes with Insurers
Over Coronavirus Claims, WALL ST.
J.
(Mar.
6,
2020
10:00
AM),
https://www.wsj. com/articles/u-s-businesses-gear-up-for-legal-disputes-with-insurers-overcoronavirus-claims-11583465668; Ioanes, supra note 39; Katherine Chiglinsky, Virus Fight
Insurers Thought They'd Dodged Is Looming Anyway, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2020 11:20
AM), https://www.washingtonpost https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-smallbusiness/virus-fight-insurers-thought-theyd-dodged-is-loominganyway/2020/03/24/aef84e06-6del-1lea-al56-0048b62cdb51_stoy.html; Kate Rogers
Betsy Spring, On Main Street, Business Owners Push for Greater Protection from
Coronavirus-related Lawsuits,
CNBC
(June
15,
2020
1:37
PM),
https://www. cnbc.com/2020/06/ 12/on-main-street-a-push-for-protection-from-coronavirusrelated-lawsuits.html ("'Itturns out that business interruption insurance is not what it sounds
like,' [Robert Cresanti, president and CEO of the International Franchise Association] said.
'Most of the insurance companies are telling our people that business interruption insurance
is actually business destruction insurance. So if your business is burned down or destroyed
by a flood, you're covered. But you're not [covered] in a crisis like this where your business
is truly interrupted."'); Karen Epper Hoffman, Business Interruption: Insurers Balk
at Paying Claims, CFO.COM
(Sept.
10,
2020),
https://www.cfo.com/riskmanagement/2020/09/pandemic-losses-out-in-the-cold
("Robert Gordon, senior vice
president for policy, research, and international for the American Property Casualty
Insurance Association (APCIA), says that because government emergency orders closed
businesses to limit human transmission of COVID-19 and not because there had been direct
property loss or damage, business interruption policies are not relevant.").
46 See, e.g., Ron Hurtibise, Sorry, That's Not Covered: Insurers Fight Businesses Over
COVID-19 Shutdowns, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Sept. 12, 2020 8:55 AM), https://www.sunsentinel. com/business/fl-bz-owners-losing-covid-related-business-interruption-suits20200912-46jlyxsftjenvlyrxg4tfbqyam-story.html ("the industry has reinforced its message
by boasting about nearly every court ruling that has gone its way. 'Another court agrees:
Business Interruption Insurance Does Not Cover Pandemic-Related Losses,' said the subject
line of an email release by the Insurance Information Institute, a trade group created by the
industry to educate consumers about insurance-related issues."); Judith Bachman, Judges
Are Deciding Whether Business Interruption Policies Cover Pandemic-Related Losses,
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as well as scholarly journals.47 When insurers prevailed in litigation, victory was
quickly trumpeted. 48
A similar public relations campaign by small business policyholders was
harder to mount given the disparate number and dispersion of random policyholders
with potential claims. 4 9 Although plaintiff law firms fulfilled some of this function
in banging the drum for coverage, their efforts were (in our view) problematic in
that many ofthese lawyers were not insurance coverage specialists from experienced
policyholder-side coverage firms. In addition, early pro-coverage efforts were (in
our view) too grandiose and not well-targeted.
For example, plaintiff firms sought mass consolidation of claims, including
a request for consolidation by the federal Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation

ROCKLAND CNTY. Bus. J. (Oct. 8, 2020), https://rcbizjournal.com/2020/10/08/judges-aredeciding-whether-business-interruption-policies-cover-pandemic-related-losses.
47 See, e.g., Robert Hartwig, Greg Niehaus & Joseph Qiu, Insurance for Economic
Losses Caused by Pandemics, 45 GENEVA RISK & INS. REV. 134, 134 (2020) ("Private
insurance coverage for economic losses caused by pandemics is limited [due in large part]
to the high levels of capital that would be required to credibly insure pandemic economic
losses with cross-sectional pooling mechanisms.").
48 Leslie Scism, Insurance Firms Gain Early Lead in CoronavirusLegal Fight With
Businesses, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 2020 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/insurersgain-early-lead-in-covid-19-legal-fight-with-businesses-11598965200 ("Insurers say the
policies are intended to help policyholders as they recover from events, such as fires, that
lead to repairs and rebuilding, and were never intended to cover virus-related claims.");
Alison Frankel, Latest COVID-19 Insurance Coverage Loss Shows Narrowing Path for
Policyholders, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2020 6:54 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/legalus-otc-insurance-idUSKBN2663HC; Andrew G. Simpson, Judges Nix Consolidating
COVID Business Interruption Suits Against Big Insurers, INS. J. (Oct. 4, 2020),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2020/10/04/585092.htm.
49 This is not to say that the business community did not on occasion make itself heard
on the issue. See, e.g., Stephen Gandel, Companies Say Insurance CompaniesAre Stiffing
Them Over Coronavirus Losses, CBS NEWS (Sept.
21,
2020
11:16 AM),
https://www. cb snews.com/news/covid-insurance-business-continuity-interruptiondeclined-coverage; Kate Rogers & Betsy Spring, On Main Street, Business Owners Push for
Greater Protection from
Coronavirus-related Lawsuits,
CNBC
(June
12,
2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/12/on-main-street-a-push-for-protection-fromcoronavirus-related-lawsuits.html. See also, Tim Carman, RestaurantsAre Suing Insurance
Companies Over Unpaid Claims-And Both Sides Say Their Survival Is at Stake,
WASH. POST
(May
19, 2020
1:37 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/voraciously/wp/2020/05/19/restaurants-are-suing-insurance-companies-over-unpaidclaims-and-both-sides-say-their-survival-is-at-stake (reporting both insurers and small
businesses taking positions that adverse coverage decisions will be financially ruinous).
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(MDL), which almost everyone (including the judges on the Panel) viewed as inapt
unless confined to the same policy forms of a single insurer in light of the varying
facts and policies of different cases. 50 More extremely, lawyers and legislators
sympathetic to business sought to legislatively require coverage by insurers
regardless of the policies at issue-a seemingly rather clear attempt to violate the
Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution that gave insurers a rather effortless public
relations victory."
As discussed below, we find the insurers' industry-wide disparagement of
coverage as legally misplaced as it may have been rhetorically brilliant. While we
cannot help but admire the manner in which insurers moved quickly and uniformly
to spin public opinion against coverage, we are dismayed that the tactic seems to
have worked on judges. There are real arguments to be made about whether and how
policyholders may have coverage for COVID-related losses. In fact, we think the
insurance industry's main contention about coverage-the "physical loss or
damage" requirement-can be refuted in most cases. But this requires a more
searching analysis of the question and less reflexive recoil than has been displayed
in the bulk of court decisions to date.
In several states, legislation was introduced to require insurers to pay for
lost policyholder revenue. There was also congressional inquiry pushing for such
coverage without regard to the actual insurance policy terms at issue in a particular
case. Predictably-and correctly in our view-insurers opposed any such legislative
mandates or compulsion as violative of the Contract Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.5 2 In doing so, they took the doctrinaire position-with which we
50

See

Andrew

G. Simpson, Judges Nix Consolidating COVID Business
Interruption Suits
Against
Big
Insurers,
INS.
J.
(Oct.
4,
2020),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2020/10/04/585092.htm. However, more
limited consolidated treatment has been approved for particularized groupings of policies
with the same operative language. See Jacob Rund, Ski Pass Insurance Row
Highlights Complex Route for Virus Suits, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 20, 2020, 6:31
AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/insurance/ski-pass-insurance-row-highlightscomplex-route-for-virus-suits (approving consolidation of 30 actions by policyholders
against Society Insurance "for denying business interruption claims of restaurants and other
hard-hit shops" as well as skiers' lawsuits against Arch Insurance Co. and United Specialty
Ins. Co. for denials of cancellation insurance purchased in connection with season-long ski
passes). Regarding MDL proceedings generally, see DAVID F. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION MANUAL:
LITIGATION (2020 ed.).

PRACTICE BEFORE THE

JUDICIAL PANEL ON

MULTIDISTRICT

See infra text accompanying notes 51-53.
See Letter from Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs & Ctr. for Ins. Pol'y and Rsch. to
Members of Cong. (May 20, 2020) (supporting insurer arguments against legislation forcing
5

52
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disagree-that business interruption insurance was never intended (apparently under
any circumstances) to provide coverage for any losses related to infectious disease
like COVID.53

coverage). See also H.B. 589, 133d Gen. Assemb., 2019-2020 Sess. (Ohio 2019) introduced
by Representatives Crossman and Rogers. The bill would "requireinsurers offering business
interruption insurance to cover losses attributable to viruses and pandemics and to declare an
emergency" that presumably would support further orders providing for governmentmandated closure of non-essential businesses. See also Elizabeth Blosfield, Despite
InsuranceIndustry Concerns, More States Introduce COVID-19 BI Bills, INS. J. (Apr. 15,
2020), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2020/04/15/564920.htm ("'It's just not
constitutional,' Don Hayden, co-founder and partner of Mark Migdal & Hayden, added. 'I
mean, what you're essentially doing is creating insurance where there is nothing. You're
essentially throwing out the underwriting and the risk evaluation that insurance companies
have done before writing a policy and saying, "You have to cover this. Even though you had
expressly said that you would not cover it in your exclusion and in your insurance
agreement.""'). But see Mark A. Packman, ConstitutionalityUnder the Contracts Clause of
Proposed Legislation Enabling Policyholders to Obtain Insurance Coverage for
Coronavirus Claims, 55 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 509 (2020) (concluding that such
legislation is constitutional due to emergency nature of pandemic and economic harm to
particular businesses).
"3 Erin Ayers, Insurers Decline Congress' Request To Pay All COVID-19 Business
Interruption Claims, ADVISEN
FRONT
PAGE
NEWS
(Mar.
23,
2020),
https://www.advisen.com/tools/fpnproc/fpns/articles new_1/P/363166470.html?rid=36316
6470&listid=1 (responding to congressional inquiry re insurer coverage of COVID
business loss claims, insurer interest groups state that "[b]usiness interruption policies do
not, and were not designed to, provide coverage against communicable diseases such as
COVID-19") (statement from leadership of American Property Casualty Insurance
Association, National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, Council of Insurance
Agents and Brokers, and Independent Insurance Agents & Brokers of America) (also taking
position that the members of these insurance industry organizations "include many small
businesses and employers grappling with the same issues as many businesses."). See also
id. (acknowledging that COVID coverage claims will be brought concerning other types of
insurance policies); Jeff Sistrunk, 4 CoronavirusDevelopments Insurance Lawyers Should
Know, LAw360 (Mar. 20, 2020, 5:31 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1255415/4coronavirus-developments-insurance-lawyers-should-know (listing the four important
topics with subheadings as follows: "Insurers Spurn Call to Expand Business Interruption
Coverage"; "NJ Lawmakers Mull Business Interruption Coverage Bill"; "House Lawmakers
Press Travel Insurers on Claim Denials"; and "Calif. Regulator Seeks 'Grace Period' on
Policy Cancellations").
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Insurers also consistently maintained that they would go broke and the
insurance industry would be destroyed if carriers were forced to provide COVID
coverage.54 Risk managers and brokers, who are normally viewed as representing
policyholder interests, tended to align with insurers, presumably because they feared
disruption of the industry more than denial of coverage to policyholder employers
or clients, many of which were likely to fail in the absence of prompt payment of
insurance coverage." Regulators also sided with insurers, 56 in our view, without
sufficient reflection and consciousness of their mission as public servants." These
entities also seemed to overlook the likely perception of policyholders who expected
(perhaps with sufficient objective reasonableness to obtain coverage) that the
premiums they had paid for years for something deemed "business interruption"
coverage would provide at least some assistance in the face of the largest business
interruption of this type in a century. 58

"4 See, e.g., Kate Smith, Pandemic Partnerships, BEST'S REV. (Aug. 2020),
news.ambest.com/articlecontent.aspx?refnum=299433&altsrc=43
("Even with pandemic
excluded from most business interruption policies, COVID-19 is expected to cost the
insurance industry more than $200 billion."). But see Kate Smith, The COVID Catastrophe,
BEST'S REV. (June 2020), http://news.ambest.com/ArticleContent.aspx?pc=1009&altsrc=15
8&refnum=297254 (stating that "The COVID-19 outbreak could dwarf other catastrophe
losses insurers have seen. .. ." but also noting that "[e]ven with the economic downturn, the
insurance industry, on the whole, is in a strong capital position"). Carman, supra note 49.
Accord, Andrew G. Simpson, P/C Insurers Put a Price Tag on Uncovered
Coronavirus Business
Interruption
Losses,
INS.
J.,
(Mar. 30,
2020),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/nationa/2020/03/30/56273 8.htm.

"Pandemics are an extraordinary catastrophe that can impact nearly
every economy in the world, so it is hard to predict and manage the risk,"
Sean Kevelighan, CEO of the Insurance Information Institute,
stated.
"Pandemic-caused losses are excluded from standard
business interruption polices because they impact all business, all at the
same time."
Moreover, he said, the exclusion for pandemic-caused losses
have been incorporated into standard business interruption policies for
years.
Simpson, supra. See also Elizabeth Pineau & Maya Nikolaeva, Insurer AXA Must Pay
Restaurant's COVID-19 Losses, French Court Rules, REUTERS (May 22, 2020, 2:08
PM) https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-insurance-axa/french-courtorders-insurer-axa-to-pay-restaurants-covid-19-losses-idUKKBN22Y2LR. ("AXA reacts to
decision by stating that it would appeal."); Elizabeth Blosfield, Despite Insurance Industry
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https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2020/04/15/564920.htm.

(Apr.
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15,

2020),

"I think in layman's terms, [legislation forcing payment
of covid claims] would implode the industry," Doug Jones, managing
director of JAG Insurance Group, told Insurance Journalin a March
webinar on business interruption and the coronavirus. "At the end of the
day, the ripple effect of what that would cause down the road,
and I'm talking short-term, not long-term; I'm talking about months from
now, not years from now. It would be difficult for anybody to buy any type
of insurance."
Additional concerns among the insurance industry about this type of
legislation surround The Contracts Clause in the U.S. Constitution, which
places limitations on states' ability to interfere with private contracts.
"It'sjust not constitutional," Don Hayden, co-founder and partner of
Mark Migdal & Hayden, added. "I mean, what you're essentially doing is
creating insurance where there is nothing. You're essentially throwing out
the underwriting and the risk evaluation that insurance companies have
done before writing a policy and saying, 'You have to cover this. Even
though you had expressly said that you would not cover it in your
exclusion and in your insurance agreement."'
Blosfield, supra.
" The tone of reporting appears to suggest that this element of the risk management and
insurance community tacitly accepted widespread lack of coverage and economic danger to
the insurance industry. As reported in one publication geared toward risk managers and
brokers only 14 percent of surveyed risk managers and corporate insurance buyers planning
to add new pandemic coverage. Andy Toh, 2020 PropertyInsurance Survey, BUS. INS. 31
(June 2020). But 27 percent state that their current policies provide coverage related to
diseases and epidemics while 49 percent deny having such coverage. Id. 41 percent of
policyholders are expecting to make a pandemic claim, with 28 percent not planning such
claims. Id
67% of risk professional expect direct business interruption losses due
to COVID-19. 77% expect the losses to be over $1 million, of which 36%
estimate losses to be more than $25 million. 91% support a federal
backstop for pandemic risk insurance similar to the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act. 65% of risk professionals would be willing to pay up to
5% more in premium for pandemic risk insurance coverage.
Claire Wilkinson, PressureBuildsfor PandemicBackstop, BUS. INS. 4 (May 2020). A draft
Pandemic Risk Insurance Act of 2020 then circulating "would establish a federal backstop
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for business interruption losses resulting from a future pandemic and would be triggered
when insurance industry losses exceed a $250 million threshold and capped at $500 billion.
... " Id. "The growing momentum among insurance buyers and others for a government
backstop to cover pandemic risks comes as insurers continue to maintain that most
commercial property policies do not provide coverage for business interruption losses arising
form the COVID-19 pandemic." Id.
The question of whether a potential Pandemic Risk Insurance Act
should be retroactive to the to the COVID-19 pandemic is an issue RIMS
is still exploring, she [Mary Roth, RIMS CEO] said
RIMS doesn't want to 'get into the business of altering contractual
agreements that were 'legally and freely entered into,' said Whitney Craig,
RIMS government relations director.
'We would be very wary of supporting legislation that has that. We
don't want to bankrupt an industry that we as risk managers rely on,' Ms.

Craig said.
Id.

56

See Leslie Scism, CompaniesHit by Covid-19 Want InsurancePayouts-InsurersSay
No, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2020, 10:24 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-hitby-covid-19-want-insurance-payouts-insurers-say-no-11593527047. ("Insurers have some
conceptual backing for their stance that business-interruption coverage isn't meant for
pandemics. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners, a standards-setting group
for state regulators, says pandemics violate a cardinal principle of insurance, which is that
large numbers of policyholders pool their risk to fund a few losses at any one time. In a
pandemic, almost all policyholders suffer losses, and simultaneously.").
5 We appreciate NAIC's concern that large coverage obligations could imperil the
insurance system generally. But we remain more than a little puzzled that a regulatory group
charged with protecting the public seems uninterested in supporting policyholders,
particularly small business policyholders, in cases where there is arguable coverage. Insurers
are in the business of risk transfer and insurance is one of the largest, most profitable
industries in the world. Although it may be regrettable if an insurance company (or several
or dozens) should fail, we consider it at least equally regrettable if policyholders who paid
for coverage fail after wrongfully being denied coverage due to fears of bankrupting the
insurance industry. Past insurer claims that their financial sky was falling proved to be
exaggerated,
something
regulators
should
know
and
appreciate. See Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage:Asbestos Liability andInsuranceAfter Three
Decades ofDispute, 12 CONN INS. L. J. 349, 353 (2006) (citing asbestos mass torts, despite
the massive costs, estimated to have been only a three percent drag on insurer earnings).
In addition, we note that there is more than a little disconnect between NAIC as an entity
tending to back the insurer mantra that "everyone knows pandemics are not insured" while
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As noted, insurers or their counsel campaigned in earnest to label COVID
an uncovered loss in both the general media and what might be termed the insurance
trade media. 59 Part of the insurer effort to disparage coverage claims was the
continued assertion that nearly all property insurance with business interruption
coverage also contained clear virus exclusions precluding coverage. 60 This claim
may be overstated. In the COVID coverage decisions to date, more than twenty
percent of the policies at issue lacked a virus exclusion. 61 Thus, even if the insurer
contention that "most" property policies have such an exclusion, there appear to be

some individual state commissioners have gone in the opposite direction and attempted to
force coverage irrespective of the language, intent, and purpose of particular policies. Our
preferred position is between these two extremes.
58 Matthew Lerner, Policy Wordings Tested by InterruptionLosses, BUS. INS. 27 (May
2020).
Business interruption claims have fast become one of the principal
legal battlefronts between commercial policyholders and insurers since the
outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic.
Dozens of businesses, including numerous restaurants, have filed state
and federal lawsuits against their insurers seeking declaratory rulings that
income lost due to the government-mandated lockdowns is covered by
insurance.
Insurers argue that many of the policies include exclusions for virus
related losses and most of those that don't still won't cover lost income
because physical damage to an insured property must occur to trigger
claims payments.
Id.
See CARRIER MGMT, supra note 44. See, e.g., Larry P. Schiffer, Does the Novel
CoronavirusCause DirectPhysicalLoss of or Damage to Property?, X NAT'L L. REV. 114
(Apr. 13,
2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/does-novel-coronavirus-causedirect-physical-loss-or-damage-to-property (concluding that "[b]ased on the case law and
the nature of the novel coronavirus, it appears unlikely that courts will conclude that viral
contamination causes 'direct physical loss."').
60 Erin Ayers, Insurers Decline Congress' Request to Pay All COVID-19 Business
InterruptionLosses,
ADVISEN
FRONT
PAGE
NEWS
(Mar.
23,
2020),
https://www.advisen.com/tools/fpnproc/fpns/articles new_1/P/363166470.html?rid=36316
6470&list id=1 ("The vast majority of commercial property insurance policies contain not
only direct physical damage, but also contain exclusions for viral/bacterial contamination
due to the unpredictability of the risk.").
61 See Baker, supra, note 10 (visited Oct. 21, 2020).
59
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a large number of cases where policyholders have a substantially better chance of
success than suggested by the insurance industry shibboleth of no coverage.
As part of its aggressive "no coverage" strategy, insurers did more than rest
on the virus exclusion (which we agree can be a strong defense to coverage where
the policy actually contains such a limitation) even when policies at issue contained
the exclusion. Rather, insurers dug in on a remarkable first line of defense: that
COVID did not and could not cause any direct physical loss or damage to property,
which is a prerequisite to most commercial property and business interruption
coverage.
[T]he mere threat of COVID-19 at the property or the preemptive
closure of businesses due to the threat of COVID-19 should not be
considered "direct physical loss or damage" to property.
Additionally, neither government-ordered closure of businesses
nor a government's official statement regarding COVID-19
damage at properties generally should be sufficient for a court to
find "direct physical loss or damage" to a particular property.
However, those insured that can prove the actual presence of the
virus on the surfaces of or otherwise in covered property may be
able to establish "direct physical loss or damage" to property. 62
62 Edward M. Koch & Elizabeth C. Dolce, "Direct Physical Loss
or Damage": The
Gatekeeper to PropertyInsurance Coverage and COVID-19, WHITE & WILLAIMS (Mar. 24,
2020), https://www.whiteandwilliams.com/resources-alerts-Direct-Physical-Loss-orDamage-The-Gatekeeper-to-Property-Insurance-Coverage-and-COVID-19.html (emphasis
in original). Accord, Randy Maniloff, First Coronavirus Coverage Suit Filedfor Business
Interruption, COVERAGE OPS. (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.coverageopinions.info/
Vol9Issue2/FirstCOVIDcase.html.

In general, and putting aside any precise policy language that may
apply, one critical requirement, for the potential availability of business
interruption insurance, is that there has been physical damage to
property. This is either to the insured's own covered premises, or, for
purposes of losses on account of the actions of civil authority, another's
premises.
Either way, it will be necessary [for policyholders] to prove that the
presence of the coronavirus causes physical loss to the affected
premises. Thus, we can expect to see arguments, like the one being made
[in the first filed case], that there has been physical loss to
a premises because the virus stays on the surface of objects or materials'fomites'-for some amount of time.
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[A]ny legislative action to compel insurers to pay business
interruption claims arising out of the coronavirus [would be]
breathtaking. To achieve their result, lawmakers would not only
obviate the "virus" exclusion, but, in addition, the fundamental
'physical damage' requirement of business interruption coverage.

&

Maniloff, supra. See Randy J. Maniloff & Margo Meta, New DJ Takes Different Tack on
Business Interruption Coverage for COVID-19, WHITE & WILLAIMS (Mar. 27, 2020)
https://www.whiteandwilliams.com/resources-alerts-New-DJ-Takes-Different-Tack-onBusiness-Interruption-Coverage-for-COVID-19.html (describing French Laundry Partners,
LP v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. case seeking declaration of coverage and noting that loss of
business use was caused primarily by government ordered suspension rather than tangible
property destruction. Maniloff & Meta are skeptical of the claim and argue that "in general,
to implicate 'Civil Authority' coverage, there must be physical damage to property other
than the covered premises. But businesses have been closed principally to foster social
distancing and not on account of the presence of the virus inside a premises." Maniloff
Meta also note that French Laundry is represented by the same attorney as policyholder
Oceana Grill, a New Orleans restaurant, that filed the nation's first COVID coverage case).
Policyholders will sometimes be asserting that insurers, that
issued immediate denials for [COVID]-19 claims, did so in bad faith on
account of an alleged failure to investigate the claim under applicable
law[.]
One business interruption coverage theory in particular is getting
attention from policyholders [what the author dubs the "public space"
theory that the ubiquitous COVID-19 virus has filled the air and attached
to tangible property, making it physically damaged-which in turn means
that the injury trigger of the typical policy is satisfied].
Another business interruption coverage issue has not received a lot of
attention. The biggest push for coverage has been for businesses that have
been shut down by order of a civil authority. However, even if owed, such
coverage is likely quite limited. Civil authority-based business
interruption coverage, per policy language, is usually available for only up
to four weeks.
The restaurant industry is beating the loudest drum in the pursuit of
business interruption coverage.
Randy Maniloff, Covid-19 And Coverage: Four Weeks and Four Takeaways, COVERAGE
OPs.
(Apr.
5,
2020),
https://www.coverageopinions.info/COVID19ISSUE/
COVIDandCoverage.html. These comments are but from one law firm, albeit a particularly
large and prestigious insurer-side firm. Many other lawyers representing insurers wrote in
the same vein in various publications and on law firm and other websites.
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The New Jersey legislature has premised its actions on the need to
take out the "virus" exclusion from business interruption policies.
But that's a tonsillectomy compared to what it is really doingremoving the heart of the policy.63
Although there were of course stories highlighting the difficulties faced by
businesses and other policyholders due to the COVID pandemic,64 insurers
succeeded in simultaneously pooh-poohing the merits of business interruption
claims and painting a scenario of risk management ruin if they were required (either
by legislatures or courts) to provide coverage they purportedly never agreed to
provide.65
63

Randy Maniloff & Edward Koch, COVID-19: The Real Operation of New Jersey's

Proposed Insurance
Legislation,
COVERAGE
OPS.
(Mar.
19,
2020),
https://www.coverageopinions.info/Vol9Issue2/COVIDOperation.html.
64 See, e.g., Suzanne Barlyn, U.S. University Insured Chinese Student Tuition Against
Virus. Then COVID-19 Hit, REUTERS: BUS. NEWS (Aug. 17, 2020, 6:25 AM),
https://in.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-university-insuran-idINKCN25D 15P
(reporting that despite paying annual premium of $424,000 for coverage, University of
Illinois found harder market emerging in early 2020, with only limited coverage and
premiums increasing to nearly $2 million).
65 See, e.g., Lucca De Paoli & Franz Wild, Don't Be Tricky With Virus Clams,
Watchdog Warns U.K. Insurers, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 19, 2020, 10:49 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03 -19/u-k-fca-requests-coronaviruscontingency-plans-from-insurers
(noting
that
the
U.K.
Financial
Conduct
Authority [FCA] has stated that "insurers must also [like policyholders] be adaptable" in
lieu of the problems posed by COVID and must take care to communicate clearly and
nondeceptively with policyholder claimants).
The industry has worked to reduce its exposure to pandemics since the
2003 outbreak of SARS in Asia. Over the years, they've tightened up their
policies, inserting communicable-disease exclusions to prevent potential
losses. That means consumers and companies will bear the brunt of the
cost for disruptions related to the virus-which has infected more than
217,000 people worldwide and left at least 9,000 dead.
Id. Laura Foggan & Michael A. Sabino, Feeling the Effect, BEST'S REV. (May 2020),
http://news.ambest.com/articlecontent.aspx?pc=1009&AltSrc=108&refnum=296290
(predicting claims across various lines of insurance, particularly property insurance with
business interruption coverage, and stating that "[i]t is essential that legislators-and the
courts-recognize the limits of insurance in accordance with policy terms and exclusions.");
Cheri Trites-Versluis, Renewal Language Scrutiny: COVID-19 Litigation is Generating a
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Policyholder counsel noted and criticized the perceived insurer public
relations campaign. 66 And some in the industry had reservations about the industry's
aggressive and rather blanket opposition to coverage. 67 Some observers also

Resurrection of Arguments Asserted at the Height of Asbestos and Silica Coverage
Litigation, NAT'L UNDERWRITER 1,
42-43 (Sep.
2020), https://www.sapiens.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/NUP_0920-dl.pdf (citing Above It All Roofing & Construction,
Inc. v. Security Nat'l Insurance Co. and RLI Insurance v. Gonzalez, which found asbestos to
be a "pollutant" within policy's pollution exclusion, and Garamendi v. Golden Eagle Ins.
Co., which found silica dust to be a pollutant, implying similar approach apt for COVID
cases). Mr. Trites-Versluis is identified in the article as "the director of policy analysis
for RiskGenius," the same company whose CEO is extensively quoted in the media
disparaging policyholder claims for business interruption coverage. Id.
66 See, e.g., Andrew G. Simpson, P C Insurers Put a Price Tag on Uncovered
Coronavirus Business Interruption Losses,
INS.
J.,
(Mar.
30,
2020),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/nationa/2020/03/30/562738.htm (quoting
policyholder attorney John Houghtaling II) ("'To avoid payments for a civil authority shut
down the insurance industry is pushing out deceptive propaganda that the virus does not
cause a dangerous condition to property.' [] 'This is a lie, it's untrue factually and legally."').
67 See, e.g., Kate
Smith, Pandemic Partnerships, BEST'S REV. (Aug. 2020),
http://news.ambest.com/articlecontent.aspx?refnum=299433&altsrc=43.
Stephen Catlin's mobile buzzed nonstop. It was early April, and he
had just written a thought leadership piece on the need for a swift and
coherent insurance industry response to pandemic. Frustrated by the
falling reputation of the industry and the "clumsy" comments and
defensive posture of some insurers, the Convex CEO called on the
insurance community to be proactive in finding a long-term solution to
pandemic. His message struck a chord.
Id. Mr. Catlin is a 50-year veteran of the insurance industry and founder of an insurer and
consulting group as well as a member of the International Insurance Society Insurance Hall
of Fame, he elaborated on his views in an Op-Ed piece.
[First,] insurers and brokers should do a much better job when
communicating with the public and with governments, especially
regarding the true value that insurance provides. Secondly, it's in the
nature of our business to focus on the past, and therefore we often
neglect giving adequate thought about the future. Finally, I regret thatwhen an event occurs that causes extreme human suffering-the insurance
industry often views the event primarily in terms of dollars and cents.
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wondered whether the more receptive negotiable attitude of some European insurers
might be more productive. 68 But in the main, American insurers were on the

Over the years, we have identified a list of potential 'Big
Ones,' events that could cause severe financial stress for insurers and
reinsurers. These events range from a Category 5 hurricane that strikes at
the heart of Miami to a powerful earthquake devastating Los Angeles or
Tokyo. Over the past two decades, an extreme act of terrorism was added
to the list.
However, until recently, relatively few insurers would have guessed
that a pandemic could be the costliest event the industry could face. I
believe that neither governments nor insurers had truly contemplated the
economic consequences of a pandemic, in part because the financial
impact of such an event is extremely difficult to model.
Unfortunately, the coronavirus has amplified some of the things that I
believe the industry often does poorly.
It is not my place to comment on whether individual policies provide
coverage for potential claims arising from COVID -19. However, I can say
that I was dismayed at the defensive nature of some insurers' statements
as the crisis began to expand. There always has been widespread public
distrust-if not distain-for the insurance industry, and the comments
uttered by some insurers did not help our relationships with governments
and our customers.
As I often have said, it's not what you say, but how you say it.
Now that it appears that COVID-19 may be the costliest event in the
industry's history, we must begin to think ahead. Will society face
pandemics of a similar magnitude in years to come? While I hope we will
not, I suspect that we will. If so, what should be the role of the insurance
industry? Should we simply adopt policy wording that make it crystal
clear that insurance coverage will be of little benefit to policyholders for
future losses arising from a pandemic? Or should we think about how
insurers can play a meaningful role in economic recovery while still
protecting the industry's capital base?
Stephen Catlin, Setting the Right Tone: InsrersMust Clarify the Role Insurances Can Play
in
Recovering from
Future
Pandemics,
BEST'S
REV.
(Aug.
2020),
http://news.ambest.com/articlecontent.aspx?refnum=299423&altsrc=43.
68 See, e.g., Sergio F. Oehninger & Daniel Hentschel, Will European Insurers'Positive
Response to COVID-19 Claims Influence US Insurers?, HUNTON INS. RECOVERY BLOG
(July 13, 2020), https://www.huntoninsurancerecoveiyblog.com/2020/07/articles/businessinterruption/will-european-insurers-positive-response-to-covid-19-claims-influence-usinsurers/.
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The positive response in Europe is in stark contrast with the insurance
industry's preliminary positions in the United States. The headlines on this
side of the hemisphere demonstrate certain insurers' attempts to avoid
liability for COVID-19 related losses, despite accepting billions in
premiums form policyholders in exchange for broad coverage promises.
In addition, the regulatory structure abroad may make for more
collaborative attack on coverage problems. Describing the role of the
Financial Conduct Authority [FCA] in England regarding COVID
coverage, one article noted:
Business interruption insurance generally only covers losses where a
company is forced to close temporarily form property damage, like a fire.
The FCA said those types of policies did not offer protection from
pandemics, but it was interested in the minority that have socalled nondamage extensions.
Those extensions can protect against the closure of a property either
from the outbreak of an infectious disease or by the denial of access by a
public authority.
The FCA said it had examined more than 500 policies from 40
insurers and narrowed down its selection to just 17 policy wordings it felt
were both the most contentious and representative.
Id. Martin Croucher, FCA Picks 8 Insurersfor Pandemic Coverage Test Case, LAw360
(June 1, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/127811 ("Colin Edelman QC of Devereuz
Chambers, Leigh-Ann Mulcahy QC and Richard Coleman QC of Fountain Court Chambers
will represent the FCA in the case, instructed by Herbert Smith Freehills LLP."). For
additional background on the Financial Conduct Authority, see Daniel Schwarcz,
Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study of the British and American
Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TUL. L. REV. 735 (2009).
In the test case litigation in the U.K., policyholders largely prevailed, but upon
somewhat different issues and policy language than has to date been litigated in the United
States. See The Fin. Conduct Auth. v. Arch In. (UK) [2020] EWHC 2448 (Comm) (UK).
In addition, continental insurers may have been nudged toward a less confrontational
style due to judicial decisions supporting policyholders. See, e.g., Oehninger, supra (noting
that after initially stating it would appeal trial court ruling requiring it to provide business
interruption coverage to policyholder with lost revenue due to COVID-19, AXA has relented
and agreed to provide coverage; "AXA reportedly has already agreed to pay over 200
COVID-19 related claims."). See also id. ("Despite initially denying liability, Swiss
insurance company, Helvetia Insurance, announced that most of its policyholders in the
hospitality industry have accepted settlements following coverage disputes for COVID-19
related business interruption losses. The settlements reportedly included policyholders form
Switzerland, Austria, and Germany.").
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defensive. COVID business interruption claims were to be strongly resisted, even
where policies lacked a virus exclusion, on the ground that these claims failed to
satisfy the "physical loss or damage" trigger for coverage. And, to perhaps state the
obvious, insurers were denying COVID claims.69 Unsurprisingly, this produced
litigation by upset policyholders on the brink of financial ruin.70
69 For an example of rather brusque insurer denial of coverage, see Letter from
Susan Sabouni, Property Claims Supervisor, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, to
Steve Powell, Chief Officer of Policyholder, The Goddard School (May 7, 2020) (on file
with author). The Letter repeats portions of the policy verbatim for nine pages and then
simply states that the insurer "considers the issues outlined above to be dispositive of
coverage" and that the insurer's "Policy does not provide coverage to the Goddard School
for the Claim" and thus "respectfully [?] declines coverage for the Claim" in connection with
the school's forced closure due to government order because of the COVID pandemic, even
though the policy also contained a "Communicable Disease Endorsement." See id. at 10. The
insurer stated that the policyholder's loss was "not 'due to an outbreak of a 'communicable
disease' ... that caused[d] an actual illness" at the School. The insurer did, however, agreed
to "reimburse the Goddard School for the cost of disinfecting the insured premises due to
reported symptoms of COVID-19 within the premises." Id. at 10.
?0 See Randy Ellis, Coronavirus in Oklahoma: Tribes Sue Insurance Companies Over
Business Interruption Coverage, THE OKLAHOMAN (Mar. 25, 2020 1:22 AM),
https://oklahoman.com/article/5658477/coronavirus-in-oklahoma (describing
Chickasaw
and Choctaw nations suits involving various insurers); CoronavirusCoverage Issues Loom:
Policy Details Crucial to Determine Success of Commercial Claims, BUS. INS. 4 (April
2020) (surveying possible COVID-related claims implicating Property Business Interruption
insurance, Directors and Officers Liability insurance, Cyber Risk insurance, Medical
Malpractice
insurance,
and Workers
Compensation
insurance);
Joseph P.
Monteleone, COVID-19's Management Liability Concerns, INS. EXCH. AGENCY (Sept. 14,
2020), https://www.ieagency.com/post/covid-19s-management-liability-insurance-concerns
(noting that COVID-related losses will prompt substantial coverage claims involving D&O
Insurance, Transactional Risk, and EPL insurance as well as Property Insurance);
Patricia Vowinkel, An Insurance Journey: Significant Coronavirus-Related Losses and
Legal Battles Over Coverage May Force Some Insurers to Rethink Their Strategic Game
Plans, BEST'S REV., 1 (May 2020); Bob Reville, Making Waves: COVID-19 Reveals a
Possible Future Upswell of Liabilitiesfor Insurers, BEST'S REV., 16 (Aug. 2020); Celeste
Bott, Coronavirus Litigation: The Week in Review, LAw360 (Oct. 8, 2020 7:15 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1318126/coronavirus-litigation-the-week-inreview (summarizing recent legal developments, including several insurer wins; also noting
that the "Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has centralized in Illinois over 30 lawsuits
accusing Society Insurance Co. of wrongfully denying coverage for business losses during
the COVID-19 pandemic, but declined to create MDLs to group similar cases against The
Hartford, Travelers, Cincinnati Insurance Co., and Lloyd's of London underwriters.");
Lauren Berg, In-N-Out Sues Zurich To Cover COVID-19 Shutdown, LAw360 (May 29, 2020
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To be sure, policyholder counsel were not silent during the time of insurer
pleas of poverty and assertion of absolute defenses to coverage. But they seemed to
have reduced prominence in both insurance trade and lay media.7
10:56 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1278397.; See also Hannah Smith, A Closer
Look: Coronavirus Insurance Lawsuit Trends, PROPERTY CASUALTY 360 (Sept. 4, 2020
12:00 AM), https://www.propertycasualty360.com/2020/09/04/a-closer-look-coronavirusinsurance-lawsuit-trends/?slreturn=20210107191656 ("The main issue that courts must
decide in addressing these claims is whether businesses whose operations were shut down
during the crisis can demonstrate 'direct physical loss or damage."') (describing several
lawsuits where insurers had prevailed in motions to dismiss, including French Laundry
Partners,LP v. HartfordFire Ins. Co., In-N-Out Burgers v. Zurich American Ins. Co., and
several claims where insurers had prevailed in motions to dismiss including PlasticSurgeons
of Lexington, PLLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. and Ohio Sec. Ins. Co. and noting that
in GavrilidesManagement Co. v. Michigan Ins. Co., the "plaintiff alleged that the physical
requirement of the policy was met because customers could not physically use the dine-in
services. The judge denied this allegation, determining that in order to meet the requirement,
the insured must show a physical alteration of the premises."). See also id. ("So far, courts
have ruled in favor of insurers in cases of business interruption coverage vs. COVID19. But the vast majority of these cases are still yet to be seen."). For additional examples
of COVID coverage complaints, see Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Prime Time
Sports Grill, Inc. v. DTW1991 Underwriting Ltd, No. 8:20-cv-00771-CEH-JSS (M.D. Fla.
May 4, 2020); see also, Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), supra (contending that
plaintiff restaurantwas not "ordered to close" by Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis Order of March
17, 2020 but was permitted to continue operating restaurant at fifty percent occupancy).
Insurers of course approve of the GavrilidesManagementdecision and were
undoubtedly pleased that the insurance trade press has given prominent display to the case
even though it is a "mere" state trial court case, albeit one of the first decisions in the area.
See Wilson Elser, Michigan Judge Rules DirectPhysicalLoss Requiredto TriggerBusiness
Interruption Coverage, LEXOLOGY (Jul. 23, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=a9de8e82-e549-44f9-83df-7b66cfd10009 (noting that "Judge [Joyce
Draganchuk] stated that direct physical loss [of or damage to the property] must be
something 'with material existence ... that alters the physical integrity of the property."').
71 See, e.g., Christine Spinella Davis, Business Interruption Coverage for COVID-19
Losses: You Can Satisfy the "Physical Loss or Damage" Requirement in Your
Commercial
Property
Policy,
BRADLEY
(Apr.
24,
2020),
https://www.itpaystobecovered.com/2020/04/business-interruption-coverage-for-covid-19losses-you-can-satisfy -the-physical-loss-or-damage-requirement-in-your-commercialproperty-policy ("Temporary loss of use and loss of functionality alone may satisfy the
physical loss or damage requirement in a property policy."); Mark Packman & Jason
Rubinstein, COVID-19 Claims May Survive Insurers' Physical Loss Defense, LAw360
(Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1306134
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Because COVID-19 does not destroy or tangibly alter the structure of
property, the insurers have asserted there is no coverage for claims arising
from the pandemic. Initial decisions on this issue broke the insurance
industry's way. But the litigation of disputes has barely begun. There is
significant evidence to suggest there are many legal paths available to
plaintiffs as they struggle with losses related to COVID-19. We explore
the findings and implications to date.
Policyholder counsel, for example, argued:
In most property insurance policies, business interruption coverage is
triggered when the property at issue suffers "direct physical loss or
damage." Structural damage to the property, however, is not a requirement
for coverage; proof that contamination or other relatively intangible
conditions like bacteria, gases, and fumes that "rendered the insured
property temporarily or permanently unusable or uninhabitable may
support a finding that the loss was a physical loss to the insure property."
Additionally, many insurance policies include civil authority
coverage, which covers losses that occur when government authorities
restrict access to the area where a business is located or that the business
depends on for its operations.
Many property insurance policies also provide contingent business
interruption coverage, triggered by damage to or disruption of a business's
suppliers, customers, or other key partners. While the policyholder itself
need not be physically damaged, it does need to have coverage for the type
of damage that affected its suppliers, busines partners, or customers.
Packman & Rubinstein, supra. Pamela D. Hans & Marshall Gilinsky, Insurance Coverage
for Losses Stemming from the Coronavirus, INS. J. (Feb.
26,
2020),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2020/02/26/559383.htm (citing Mellin v.
Northern Sec. Ins. Co., 115 A.3d 799, 805 (N.H. 2015) and also citing Gregory Packaging,
Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165232, *15-17 (D.N.J. Nov.
25, 2014) "[C]ourts considering non-structural property damage claims have found that
buildings rendered uninhabitable by dangerous gases or bacteria suffered direct physical loss
or damage.").
Business owners are submitting claims for business interruption
insurance losses, but many insurance companies' knee-jerk reaction is to
deny. This has led to a proliferation of lawsuits. While the viability of
these suits depends on each business's unique circumstances and policy
language, the prospects look very good for many Pennsylvania business
owners.
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There has also been, in our view, something of a race-to-the-courthouse
problem in that a number of the initial policyholder claims appear to be brought by
counsel without substantial experience in insurance coverage litigation, something
that more seasoned coverage lawyers noted with some dismay (along with voicing
concerns that the efforts of some plaintiff counsel to consolidate proceedings was
hurtful to the COVID coverage cause).72

Many Pennsylvania businesses bought all-risk commercial property
insurance policies that contain business interruption coverage. The
coverage provisions are broad ....
Many insurance companies will dispute that COVID-19 losses satisfy
the direct physical loss or damage requirement. . . . Courts have rejected
this view on numerous occasions in numerous contexts.
Patrick Campbell, Charles Casper & Brett Waldron, Pa. Insureds' Path to Pandemic Biz
Interruption Coverage, LAw360 (May 19, 2020 5:50 PM), https://www.law360.com/
appellate/articles/1274214/pa-insureds-path-to-pandemic-buz-interruption-coverage
(also
arguing that there should be coverage even if policy has virus exclusion due to rule that
exclusions are construed narrowly and government shutdown orders rather than the virus
itself are the cause of business interruption).
72 See, e.g., Chip Merlin, What isMultidistrictLitigation (MDL) and Will ItImpact Virus
Business Income Claims?, PROP. INS. COVERAGE L. BLOG (May 10, 2020),
https://www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw. com/2020/05/articles/commercial-insruanceclaims/what-is-multidistrict-litigation-mdl-and-will-it-impact
(writing
by
noted
policyholder coverage attorney expresses some doubt about efficacy of consolidation). A
large and prominent policyholder firm was less tentative and more critical of consolidation.
Savvy policyholders and experienced counsel may also find
consolidated and class action proceedings ill-suited to the resolution of
insurance coverage disputes. That is because claim-specific differences
are likely to predominate over common issues in three fundamental
respects: (1) the specific facts of any particular insurance claim, and
how that claim is best presented and substantiated, often vary greatly from
claim to claim, place to place, and industry to industry; (2) the specific
language of any given insurance policy is critical, and there can be
enormous variation in policy language on the material issues implicated
by COVID-19; and (3) insurance coverage is a matter of state law, which
varies widely across jurisdictions on issues of importance for many
policyholders.
For these reasons, sophisticated insureds should carefully review their
own insurance policies, claims, and circumstances before signing on to any
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As discussed in the next section, we take issue with the insurance industry's
rush to judgment opposing COVID-related coverage across the board. We also are
concerned that insurers are exaggerating both their potential financial responsibility
if COVID coverage claims succeed and the industry's purported inability to absorb
such claims.
First, the estimated costs. Insurers have suggested that if covered, the costs
of business interruption claims would range as high as $800 billion per month. 73 But

of the current efforts to aggregate coronavirus-related insurance cases into
MDL or class action proceedings.
David Goodwin, Allan B. Moore & Rani Gupta, PolicyholdersBeware: The Risks ofMultiDistrictand ClassAction Treatmentof COVID-19 Insurance Claims, COVINGTON, 1-2 (May
4, 2020), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2020/05/policyholdersbeware-the-risks-of-multidistrict-and-class-action-treatment-of-covid- 1 9-insurance-

claims.pdf.
Strong claims should be timely noticed and pursued aggressively by
experienced insurance coverage counsel, particularly if insurers do not
meet their obligations to pay promptly. Decisions to pursue coverage
litigation must take into account the most favorable jurisdictions,
procedures, and timing to maximize recovery for policyholders affected
by COVID-19. In knowledgeable counsel is able to litigate the strongest
claims first, those cases will set appropriate precedents that will establish
insureds' rights to recover COVID-19 losses and benefit other
policyholders.
Id. at 5.
In addition, despite being defendants, insurers have considerable power to shape early
case outcomes by making motions to dismiss when presented with favorable facts, policy
language, or courts while simply answering the complaint when faced with unfavorable facts,
policy language or tribunals, thereby delaying any legal rulings from these less favorable
forums until the industry could accumulated the momentum of early Rule 12 victories.
73 As reported in one prominent industry periodical:
It's hard to quantify the full financial impact COVID -19 will have on
the industry. But one thing is certain, this pandemic is on track to become
the largest event in insurance history.
"It is truly a catastrophic event the proportion of which we have not
seen before," Stefan Holzberger, chief rating officer for AM Best,
said. "The breadth and depth of the event, how it is affecting multiple
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geographics and multiple segments of the insurance market-this is really
something that dwarfs the other major events in recent history."
And yet, the insurance industry has been prepared to handle this
event.
There is a caveat to this, however. The industry's ability to absorb the
impact of COVID-19 hinges on business interruption. As of early May,
seven states had introduced legislation requiring insurers to provide
retroactive business interruption coverage, in some cases regardless of
whether policies included a virus exclusion, as most do.
If forced to pay retroactive BI, the insurance industry could be facing
losses of $150 billion to $200 billion per month, according to the Best's
Commentary, Legislation to Nullify BI Exclusions Poses Existential
Threat to P/C Insurers. The Insurance Information Institute's estimates are
even higher. The III [Insurance Information Institute] forecasts costs of
up to $380 billion per month, which it said would "break" the insurance
industry within months. That scenario, however, is unlikely [because of
lack of coverage.]
If you take business interruption out of the equation, the industry as a
whole is on solid financial footing.
Kate Smith, The COVID Catastrophe: The Global Pandemic is on Track to be the Costliest
Event in Insurance History. It's also a Defining Moment for the Industry Special Risk
Section
Sponsored by
Lexington Insurance, BEST'S REV.
(Jun.
2020),
http://news.ambest.com/articlecontent.aspx?refnum=297254&altsrc=123. See also Robert
Hartwig, Greg Niehaus & Joseph Qui, Insurance for Economic Losses Caused by
Pandemics, 45 Geneva Risk and Ins. Rev. 134, 135 (2020) (estimating losses at one trillion
dollars per month for business interruption alone).
We like hyperbole as well as the next authors, but we think it is a bit much to suggest
that possible business interruption coverage would "dwarf" the financial consequences of
major insurance events such as the asbestos mass tort or pollution claims. We are not
dismissive of the potential magnitude of COVID claims but remain concerned that the
insurance industry has been a bit cavalier in suggesting such large losses and generally
wailing gloom and doom in the event of coverage. It may be a good public relations strategy
that will gain sympathy from the courts but strikes us as overblown. And, as discussed later
in the article, there is something concerning about attempts to convince courts and
policymakers that insurers are too vulnerable to be saddled with COVID losses when the
alternative is saddling much more vulnerable small businesses with these losses. If that is the
fate decreed by contractual agreement, perhaps there is no escape (save for invocation of
reasonable expectations, unconscionability, and public policy canons for construing those
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at this juncture, we have not seen any detailing of this estimate or the methodology
behind it. We remain skeptical, particularly so in light of the commonly found
sublimits (either temporable or monetary) on coverage for business interruption
occasioned by government order that insurers contend is contained in most policies
and which appears popular in policy forms. One article provides a flavor of the
industry's tone.
The Insurance Information Institute and American Property
Casualty Insurance Association place the estimates much higher:
The APCIA forecast losses of up to $668 billion per month, while
the III estimated retroactive BI could cost the industry up to $380
billion per month. "That's an industry-breaking event," James
Lynch, chief actuary for the II, said. "That would break the industry
in two directions. One, the financial load it would place on
companies to have to pay claims they had priced the business for,
and had specifically excluded, would create financial ruin.
Moreover, that intervention into clear policy language would call
into question the entire insurance business model."
"They're trying to make the case that they're shutting down because
of physical loss and damage from the virus," said RiskGenius CEO
Chris Cheatham, whose company uses software to help insurers
evaluate policy language. "That's not an accident. That's not how

people talk."
Bob Hartwig, director of the Risk and Uncertainty Management
Center at the University of South Carolina's Darla Moore School of
Business, said politicians were fed such language from plaintiffs'
attorney groups who are "looking at this as a potentially huge
payday."
"The State of New York cannot alter the laws of physics to satisfy
its trial lawyer masters, "Hartwig said. "That's essentially what
happened. They developed this language in an attempt to overruled
the virus exclusion."
"All legal scholars agree this will fail a Constitutional test. There's
no question about it."

contracts) from this bothersome result. But, as discussed later, the insurance industry's
extreme anti-coverage position is incorrect.
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The battle over business interruption will, without doubt, make its
way into the courts. And most agree the courts will side with
insurance companies.
"The exclusion for viruses is not an ambiguous one," Lynch said.
"It'san exclusion of loss due to virus or bacteria. When it was filed,
the filing specifically mentioned the potential for a pandemic
similar to SARS CoV-1. And the current pandemic is SARS CoV2. So I don't think there's a lot of ambiguity here about what the
exclusion was meant to exclude.
Stefan Holzbeger, chief rating officer of AM Best, agreed.
"Those
well-defined,
long-instituted,
regulator-approved
exclusions for pandemics or viruses should hold," Holzberger said.
"The business interruption policies that have that exclusion, which
is the vast majority in the U.S., should not have to honor claims
associated with a loss of revenue related to COVID-19.
[Holzberger further predicted that if legislation negating virus
exclusions was enacted and upheld in court] we would see
widespread insolvency because the magnitude of lost revenue in
relation to the capital surplus is so great. The insurance industry
could not bear those losses. Which is why they weren't covered in
the first place." 4

74 Smith, supra note 73. Best's Review loved the inflammatory quote about trial
lawyers so much, it was emphasized in a pull-quote from the sidebar in large print, complete
with a 20-year-old picture of Professor Hartwig, a former insurer lobbyist before entering
academia.

The property/casualty industry estimates that business interruption
losses from the coronavirus just for small businesses in the U.S. could be
between $220-$383 billion per month-or a quarter to half of total industry
surplus available to pay all P/C claims.
David A. Sampson, president and CEO of the American Property
Casualty Insurance Association, said the $200-383 billion per month loss
estimate assumes there could be as many as 30 million claims from small
business that suffered coronavirus-related losses. According to APCIA,
that is 10 times the most claims ever handled by the industry in one
year. The industry processed more than three million from the 2005
hurricane season that included Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Wilma and
several other storms, the trade group said.
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Second, as to insurer ability to pay: if the insurance industry were a
sovereign nation, it would have the third largest economy in the world. 75 Insurers
receive hundreds of billions of dollars in premium income alone each year, 76 which
in turn has usually been invested for some time before the funds are required to be
paid in claims. Insurance is generally a more consistently profitable business than
most, advantaged by its ability to amass large sums that can be invested, perhaps for
years (or decades in the case of liability insurance) before payment. This "float," as
Warren Buffett calls it, enables even insurers with weak underwriting to survive and
even thrive. Insurers with sound underwriting and investment do particularly well.77
So, what of the effect of the insurance industry's initial media messaging?
We are not in a position to pinpoint entirely the impact of the industry's anticoverage messaging on legal developments to date. We cannot count the claims that
Sampson said the combined capital of the top business insurance
underwriters represents only a fraction of the amount that might be
expected in coronavirus losses form just small businesses.
"Insurance stability is especially important in a time of increased
natural catastrophes. Spring flood season is underway, hurricane season
is around the corner, and wildfires pose a threat year-round," he said.
Simpson, supra note 66.
71 See Richard V. Ericson, Aaron Doyle & Dean Barry, Insurance as Governance,
1, 4
(2003) (noting the degree to which insurance shapes behavior by setting contours of coverage
and conduct in order to obtain insurance).
76 Ranked by 2019 net premiums written, the smallest of the Top 200 (HCI Ins. Group)
collects $228,488,000 in annual premiums; 82 insurers have $1 billion or more in annual
premium income. See Top 200 U.S. Property/CasualtyWriters, BEST'S REV. (July 2020),

http://www.ambest.com/review/displaychart.aspx?RecordCode=274586&src=43&_ga=2.
171650912.1123988532.1612739172-73892297.1612560642. Some household name
insurers have astounding volumes of premium income, e.g.: State Farm ($65.1 billion);
Berkshire Hathaway ($53.75 billion); Progressive ($37.6 billion); Allstate ($34 billion);
Liberty Mutual ($32.3 billion); Travelers ($27.2 billion); USAA ($23 billion); Chubb INA
($18.2 billion); Nationwide ($18 billion); AIG ($14.8 billion); Farmers ($14.5 billion);
Harford ($11.9 billion); American Family ($11.8 billion); Auto-Owners ($8.6 billion);
Fairfax ($7.6 billion); Erie ($7.5 billion). Id. Cincinnati Insurance, a defendant in several
prominent COVID coverage actions, received almost $5.4 billion in premiums in 2019. Id.
77 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Erik S. Knutsen & Peter N. Swisher, Principles of Insurance
Law § 1.06 (5th ed. 2020) ("A Note on Insurer Operations"); Stempel & Knutsen, supra note
33, at § 1.01 (describing insurer operations, using in part description provided by Buffett
(who is typically ranked as one of the world's ten richest people) in his annual letter to
Berkshire Hathaway shareholders; Berkshire's success, according to Buffett, is due in large
part to investment funds generated by its insurance and reinsurance operations).
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were not filed because a business or a business' lawyer read in the newspaper that
"COVID claims are not covered." Nor can we precisely discern the effect on judges
as the majority of COVID-related claims were dismissed in favor of insurers at the
pleadings stage (though we find that result quizzical). We have yet to learn the effect
of the messaging on lay juries, as these cases have not yet made it far enough in
litigation (because most are bounced out on the pleadings alone).
But we are able to say that perhaps it is more influential to get out in front
of a story and control the narrative than to be correct. If nearly every insurance trade
publication, lawyers' publication and popular news press sees the same message,
surely there must be some even subliminal effect on how one approaches the
insurance coverage question for COVID cases. Moreover, and most concerning to
us, there appear to be absolutely no ramifications if the message proffered in the
media is actually incorrect! Are we entering a new phase of insurer public relations
tactics that are, at least in part, designed with a motive to affect coverage results in
legal cases?
In Part III below, we explain how the main coverage question of "direct
physical loss or damage" is counter to the main thrust of the insurance industry's
message in the media to date. We conclude with our thoughts as to where the issues
will resolve in the end.
III.

THE KEY COVERAGE ISSUE: DISCERNING THE (REASONABLE)
MEANING(S) OF "DIRECT PHSYICAL LOSS OR DAMAGE"78
A.

THE INSURER ARGUMENT FOR REQUIRING TANGIBLE DESTRUCTION TO
TRIGGER COVERAGE

Insurer efforts to dismiss business interruption claims as strained have
resonated with most in the industry, including respected authorities who should in
our view be less dismissive of claims of loss or damage. A prominent editor of the
Fidelity, Casualty & Surety (FC&S) organization has, for example, approached the
question as follows.
When policies don't define a term, courts generally refer to a
standard dictionary. Merriam-Webster defines damage as "loss or
harm resulting from injury to person, property or reputation." This
78 In this article, we focus almost exclusively on coverage issues concerning
first-party
property insurance and its business interruption component as these policies have been those
at issue in the first wave of coverage litigation. We expect significant coverage litigation
concerning liability insurance to emerge in the future.
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is not definitive, so we look at the definitions of loss and harm. Loss
is defined as "destruction, ruin," and harm is defined as "physical
or mental damage."
The virus does not harm physical property. The virus may be
cleaned off like other germs or bacteria. The property does not need
to be replaced or repaired, just sanitized as advised by public health
authorities.79
Continuing in this vein, and seeking a trifecta of sorts of no coverage pursuant to
government order provisions plus the prevalent pollution exclusion, she wrote:
ISO has a mandatory virus and bacteria exclusion, but what about
carriers not using ISO forms? What about carriers that have adopted
parts of ISO forms, such as the business interruption language, but
have not adopted the rest and did not adopt the mandatory
endorsement?
The issue at hand with the virus is business interruption and action
of civil authority. Is there coverage when local authorities require
bars, restaurants, gyms and other establishments to close because of
the chances of spreading the virus? For this, we need to look at an
endorsement; for the sake of discussion, we are looking at the
Business Income (and Extra Expense) Coverage Form CP 00 30.
Coverage is provided for the actual loss of business income due to
the necessary suspension of business operations during the period
of restoration. The period of restoration must be due to direct
physical loss of or damage to coverage property. Also covered is
loss triggered by a civil authority prohibiting access to the insured
property because of damage to other property, but two conditions
must apply. That other property must be within one mile of the
insured property, and the action of the civil authority is taken in
response to dangerous physical conditions resulting form the loss,
continuation of the covered cause of loss that caused the damage, or
to allow the authority unimpeded access to the property.

79 Christine G. Barlow, Does COVID-19 Cause Physical Loss?, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER
1,
10
(May
2020),
https://www.property-casualtydigital.com/
propertycasualty/202005?pg=12#pg12.
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So herein lies the rub. Coverage is provided only when a property
has been physically damaged. COVI-19 does not cause physical
damage to property. Even if it is considered physical damage, then
you have the pollution exclusion to deal with, and the virus is a
pollutant. Pollutants are excluded when they are dispersed,
discharged, seep, migrate or otherwise escape. So it comes down to
whether an individual can be considered to be dispersing,
discharging, or otherwise releasing the virus, action that would
trigger the pollution exclusion.
Recently a physician from San Francisco attended a conference
with hundreds of other physicians in New York. Upon returning
home, he felt ill and was tested for the virus, which came back with
positive results. Those people attending the conference were
possibly exposed to the virus. Does this count as dispersing the
virus, even though unintentionally? It seems so.
This is different from closing businesses, because the threat of the
threat of exposure or spread of the virus, a threat is not physical
damage, and therefore there is no coverage. 80
B.

THE FLAWS OF THE INSURER-ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WISDOM

1.

Dictionary Fetishism: Improperly Collapsing "Loss" and
"Damage"

'

Notwithstanding our respect for this author and the FC&S organization, 8
we are constrained to disagree. Although the "Order of Civil Authority" coverage
provided in many policies is limited to four weeks of lost income 82 and the presence
of the basic ISO virus exclusion may typically preclude coverage, 83 the FC&S

80

Id. at 10-11.

And Ms. Barlow's dismissiveness toward COVID claims may be mild compared to
what is coming from another prominent coverage expert. See Bill Wilson, WHY INSURANCE
DOESN'T COVER THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC (2020) (e-book format released Oct. 29,
2020). Mr. Wilson is the author of the widely celebrated coverage analysis WHEN WORDS
81

COLLIDE: RESOLVING INSURANCE COVERAGE AND CLAIMS DISPUTES (2018).
82 See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text discussing order of civil authority
coverage.
83

See infra notes 180-202 and accompanying text discussing virus exclusion.
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analysis is severely deficient regarding the question of physical loss or damage and
utterly absurd regarding application of the pollution exclusion.84
Property insurance policies can vary significantly. While many do not
include business interruption or "business income" coverage (a plus for insurers in
light of the lost business revenue caused by COVID), many also lack a virus
exclusion (a plus for policyholders). But almost all make a finding of "direct
physical loss or damage" an initial requirement for coverage. 85 As discussed below,
in decades of coverage litigation preceding COVID claims, courts have divided over
the meaning of these terms. But prior to examining case law, courts might profitably
examine the facial clarity of these terms, neither of which is usually defined in the
insurance policy despite its separate "Definitions" section that normally contains
specifically defined terms.
FC&S's analysis tends not to look to case law but to focus on policy text.
This is historically a typical insurer response, as a contextless reading of insurance
policy terms most often favors the insurer. This is so because the policyholder
litigating the claim probably suffered a loss within the grey areas of coverage
(otherwise, why litigate?). The potential pitfalls of the standard insurer textual
approach are reflected in its analysis above: seek out the plain meaning of policy
terms so as to have the interpretive analysis stop at the plain meaning stage of
determining policy coverage-and thus avoid any interpretive ambiguity in the
meaning of those terms (otherwise, the policyholder-favoring tools of contra
proferentem or reasonable expectations are visited upon the entire analysis).
First, the insurer COVID coverage language assessment tends to collapse
the terms "loss" and "damage" into one-a rhetorical move that is both unwarranted
Due to space limitations, we will not present a full examination of the pollution
exclusion in the context of COVID-19 in this article. But for reasons we have set forth at
length elsewhere, it is absurdist textual literalism to argue that infection of premises by a
virus (or bacteria, fungus or the like) is "pollution" as the term is ordinarily understood. It is
similarly laughable to suggest that a conference attendee is "dispersing" "pollutants" when
sneezing. What, pray-tell, is next, insurers asserting that an attendee's nausea at the office
cocktail party is a pollution event? Such broad construction of an exclusion-part of the
insurance policy upon which the insurer bears the burden of persuasion must be narrowly
and strictly construed against the insurer who-would operate to undermine the basic
84

purpose of property insurance or liability insurance. See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note
33, at § 14.11; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Construing the "Absolute"
Pollution Exclusion in Context and in Light of its Purpose andParty Expectations, 34 TORT
& INS. L.J. 1 (1998); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unreason in Action: A Case Study in the Wrong
Approach to Construing the Liability InsurancePollution Exclusion, 50 FLA. L. REV. 463
(1998).
85 See French, supra note 4, at n. 21-22 and accompanying
text.
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(we think the two words are distinct) and misleading in its use of "the dictionary."
As the fetishism of textualism in American judicial interpretation of insurance policy
terms rages on, we think that taking the insurer-led textual charge head-on leads to
the opposite result that the insurers advocate. Indeed, this is doubly bizarre because
historically, insurers have favored a textualist and literalist approach to policy
language-probably because historically they have benefitted from such
application. But here, in determining coverage for "direct physical loss or damage,"
the use of one of the key textualist interpretive tools-the use of dictionary
definitions to discern the ordinary lay meaning of policy terms-actually spins
counter to insurer interests, when deployed properly.
Regarding the distinction between the words "loss" and "damage", it should
be noted that courts typically subscribe to the "surplusage" canon of construction,
which posits that each word in a document (statute, contract, regulation) should be
given its own meaning and not treated as a mere repetition by synonym. 86 Although
it is in some ways a problematic canon,8 7 it is nonetheless one of the "rules" of
interpretation. And insurers, when it suits their purpose, embrace the surplusage
canon.
For example, when litigating the application of the pollution exclusion,
insurers routinely argue that each of the seventeen words in the exclusion (e.g.,
irritant, contaminant, chemical, waste) deserves independent meaning rather than
reinforcing a core concept of pollution,88 with courts frequently agreeing and giving
86 The "surplusage" canon of construction posits that "[i]fpossible every
word and every
provision should be given effect (verba cum effectu sunt accipienda).None should needlessly
be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no
consequence. 'These words cannot be meaningless, else they would not have been

used." ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW:

THE INTERPRETATION OF

&

LEGAL TEXTS 174 (2012) (citing U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (Roberts, J.)).
87 See Laurence Solan & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rethinking Redundancy: The False
Premisesand Practicesof the Surplusage Canon (Jan. 2020) (manuscript on file with author)
(describing drawbacks of surplusage and tendence for drafters to use redundancy as a means
of attempting to achieve clarity). Accord, Ethan J. Leib & James Brudney, The Belt-andSuspenders Canon, 105 IOWA L. REv. 735 (2020) (suggesting that in practice many courts
treat drafting repetition as clarifying a particular intent rather than using each word to convey
its own concept).
88 The typical definition of "pollutants" in a standard form general liability, which has
been widely used for thirty years or more, includes "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal
irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, and
waste" with wasted "include[ing] materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed." See,
e.g., Commercial General Liability Policy Form CG 00 01 01 96, in DONALD S. MALECKI
ARTHUR L. FLITNER, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY 271 (6th ed. 1998).
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the words literal application even though they are contained in an exclusion that is,
according to contract construction rules, supposed to be strictly and narrowly
construed against the insurer with the insurer bearing the burden of persuasion to
demonstrate the applicability of the exclusion. 89 If the insurers are to be consistent
in their interpretative arguments, the word "loss" should be viewed as meaning
something different than "damage."
Perhaps more important, if one is "making a fortress" out of the dictionary
(something cautioned against by the great Second Circuit Judge Learned Hand),90
that fortress provides quite a lot of protection to policyholders-and this should be
conceded by insurer advocates, who have to date disappointingly taken a selfserving view of the terms "loss" and "damage," with too much acquiescence from
courts. Even if one is not ready to concede that dictionary definitions favor
policyholders more than insurers, it seems to us undeniable that there are many
dictionary entries supporting the policyholder perspective. This in turn means that
policyholder textual arguments are reasonable. And this further means that the term
See, e.g., QuadrantCorp. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 110 P.3d 733 (Wash. 2005) (taking
broad view of pollution exclusion as precluding coverage for policyholder negligence in
application of sealant exposing apartment resident to noxious fumes). See William P.
Shelley & Richard C. Mason, Application of the Absolute Pollution Exclusion to Toxic Tort
Claims: Will Courts Choose Policy Construction or Deconstruction?, 33 TORT & INS.
L.J. 749 (1998) (detailing a prominent insurer counsel advocate's broad application of the
exclusion to cover claims of policyholder negligent injury with any involvement of
chemicals).
89

90

See Cabnell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) ("But it is one of the surest

indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary;
but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose
sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.") By this, Judge
Hand sensibly meant that words should be construed in accord with party intent and overall
purpose rather than through textual assessment alone. We agree and also note that there may
well be extrinsic evidence supporting the insurance industry's view that when drafting
property policies, it intended to provide coverage only for the sort of tangible structural injury
that comes from external forces such as fire, windstorm, a sudden flooding, vandalism or
other actions that wreak palpable destruction on property. But to date, insurers have not done
so, preferring to fight on the metaphorical "hill" of ahistorical, acontextual textualism. In
COVID decisions to date, they have been holding that hill. Should they start to die on the
hill (e.g., if courts begin in greater degree to recognize that "physical loss or damage" does
not inexorably mean tangible destruction), one would expect them to proffer supporting
extrinsic evidence that this is what was meant or intended or required by sound risk
management practice. If they cannot provide such evidence, policyholders deserve to win
on the "physical loss or damage" question, even in jurisdictions with a weak application of
the contra proferentem principle.
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"physical loss or damage" is sufficiently ambiguous that policyholders should enjoy
the benefit of the contraproferentem principle and avoid dismissal of their claims
on this basis unless insurers can proffer sufficient extrinsic evidence to support their
preferred meaning of the term-something insurers have not done to date.
2.

Dictionary Definitions Support Policyholders as Least as Much
as Insurers

In arguing that coverage requires tangible destruction that can not be easily
rectified, FC&S refers to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, editions of which are on
our respective desks, but selects and presents the definitions in a pronouncedly antipolicyholder fashion. The more complete excerpt of key terms presented below
provides an alternative meaning of "loss" that distinguishes it from "damage."
damage [means] 1 : loss or harm resulting from injury to person,
property, or reputation . .
loss [means] 1 : DESTRUCTION, RUIN 2 a : the act of losing
possession b : the harm or privation resulting form loss or
separation c : an instance of losing . . . 4 a : failure to gain, win,
obtain, or utilize . . 5: decrease in amount, magnitude,
or degree...
lose [means] 1 a : to bring to destruction . . 3 : to suffer deprivation
of: part with esp. in an unforeseen or accidental manner . .. vi 1: to
undergo deprivation of something of value . .
physical [means] 1 a : having material existence : perceptible esp.
through the senses and subject to the laws of nature . . . b : of or
relating to material things .. .91
Applying this mix of Merriam-Webster definitions suggests that one might
reasonably find a "physical loss" when a policyholder is deprived of something
material-such as use of one's business, especially if the loss takes place in an
unanticipated manner through something like a pandemic that spurs governmentordered use of the business property.
Similarly, it is perfectly reasonable to state that one's physical property has
been lost or harmed or injured by a virus on surfaces or in the air on the property.
Insurers argue that because the virus can be "wiped off," there has been no loss or

91 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

291,

689, 689,

877

(10th ed.

1996).
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damage. The "virus damages lungs, not property"92 has become an insurance
industry aphorism akin to "the CGL [commercial general liability] policy is not a
performance bond," a cliche invoked by CGL insurers seeking to avoid coverage for
damage inflicted by defective construction. 93 Actually, the damages-lungs-notproperty mantra is more misleading.
The not-a-performance-bond trope is true as a general rule. But, as courts
have come to recognize almost uniformly, this general rule is not applicable where
a CGL policyholder's negligence inflicts damage (defined as "physical injury to
tangible property") upon other property and the CGL coverage is not based on
merely correcting substandard work but compensating victims for damage done to
other property by the substandard work.94
The damages-lungs-not-property trope is not true-period-or is only true
if one excises the word "loss" from the trigger term "physical loss or damage." Even
under the view that a cleaning will make infected property "as good as new" (which
may not be the case), the property has nonetheless been lost to its owner for at least
some period of time, perhaps a significant period of time depending upon the
cleaning and public health requirements to which the property is subject (let alone
serious public relations issues with regard to perceived safety of the premises).
Further, a facility in which COVID has been found is, at least temporarily,
"damaged" goods. The susceptibility of COVID to cleaning is relevant to questions
of the degree of injury and the period of restoration required for a COVID-infected
business. COVID infection is not the same as a fire or explosion, and in many cases
is more easily rectified than water damage from a burst pipe. But there nonetheless
is at least some physical damage and considerable physical loss of property if the
cleaning and disinfecting is time-consuming or if government authorities restrict
operation of the facility.
In addition, remediation of COVID damage to property is likely to be
fleeting in many situations. COVID-inflicted injury may be susceptible to

&

92 Transcript of Teleconference Order to Show Cause at 5:3-4, Soc. Life Magazine, Inc.
v. Sentinel Ins. Co., No. 20 Civ. 3311 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2020).
93 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rediscovering the Sawyer Solution: Bundling Risk for
Protectionand Profit, 11 RUTGERS J. OF L. & PUB. POL'Y 170, 210, n. 89 (2013) (noting the
prevalence of this argument by liability insurers in defective construction cases). See, e.g.,
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wenger, 278 S.E.2d 874 (Va. 1981) (exemplifying a general
liability insurer arguing to receptive court that coverage for construction defects, absent
injury to non-policyholder property, would improperly convert the liability policy into a
performance bond).
94 See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 33, at § 14.13; STEMPEL, SWISHER,
KNUTSEN, supra note 77, 657-61. See, e.g., Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, 673

N.W.2d 65 (Wis. 2004).
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disinfection but may be repeated within hours as customers or employees return to
a restaurant, bar, retail outlet, or factory. COVID damage may even be re-imposed
almost as quickly as it first struck if members of the cleaning crew are COVIDpositive, which may be the case even if the workers show no detectible symptoms
of infection.
A brief survey of other dictionaries reveals a nesting of definitions of the
key words of COVID coverage disputes that is more consistent with our broader
view of the meaning of the terms "physical loss or damage" than the seemingly
cherry-picked FC&S emphasis on irreversible tangibility as a prerequisite to finding
such loss or damage. Consider the following entries, all from mainstream sources.
damage [means] [i]mpairment of the usefulness or value of person
or property . .
loss [means] b. The condition of being deprived or bereaved of
something or someone . .
lose [means] 2.a. To come to be deprived of the ownership, care,
control of (something one has had) . . .9
or

damage [means] 1. Harm or injury to property or a person, resulting
in loss of value or the impairment of usefulness.
loss [means] 1. The act or an instance of losing . . b. The condition
of being deprived or bereaved of something or someone.
lose [means] 2a. To be deprived of (something one has had).
physical [means] 2. Of or relating to materials things . . 96
or
damage . . See breakage, harm [as a noun]. See injure [as a verb].
loss [means] The act or an instance of losing something : losing,
misplacement.... See also deprivation.
deprivation [means] The condition of being deprived for what one
once had or ought to have : deprival, dispossession, divestiture, loss,
privation.
lose [means] To be unable to find : mislay, misplace.

95 THE AMERICAN HERITGAE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 350, 801, 1031 (3rd ed. 1993).
96 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 357, 817, 818, 1050 (4th ed. 2004).
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physical [means] 1. Composed of or relating to things that occupy
space and can be perceived by the senses: concrete, corporeal,
material, objective, phenomenal, sensible, substantial, tangible.9 7
or
damage [means] 1. Impairment of the worth or usefulness of person
or property: harm.
loss [means] 1. The damage or suffering that is caused by losing.
2. One that is lost.
lose [means] 3. To be deprived of . .
physical [means] 1. Of or relating to the body rather than the
emotions or mind. 2. Material rather than imaginary. 3. a. Of,
pertaining to, or produced by nonliving matter and energy. 98
Perhaps most surprising is that many standard-fare dictionaries actually use
the term "damage" in defining the term "loss" to indicate that "loss" can mean "loss
of use" or deprivation of property.
3.

Apt Use of Dictionaries in COVID Coverage Controversies
Often Supports Coverage

This is perhaps the time to note that in most every dictionary, the order of
definitions does not proceed from most popular to least used, as many people
(including lawyers) often mistakenly think. Rather, the presentation proceeds from
earliest usage to most recent usage.99 The first definition presented is simply the
oldest and not the primary or best or most widely used or accepted definition. In
many cases, the oldest definition may be considerably less popular or representative
or "correct" than definitions listed later in the dictionary entry. As a result, we
believe it is inappropriate for courts or commentators to argue that a term is clear
and unambiguous based on presentation order in the dictionary. For example, a
lawyer's argument that definition number one is what was meant because it is the
first definition seems to us quite misplaced.
Insurers might seize upon this to suggest that a definition of "loss" that
includes "destruction" or "ruin"is the clearly correct definition because it emerged
97 ROGET'S II: THE NEW THESAURUS 105, 265, 117, 265, 314 (3d ed 1995).
98

WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 177, 407, 406, 515 (rev. ed. 1996).

99 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 19 (9th ed. 1984) (the "[o]rder of

senses [in the dictionary] is historical.").
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relatively later in the usage. But that is too ambitious a claim. Rather, each of the
different definitions in a dictionary entry would appear to us to be per se reasonable
constructions of the word, at least in the absence of context. Contextual material may
make it clear that Definition X should prevail rather than Definition Y. But to claim
that the words of the definitions themselves admit of clear choice strikes us as simply
incorrect.
In examining dictionary definitions, it is also important to remember the
dangers of motivated reasoning. As noted D.C. Circuit Judge Harold Leventhal
apparently observed when discussing court use of legislative history, it can be a bit
like "looking out over a crowd and spotting your friends."0 0 But the same, of course,
is true regarding selection of a preferred dictionary definition. Insurers (and, of
course, policyholders as well) know what they want to be the answer and will
naturally be drawn, at least subconsciously, to the definition that best meets their
coverage dispute and litigation needs. In addition, dictionary use may mislead
through simple happenstance when a judge (or law clerk or counsel writing a brief
that influences the judge) reaches for the dictionary that just happens to be on the
closest desk or shelf or reads only the first dictionary entry resulting from a browser
search. To the extent that there are differences in dictionaries, this human foible of
taking the path of least resistance may mislead. In addition, it has been our
experience that many dictionary users operate under the false impression that the
first definitional entry in a dictionary is the primary or main meaning of a term when,
as noted above, it is merely the earliest use of the term.
Thus, decision by dictionary is more than a little problematic.
Notwithstanding this human tendency, we think the above excerpts (and we could
have listed another dozen or two of similar definitions or associations) establishes
that the words "physical loss or damage" admit of construction quite favorable to
policyholders.' FC&S and others supporting insurers in the COVID coverage
100 See, e.g. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in
the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (citing a conversation with
Judge Leventhal), quoted in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Seivs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568
(2005); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (paraphrasing
Leventhal); Abner J. Mikva, StatutoryInterpretation:Getting the Law to Be Less Common,
50 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 981-82 (1989); Adam M. Samaha, Looking Over a Crowd-DoMore
Interpretive Sources Mean More Discretion?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554 (2017) (discussing the
genealogy and meaning of the quote attributed to Judge Leventhal).
"' Another possible avenue for assessing the meaning of text is corpus linguistics
analysis, which involves assessing the collates and clusters of words as an aid to
interpretation. See Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in
Legal Interpretation,6 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1311, 1315 (2017). Although in our view, it would
be a mistake to attach talismanic power to the use of big data in assessing insurance policy
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battles are simply not being fair or reasonable in arguing that this key coverage
provision "clearly" or "unambiguously" requires some sort of structural change of
insured property as a prerequisite to coverage. Too many courts have accepted this
unsupportable shibboleth. Even if their decisions finding no coverage are correct
(due to the presence of a virus exclusion or other bar to coverage), these courts have
done unnecessary "damage" to norms of insurance policy construction that impacts
not only COVID coverage claims but construction of insurance policies as a whole.
As discussed below, insurers typically argue that "damage" entails a
requirement of structural change in covered property and that "loss" is largely a
synonym for "damage." In our view, the term "loss" connotes something quite
different than "damage." For example, dictionaries commonly define "loss" as
deprivation of something (whether as a result of "damage," or theft or something
else). Government shutdown orders (described below) by definition deprive
policyholders of the use of their property-property that is physical, corporeal,
choate, and tangible. Although alternative definitions of loss are also common in
dictionaries, definitions connoting deprivation, lack of access, or the like are
sufficiently common that a reasonable interpreter must concede that the concept of
"loss" proffered by a policyholder forced to curtail operations is at least a reasonable
meaning of the term.
According to well-established ground rules for insurance policy
interpretation, if both policyholder and insurer have set forth reasonable
constructions of a term, the term is ambiguous and questions of meaning should be
resolved against the insurer that drafted the policy and in favor of the policyholder.
When this interpretative debate takes place at the motion to dismiss stage of
litigation, contra proferentem (which translates as "against the drafter") logically
should have particular force. An early ruling favoring the insurer's implicit argument
(that "loss" or "damage" requires structural change in property) effectively involved
the court ruling as a matter of law that a definition of loss drawn from dictionaries
is not reasonable-an absurd result. If such a construction of the term "loss" was not
reasonable, it presumably would not be in a published dictionary.
4.

Prior Insurer Industry Action Contradicts Insurers' Current
Interpretation Angle

In addition to taking an insurer-serving approach to defining "physical loss
or injury," the FC&S assertion that COVID claims fail to involve triggering loss is
term meaning, this sort of broader based linguistic analysis may be superior to simply
"looking it up" in the dictionary at random due to the potential unconscious bias or
happenstance of dictionary use.
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inconsistent with prior FC&S action. Consider, for example, the following FC&S
assessment that predated the COVID pandemic by eight years. An insurance agent
made the following inquiry.

"

Our insured accidently threw away some digital x-ray sensors in the
trash. Now, they want to be compensated for them. The BOP policy,
Section 1 Property, Coverage agreement states, "We will pay for
direct physical loss ....
I believe the coverage agreement precludes coverage as this is not
"direct physical loss." Nothing happened to them-they were
simply thrown away.
Do you believe coverage exists?
Oregon Subscribero2
FC&S replied as follows.
There is no exclusion that applies to this loss. There does not need
to be any impact on or damage to the items themselves for there to
be a direct physical loss-just like when items are stolen. But there
is a loss in that they are no longer available to the insured.1 03
If FC&S was being consistent with this prior analysis, it would have to
acknowledge that businesses forced to close due to either site-specific infection or
government mandate have suffered a loss in that the physical business facilities are
"no longer available" to them, at least until a government order is lifted or infected
property is cleaned and otherwise rehabilitated.
This prior inconsistent statement in the insurance press raises the spectre of
how important it is to view all media on an issue in its context and not simply that
purpose-built for a particular cause. If insurers wish to flood the current press with
commentary, past press on the same and related issues will require defense or
acknowledgement, to be fair.

102 Direct Physical Loss Under BOP, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER (June 27, 2011),
https://www.nuco.com/fcs/2011/07/12/direct-physical-loss-under-bop-422-12966.
103

Id
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Prior Judicial Treatment of the "Physical Loss or Damage"
Clauses Has Been More Favorable to Policyholders than Initial
COVID Coverage Decisions Suggest

The COVID insurance coverage cases to date have shown that courts prefer
some allegations of tangible physical harm to property that alters its essential
character and structure in order to trigger business interruption or civil authority
coverage for pandemic-related losses. "Direct physical loss of or damage to
property" thus seems to require that some external force touches the property and
alters it in order for insurance coverage to attach. There is no definition of the
coverage clause or its individual composite words in any property insurance policy.
In attempting to provide meaning to the coverage clause, courts may have
inadvertently hyper-focused on the parsed-out words of the clause as standing alone
(i.e. "physical," "loss' and "damage"). The dictionary sections noted in the prior
section underline the problems with doing so, because dictionary definitions are
inconsistent, are presented in chronological and not frequency order, and can be
cherry-picked to "say" what one wants.
Review of the current batch of COVID coverage cases shows that it is
possible in some jurisdictions that a policyholder does not need tangible structural
harm to property in order to trigger the coverage clause in the policy. The virus does
not need to "wreck" some property; it just has to be present to make the property
unusable to the policyholder. This reasoning tracks the better-reasoned decisions of
courts interpreting "direct physical loss" in other property insurance contexts.10 4
Courts have held that the following causes of loss are covered as "direct physical
loss or damage:"
a) noxious particles post-9/11 World Trade Center disaster;" 5
b) contamination with radioactive dust and radon gas;1 06

See Scott G. Johnson, What Constitutes Physical Loss or Damage in a Property
InsurancePolicy?, 54 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 95 (2019) (surveying caselaw and
finding trend and dominance of better reasoned decisions finding loss or damage without
palpable destruction or tangible structural alteration of property); Steven Plitt, Direct
Physical Loss in All-Risk Policies: The Modern Trend Does Not Require Specific Physical
Damage, Alternation, CLAIMS J. (Apr. 15, 2013), https://www.claimsjournal.com/
magazines/idea-exchange/2013/04/15/226666.htm.
05 Schlamm, Stone & Dolan, LLP v. Seneca Ins. Co., 800 N.Y.S.2d
356 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
106 Am. All. Ins. Co. v. Keleket X-Ray Corp., 248 F.2d 920, 925 (6th Cir.
1957).
104
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c) smoke from wildfires cancelling a theatre performance;10 7
d) unpleasant odor making premises uninhabitable (i.e. "locker
room" smell, cat urine, or meth lab);108
e) drywall
releasing
poisonous
gas
rendering
home
uninhabitable; 0 9
f) asbestos in carpeting impaired building's function;"
g) asbestos in buildings;1"
h) mold spores and bacteria rendering home uninhabitable;112
i) release of unknown substance in sewage treatment plant
causing plant shutdown;" 3
j) hidden building decay due to seawater damage;" 4
k) e-coli contamination in a well;" 5
1) carbon monoxide poisoning;'' 6
m) trace amounts of benzene in beverages;"1
n) metal parts contaminated with lead;" 8
o) salad dressing exposed to vaporized agricultural chemicals; "'
Or. Shakespeare Festival Ass'n v. Great Am. Ins. Co., No. 1:15-cv-01932-CL, 2016
WL 3267247, at *5 (D. Or. June 7, 2016).
108 Essex Ins. Co. v. BloomSouth Flooring Corp., 562 F.3d 399 (1st Cir.
2009) ("locker
room" smell); Mellinv. N. Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. 115 A.3d 799 (N.H. 2015) (cat urine odor);
Farmers Ins. Co. of Or. v. Trutanich, 858 P.2d 1332 (Or. 1993) (meth lab odor).
109 TRAVCO Ins. Co. v. Ward, 715 F. Supp. 2d 699, 708 (E.D.
Va. 2010).
110 Sentinel Mgmt. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 615 N.W.2d 819, 826 (Minn. 2000).
" Yale Univ. v. Cigna Ins. Co., 224 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 (D. Conn. 2002); Bd. of Educ.
of Twp. High School Dist. No. 211 v. Int'l Ins. Co., 720 N.E.2d 622, 625-26 (Ill. App. Ct.
1999).
112 Sullivan v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 956 A.2d 643 (Del. 2008); Prudential Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Lillard-Roberts, No. CV-01-1362-ST, 2002 WL 31495830, at *8-10 (D. Or. June
18, 2002) (applying Oregon law).
113 Azalea, Ltd. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 656 So. 2d 600, 602 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
114 Three Palms Pointe, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 250 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 136061 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
115 Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hardinger, 131 F.App'x 823, 823 (3d Cir. 2005).
116 Matzner v. Seaco Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 96-0498-B, 1998 WL 566658
(Mass. Super.
Aug. 12, 1998).
" National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Terra Indus., 346 F.3d 1160 (8th Cir.
2003).
118 Stack Metallurgical Servs., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., No. 05-1315-JE,
2007 WL 464715, at *2 (D. Or. Feb. 7, 2007).
119 Henri's Food Prods. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 474 F. Supp. 889, 892 (E.D. Wis. 1979)
(applying Wisconsin law).
107
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p)

loss of soil supports due to adjacent landslide, even though
home itself not damaged;12
church
of gas beneath
church
rendering
q) buildup
uninhabitable;121
r) ammonia release;1 2 2
s) infestation of brown recluse spiders;1 23
t) organisms in canned creamed corn;1 24 and
u) cereal oats treated with a non-FDA approved pesticide, even
though chemically identical to approved pesticide.1 25
There are also a much smaller group of cases which deny claims for what appear to
be very similar or even identical causes of loss like:
a) mold, which apparently could be removed by cleaning;1 26
b) odors or bacteria in an HVAC system;1 2 7 and
c) asbestos contamination which apparently did not alter the
structure of the building.1 2 8
The reasoning featured in the first list of cases finding coverage for more
ephemeral physical losses also tracks the better-reasoned decisions in recent cases
involving coverage for cyber-losses under property policies. Insurance claims for
electronic data losses also went through a similar wave as COVID insurance claims
as courts wrestled with whether or not electronic data stored on a computer could
experience a "direct physical loss or damage" because it appears to be intangible and

Hughes v. Potomac Ins. Co. of D.C., 199 Cal. App. 2d 239, 248 (1962).
W. Fire Ins. Co. v. First Presbyterian Church, 437 P.2d 52, 55 (Colo. 1968).
122 Gregory Packaging, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Co. of Am., No. 2:12-cv-04418,
2014 WL 6675934 at *5-6 (D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2014) (applying New Jersey and Georgia law).
123 Cook v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 48D02-0611-PL-01156, 2007 Ind. Super. LEXIS 32,
at *7-9 (Ind. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 2007).
124 Pillsbury Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 705 F. Supp. 1396, 1401 (D. Minn.
1989).
125 Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Gold Medal Ins. Co., 622 N.W.2d 147, 152 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2001).
126 Mastellone v. Lightning Rod Mut. Ins. Co., 884 N.E.2d 1130, 1144-45
(Ohio Ct.
App. 2008).
127 Universal Image Prods. v. Chubb Corp., 703 F. Supp. 2d 705, 713 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
128 Great N. Ins. Co. v. Benjamin Franklin Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 793
F. Supp. 259
(D. Or. 1990), aff'd, 953 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1992).
120
121
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is unseen by the naked eye, existing as data on a hard drive or in the online cloud.1 29
Courts have treated losses relating to electronic data and computer equipment in
sometimes strange ways.
The more reasonable and now widely accepted approach has been to find
that electronic data losses are capable of being covered as a "direct physical loss"
under a property policy when the data is corrupted, lost or damaged. Many courts
have found that, although data cannot be seen or touched, it nevertheless exists in
some fashion electronically and microscopically as property and can suffer a direct
physical loss.1'30 Indeed, it would be foolish to have a property policy cover data loss
if the data were stored in hard paper copy and destroyed, but then deny coverage for
a similar loss if the data exists in electronic form. That would make for perverse
record-keeping incentives.
Holding that a virus like COVID-19 can at least potentially damage property
makes sense in this regard. The virus does render surfaces unusable to humans for a
period of time. It is potentially deadly and spreads quickly, through touched surfaces
or the air. One would assume insurers would not want business owners putting
employees and customers in infected stores if such would vastly increase the risk of
an even larger claim if a person became ill or died (though such a claim would be
made under a different insurance product: liability insurance or workers
compensation).
The long list of cases that have considered various external forces' impact
on property as a "direct physical loss" demonstrate that courts are willing to find
coverage if the force is a disease-causing agent or poison, if it is purely airborne, and
if it does not permanently affect or even alter in any way the physical property
insured. "Loss" or "damage" can mean "lost to the policyholder" in terms of use, in
a variety of ways that do not involve actual physical destruction of the property.
The case law supports a conclusion that physical damage from a virus does
not have to be permanent; it can be transient.13' With a virus like COVID-19, an

12 9 See Stempel & Knutsen, supra note 33, at §23; Erik S. Knutsen & Jeffrey W. Stempel,

The Techno-Neutrality Solution to Navigating Insurance Coverage for Cyber Losses, 122
PA. STATE U. L. REV. 645, 646-47 (2018).
130 See, e.g., Ashland Hosp. Corp. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., No. 11-16-DLB-EBA, 2013
WL 4400516, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 14, 2013) (finding disk drive damage due to excessive
temperatures is a "direct physical loss" at a microscopic level); Se. Mental Health Ctr., Inc.
v. Pac. Ins. Co., 439 F. Supp. 2d 831, 837 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (finding data corrupted
by power loss at pharmacy is a covered "direct physical loss").
131 See, e.g., Phibro Animal Health Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, No.
A-5589-13T3, 2016 WL 3884255, at *9-10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July
14, 2016) (finding that medicine given to chickens that stunted their growth constituted

2020

INFECTED JUDGMENT

245

insured property may be impacted, and a loss may ensue in two typical scenarios:
immediately after an infected customer or employee becomes ill on the premises or,
more broadly, while the virus itself is highly prevalent in the community in question
and therefore must be on the premises.
For the first scenario-that of immediate infection of an employee-it
would seem that physical loss or damage would be simple to prove. There was virus
present on the property. No one can tell where it spread or on what surfaces. It may
well be in the air or ventilation system. Entry to the property is thus dangerous until
the illness reasonably subsides, decontamination has occurred, and it is again safe to
enter.

But for the second scenario-that of virus generally prevalent in the
community-can coverage attach simply because the illness is potentially 'out
there?' In that instance, reasoning such as that featured in the Studio 417, Inc. v.
Cincinnati Insurance Company 3 2 case is helpful: where the virus is so highly
prevalent such that a large proportion of the population is ill (and sometimes without
any knowledge of being ill) to the degree that civil authorities are making orders
restricting both use of property and peoples' movement, then one can probably
assume actual presence of virus on the property somehow, especially at a place of
business open to the public. At a certain point in time, the harm will of course
subside. Those cases holding that physical damage does not have to be permanent
to trigger coverage support reasoning that coverage would last as long as the danger
is rendering the property unfit for use.
A number of cases have found coverage due to the imminent threat of
physical loss or damage:
a) government shutdown due to impending riots; 133
b) evacuation from an imminent building collapse; 134
c) an impending hurricane; 135

property damage, despite the possibility of the chickens being restored to their original
conditions, because property damage need not be permanent).
132
No.
20-cv-03127-SRB, 2020
WL 4692385
(W.D.
Mo.
Aug.
12,
2020)133(applying Missouri law).
See, e.g., Sloan v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 207 N.W.2d 434, 437 (Ct. App. Mich.
1973) (finding loss of use due to government shutdown in response to riots is covered even
though there is no direct physical loss to property).
134 See, e.g., Hampton Foods, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 787 F.2d 349, 352 (8th Cir.
1986).
135 See, e.g., Houston Cas. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. H-05-1804, 2006 WL
7348102, at *6 (S.D. Tex. June 15, 2006) (finding coverage for business interruption due to
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d) imminent landslide;1 36
e) imminent threat of release of asbestos fibres.13 7
However, other cases have found that fears of future threats did not
constitute a covered loss because there was no loss to property.1 38
The threat of something can make property uninhabitable. The threat of
COVID-19 is quite serious: the virus is highly contagious, spreads through the air
and surfaces, and can be deadly. Those in close indoor quarters to the virus also have
a high possibility of contracting the disease. To that end, the COVID-19 situation
perhaps differs from those cases that have found that future threats did not equate to
a loss in property. The possibility of damage in the COVID-19 situation is relatively
high if virus is in the vicinity. It is not like taking a preventative measure after an
event out of concern for a follow-up event (like ordering a curfew after a socially
disruptive event). Rather, it is a highly likely scenario that putting someone in close
indoor proximity to the virus will make that person ill. It is more similar to the
impending earthquake and hurricane cases where one knows the event is on its way,
than it is to those where losses stemmed from concerns of more vague future events
occurring. With COVID-19, a significant number of people sufficiently exposed
indoors will get sick.
This highlights one other area of coverage concern: actual physical damage
versus loss of use or function of property to the policyholder. There is support in

evacuation arising from impending Hurricane Floyd, even though policyholder did not suffer
physical damage to property from hurricane).
136 See, e.g., Murray v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 509 S.E.2d
1, 16-17 (W. Va.
1998) (finding threat of imminent landslide enough to satisfy "direct physical loss" for
coverage to attach).
137 Port Auth. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 226, 236 (3d Cir. 2002).
138 See, e.g., United Air Lines v. Ins. Co. State of Pa., 439 F.3d 128, 133-35 (2d Cir.
2006) (finding no civil authority coverage where a government halt of airport operations is
based on fears of future attacks after Sept. 11, 2001 and no property damage to adjacent
property); Paradies Shops, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 1:03-CV-3154-JEC, 2004 WL
5704715, at *6-8 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 15, 2004) (finding no property damage from air ground
stop order after Sept. 11, 2001 as the order did not prohibit access to airports and their
businesses); Syufy Enters. v. Home Ins. Co. of Ind., No. 94-0756 FMS, 1995 WL 129229,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 1995) (finding curfews imposed to curb looting were not the result
of damage to adjacent property); Two Caesars Corp. v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y., 280 A.2d
305, 307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (finding acts of avoiding civil unrest had no causal relation to
damage to property).
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case law such as Gregory Packaging139 where loss of use or function of a particular
property can equate to direct physical loss without tangible physical harm to the
property. While property may not be permanently damaged by COVID-19, a
policyholder loses the use of that property in a reasonable fashion if there is an
infection on the premises or the virus present in the surroundings. Some courts have
held that the disjunctive "or" between "physical loss of or damage to" property must
mean that "loss" must mean something different than "damage" (typically it is held
to mean an absence of property, as in theft). In that regard, "loss" could mean "loss
of use" or "loss of function" such that it renders the property useless to the
policyholder (i.e. if you lost the useful use of the property, it is as if you lost it, even
though it did not physically go away). In fact, the textualist dictionary analysis as
noted above also provides support for "loss" equating to "loss of use."
There is, however, a line of cases often cited by courts adjudicating this first
wave of COVID insurance coverage cases-from Source Food Technology, Inc. v.
UnitedStates Fidelity and GuarantyCo.14 0 and Mama Jo's, Inc. v. Sparta Insurance
Co. 4' 1 -that would hold that only tangible physical alteration of property would
qualify as "direct physical loss or damage." But unlike in those cases, where the
courts held respectively that an import ban did not damage imported beef or
construction dust did not damage music speakers, the COVID-19 situation has a
dangerous substance actually physically present on the property, either in the air or
through employees and customers spreading it. This tracks the reasoning in COVID
insurance coverage cases finding for the policyholder like Studio 417,142 Blue
Springs Dental Care v. Owners Ins. Co 43 and Mudpie, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty
Ins. Co. of America,'44 where the courts there held that pleading actual physical
presence of the virus made the analytical difference in proving coverage through a
"direct physical loss."145 Indeed, in many of the past non-COVID cases that found a
"direct physical loss" due to the invasion of some harmful substance, the substance
139 Gregory Packaging, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., No. 2:12-CV-04418
WHW, 2014 WL 6675934, at *8 (D. N.J. Nov. 25, 2014) (applying New Jersey and Georgia

law).
140 465 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying Minnesota law).
141 823 Fed. App'x 868 (11th Cir. 2020) (applying Florida law).
142 2020 WL 4692385 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 12, 2020) (applying Missouri law).
143 No. 20-CV-00383-SRB, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172639 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 21, 2020).
44 No. 20-CV-03213-JST, 2020 WL5525171 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2020) (applying
California law).
45 We discuss these cases, particularly Studio 417, supra note 142, in more detail in the
next section, infra, as we find their reasoning quite superior to that of most of the courts
dismissing policyholder claims on grounds of no physical loss or damage-as a matter of

law.
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merely resulted in the property owner not being able to use the property until
decontamination occurred. This strongly suggests that dismissing COVID claims
merely because property can be disinfected is incorrect.
In some jurisdictions, merely partially restricted access to a property does
not equate to a prohibition of access by civil authority.1 46 In other instances, a
recommendation from a civil authority (as opposed to a direct command) may be
not enough to provide coverage because access was not "prohibited."1 47 For COVID19-related losses, it can be challenging to argue that government ordered alterations
in service provision-such as a mandated move from in-person dining to take-out
and delivery only-results in lost or restricted access to the property or even use of
the property.1 48 However, on balance, a restaurant faced with this imposed condition
could certainly argue that a large proportion of its property typically used for dinein customers has been rendered entirely unusable by a civil authority.1 4 9
As the cases now stand, courts appear to be receptive to finding coverage
for direct physical loss or damage if the policyholder alleges some factual aspects of
physical presence of the virus on the commercial premises. The courts in Studio 417
and Blue Springs Dental Care found the possibility of coverage for this reason and
See, e.g., Ski Shawnee, Inc. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., No. 3:09-CV-02391, 2010
WL 2696782 (M.D. Pa. July 6, 2010) (stating there is no coverage when Department of
Transport closed main route to policyholder's ski resort because customers could travel to
the resort via an alternate route); Abner, Herrman & Brock, Inc. v. Great N. Ins. Co., 308 F.
Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that after World Trade Center disaster, civil authority
coverage only provided where order completely prohibited access to property and not during
periods where traffic restrictions made access merely more difficult); 54th St. Ltd. Partners
v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 306 A.D.2d 67 (asserting that although traffic to property was
diverted, the public was not denied access).
147 See, e.g., Kean Miller LLP v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, No. 06-770-C, 2007
WL 2489711, at *6 (M.D. La. Aug. 29, 2007) (holding that an advisory to stay off streets
during Hurricane Katrina did not prohibit access; no civil authority coverage).
148 See, e.g., Phila. Parking Auth. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 385 F. Supp. 2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(finding that government order eliminated need for policyholder's parking services but did
not prohibit access to its garage).
149 Although this line of argument was unsuccessful in Henry's La. Grill, Inc. v. Allied
Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:20-cv-2939-TWT, 2020 WL 5938755 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 2020)
(applying Georgia law), where the policyholder restaurant argued that a physical change to
the property had occurred because the restaurant had to reconfigure its premises for take-out,
not dine-in, as a result of governmental orders. The court held that "loss" means "total
destruction" and simply moving things around was not a "loss" or "damage." See also Hajer
v. Ohio Sec. Ins. Co., No. 6:20-cv-00283, 2020 WL 7211636 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2020)
(applying Texas law) (finding no damage and dismissing case after policyholder argued it
had to physically alter its rug business to follow governmental safety order).
146
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the court in Mudpie notes it would have, had the policyholder alleged the
of the virus.
At its heart, this logic follows the case law stemming from
Packaging as opposed to the Source Foods/Mama Jo's line of reasoning.
or not there needs to be tangible physical damage to property in order for
to be triggered, there must be some invasion of the virus physically on the
in question for coverage to attach.
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THE DISAPPOINTING EARLY CASELAW CONCERNING
COVID-19 BUSINESS INTERRUPTION CLAIMS
A.

THE PREVAIING ANALYSIS

Cases testing the extent of business interruption insurance coverage for
COVID-19 pandemic-related losses are still winding their way through the legal
system. To date, court decisions have been made largely in the context of motions
to dismiss a policyholder's claim on the pleadings, with no factual record except the
pleadings taken by the court as true. Thus, the emerging caselaw is currently limited
in its predictive ability as a fulsome canvassing of the issues.
Two distinct lines of reasoning and factual trends have emerged thus far in
the case law. Courts are split as to whether the main coverage clause which requires
"direct physical loss of or damage to" covered property is even triggered as a result
of COVID-19 business interruption losses.
The majority of decisions to date have held that, for "direct physical loss of
or damage to" property to have occurred, the property in question must have been
physically altered in some tangible fashion. As COVID-19 does not permanently
alter the physical characteristics of property, but rather makes people ill by infecting
through the air or on touchable surfaces, most courts have found that there is thus
no coverage for business interruption losses unless the policyholder specifically
alleges the actual physical presence of the virus was on its premises (i.e. on surfaces,
in the air, or through infected customers or employees).
If a policyholder alleges physical presence of the virus, some courts to date
have found that the covered property was requisitely affected directly and physically
by the alleged presence of the virus, even though the virus is microscopic and the
property itself appears to be capable of decontamination. The loss of use of the
property either through necessary decontamination or as a result of virus presence
was enough for those courts to hold that business interruption coverage was
triggered as a result of "direct physical loss of or damage to" property.
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When determining coverage for losses resulting from civil authority orders,
courts have split along the same line. If a policyholder can allege the actual physical
presence of the virus on adjacent property that resulted in the order being made, the
claim is not dismissed. However, if there are no allegations of the physical presence
of the virus on other or adjacent property that prompted governmental authorities to
restrict property access, governmental orders to quell the spread of the virus are not
enough to trigger loss of use of the property to a degree that it is "direct" and
"physical." These courts denying coverage rest their reasoning on a causation
analysis: the virus, not the orders, caused the loss and the virus does not cause direct
physical loss unless actual tangible property damage is alleged.
If a property policy has an exclusion for losses caused by viruses or bacteria,
courts appear to be ready to deny coverage to policyholders on the face of the
exclusionary language, without much more than a cursory analysis. Courts appear
to link the cause of any governmental orders restricting property access to the reason
for those orders: the virus, an excluded cause of loss. If the virus exclusion has an
anti-concurrent cause clause, courts appear even more ready to deny coverage for
business interruption or civil authority claims without much substantive analysis.
The cases wrestling with coverage for pandemic-related losses due to
COVID-19 commonly engage with lines of reasoning from three prior precedents:
the 11th Circuit 2020 decision in Mama Jo's, Inc. v. Sparta Insurance Co.' 0
(applying Florida law), the 2014 U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
case of Gregory Packaging, Inc. v. Travelers Property and Casualty Co. of
5
America1
' (applying New Jersey and Georgia law), and the 8th Circuit 2006
decision in Source Food Technology, Inc. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co.' 5 2 (applying Minnesota law). These cases highlight the tension between two
possible approaches to pandemic-related insurance coverage issues: a strict
requirement that the insured property suffer tangible physical alteration to property
as a result of some external force (the Mama Jo's and Source Food approach) versus
the notion of loss of "use" of the property equating to physical loss or damage to
property, even though the physical property itself is not permanently altered by some
external force (the Gregory Packaging approach).
In Mama Jo's, the policyholder restaurant was denied its business
interruption and remediation claims when the restaurant's lighting and audio
equipment was coated with dust from outside road construction. Under Florida law,
the court held that surfaces that can be cleaned have not suffered a direct physical
150

823 Fed. App'x 868 (11th Cir. 2020) (applying Florida law).

No. 2:12-CV-04418, 2014 WL 6675934 (D. N.J. Nov. 25, 2014) (applying New
Jersey and Georgia law).
152 465 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2006)(applying Minnesota law).
'5'
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loss: the damage must be tangible and physical, resulting in an actual change in the
property. Although dust in the accumulations involved in that case is a tangible
contaminant, the court regarded the property as undamaged because it could be
wiped away, even though cleaning on this scale exceeded that required for normal
business operations.
In Source Food Technology, a beef wholesaler brought a claim for business
interruption insurance due to lost revenue resulting from an embargo of Canadian
beef after reports of "mad cow" disease. Source Food's sole supplier of beef was
located in Ontario, Canada. The beef was not contaminated by mad cow disease.
The claim for losses was as a result of the inability to ship the beef across the border.
The court held that there was no direct physical loss or damage to the beef-it simply
could not be shipped across the border. Thus, there was no coverage for the loss.
The court specifically refused to adopt the position that "direct physical loss or
damage is established whenever property cannot be used for its intended purpose."1 53
A different approach was taken by the court in Gregory Packaging.5 1 In
that case, the accidental release of ammonia in a juice box manufacturing plant
required that the facility be decontaminated and evacuated. According to the court,
the ammonia release physically transformed the air within the manufacturer's
facility to make it unsafe. Because the facility was unusable for a period of time, the
court held that the property suffered a direct physical loss. Even though, under
Georgia law, coverage requires an actual physical change in property, the court held
that that requirement was satisfied because the ammonia release physically changed
the facility's condition to such a state that it needed repair.
B.

MISAPPLYING TRADITIONAL CONTRACT AND INSURANCE LAW

Our own preference is for the Gregory Packaging approach rather than the
Mama Jo's or Source Foods approach. But we find the early cases dismissing
policyholder COVID claims disturbing not only because of their doctrinal choices
but also because they in our view reflect a reductionist view and absence of judicial
humility. In particular, the courts finding no "direct physical loss or damage" have
been insufficiently appreciative of the range of meanings for these words that in turn
makes it inappropriate for courts to declare a lack of triggering loss or damage as a
matter of law.

1 53

Id. at 838 (citing Marshall Produce Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 98 N.W.2d
280 (Minn. 1959)).
154 2014 WL 6675934 (applying New Jersey
Law).
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Glib Tautology and False Consensus Bias

Particularly troubling examples are Social Life Magazine, Inc. v. Sentinel
InsuranceCompany 5 5 (in which the court blithely declared that there was no loss or
damage to covered property because COVID "damages lungs. It doesn't damage
printing presses"), Sandy Point Dental, PC v. Cincinnati Insurance Company,156
57
GavrilidesManagment Company. v. MichiganInsurance Company,?
and Rose's 1,
5
8
LLC v. Erie Insurance Exchange.1
The Social Life Magazine statement may make for a clever punchline but it
is not even particularly accurate as a medical statement, let alone as an analysis of
potential insurance coverage.1 59 COVID's impact is not confined to lungs but
includes many other organs such as kidneys and the brain as well as senses of hearing
and smell.1'60 More to the point for insurance purposes, viral infestation of a printing
155 No. 1:20-cv-03311-VEC (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2020).
156 No. 20 CV 2160, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171979 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21,
2020).
157 No. 20-000258-CB (Mich. Cir. Ct., Ingham Cty. July 1, 2020) (explaining
that direct
physical loss to property requires tangible alteration or damage that impacts the integrity of
the property, and dismissing the case because plaintiff failed to allege that the coronavirus
had any impact to the premises).
158 No. 2020 CA 002424 B, 2020 WL 4589206, at *5 (D.C. Super. Aug. 6, 2020)
(granting summary judgment for insurer on restaurant's claims of lost business caused by
coronavirus closure orders because there was no direct physical loss to property).
159 A similar sort of reasoning featured in Plan Check Downtown III, LLC v. Amguard
Ins. Co., No. cv 20-6954-GW-Skx, 2020 WL 5742712 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2020) (applying
California law), where a restaurant's claim was dismissed because the court anchored its
finding that "loss" requires tangible alteration to property because otherwise any regulatory
change from any governmental order that affected any business in any fashion would trigger
business interruption insurance. It went further to opine that even a snowstorm interferes
with "use" of premises for the business by customers and employees and surely covering
losses from snowstorms would make business interruption coverage far too broad.
160 The same concept was picked up by the court in Uncork & Create LLC, v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., No. 2:20-cv-00401, 2020 WL 6436948 (S.D.W. Va.) (applying West Virginia law)
which denied coverage and went so far as to state that it would deny coverage even if there
was physical presence of the virus. The court held that COVID-19 does not harm inanimate
structures, can be eliminated with disinfectant and routine cleaning. Id. at 5. The court went
so far as to state that even the actual presence of the virus on the property is not enough to
trigger the coverage clause "physical damage or physical loss to the property." Id. at 6. See
also Promotional Headwear Int'l v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-2211-JAR-GEB, 2020
WL 7078735 (D. Kan. Dec. 3, 2020) (applying Kansas law) where the court (on a motion to
dismiss on the pleadings!) does not accept the policyholder's allegations that the virus
contaminated its property, citing both Source Food Technology, Inc. and Mama Jo's, Inc.;
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facility does, for the reasons discussed above, damage the facility's air quality and
its equipment. Although the "fix" may be relatively straight-forward cleaning, it is
damage nonetheless and renders the facility unusable until cleaned-a process that
may become so repetetive due to re-infection as to constitute long-term damage and
loss of use. More important, if this and other pandemic injury result in governmentordered limitations on operation of the policyholder's property, this produces rather
direct physical loss to the policyholder.
Sandy Point Dentalmakes a similarly breezy and overly restrictive reading
of the direct physical loss or damage trigger. Although the court recognizes that
Illinois law is applicable, it cites no Illinois cases regarding loss or damage' 6 ' even
though there are important state law decisions finding that adulterated air or surfaces
can constitute physical damage to property. 6 2 If Sandy Point Dental had merely
Terry Black's Barbecue, LLC v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:20-cv-665-RP, 2020 WL
7351246 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2020) (applying Texas law) (citing Uncork & Create, LLC
and holding that, even assuming the virus is present, the court held it can be cleaned).
161 The Sandy Point Dental court's citation of Illinois law is limited to general
pronouncements, including the axiom that a court construing an insurance policy should be
"giving effect to every provision, if possible, because it must be assumed that every provision
was intended to serve a purpose." No. 20-cv-2160, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171979, at *3-4
(quoting Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Swiderski Elecs., Inc., 860 N.E. 307, 314 (Ill. 2006). But
this "surplusage" canon of construction (discussed supra text accompanying notes 85-86)
augers in favor of giving "loss" a sufficiently distinct meaning from "damage." But instead
of doing this, the Sandy Point Dental court treats the words as synonyms but then focuses
only on the term "damage," which connotes more tangibility than "loss." The court also
notes that Illinois requires words in a policy to be giving their "plain, ordinary, and popular
meaning." See U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171979 at *4 (citing Central Ill. Light Co. v. Homes Ins.
Co., 821 N.E.2d 206, 213 (Ill. 2004)). As previously discussed, (see supra test accompanying
notes 90-99), there is ample evidence in dictionaries and thesauruses suggesting the plain
and ordinary meaning approach augers in favor of finding loss when a policyholder's use of
property is restricted by viral infection or government order.
162 Illinois has had more than its share of asbestos coverage cases, the bulk of which
have concluded that the presence of asbestos materials in a structure or in the interior air of
a building constitutes physical damage. See, e.g., J.R. French Auto. Castings, Inc. v. Factory
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 02-c-9479, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13060 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2003) (noting
that the presence of human remains in a press machine constituted contamination that was
physical damage even though equipment not tangibly structurally altered but no coverage
because of exclusionary language in policy); Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Board of Educ., No.
90-c-6040, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15151 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 1992) (noting that contaminated
air is physical damage and the inability to use because of contamination is physical loss);
Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. Prot. Mut. Ins. Co., 655 N.E.2d 842 (Ill. 1995) (finding no
duty to defend because a formal lawsuit was not filed but suggesting that contamination can
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followed this applicable law, it would have reached a correct decision on the motion
to dismiss. But the court simply failed to locate (whether due to deficient advocacy
or something else) or examine these precedents.
In addition, the Sandy Point Dental court seems to have forgotten that even
in a world of heightened pleading requirements, the court faced with a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss must (absent extreme circumstances) treat the allegations of the
plaintiff's complaint as true.1 63 Instead, the court in essence second-guessed those
allegations, with the judge refusing to accept them at face value.
And in perhaps its lowest moment of judicial craft, Sandy Point Dental
sought to distinguish an important decision favoring the policyholder.
Plaintiff heavily relies on Studio 417 Inc. v. The Cincinnati
Insurance Company, 20 C 3127-SRB, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
147600 (S.D. Mo. Aug. 12, 2020), a Missouri case that found that
the coronavirus caused a physical loss to property warranting
insurance coverage. That court rested its decision on that policy's
expansive language, language very different from the policy in the
instant case. The unambiguous language in the instant policy
warrants
a different conclusion-physical
damage that
demonstrably alters the property is necessary for coverage, and the
coronavirus does not cause physical damage.1 64
Unfortunately, Sandy Point's characterization is simply not true. The
Cincinnati policy form at issue in Studio 417 (and the KC Hopps and Blue Springs
Dental cases also decided in the Western District of Missouri) is the same (at least
regarding the direct physical loss requirement and the absence of a virus exclusion)
as the Cincinnati policy at issue in Sandy Point.
In an opinion read from the bench, Gavrilides Management,165 like Sandy
Point, conflates the term "loss" and the term "damage," robbing them of their
respectively different connotations and emphases. Worse yet, it engrafts on the term

be physical damage and lack of access can be physical loss of property); Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. LKQ Smart Parts, Inc., 963 N.E.2d 930 (Ill. Ct. App. 2011) (noting
that the deprivation of use of a vehicle is physical loss) (but there was also tangible physical

damage to vehicle); Board of Educ. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 720 N.E.2d 622 (Ill. Ct. App. 1999)
(finding that the presence of asbestos fibers in air constituted physical damage to property).
16 3 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); BROOKE D. COLEMAN, ET AL., LEARNING
CIVIL PROCEDURE 285-302 (3d ed. 2018).
164 No. 20-cv-2160, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171979, at *7
n. 2.
165 No. 20-000258-CB (Mich. Cir. Ct., Ingham Cty. July 1, 2020).
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(having collapsed loss and damage into one) a requirement that property must have
been permanently, structurally altered to be considered sufficiently "damaged" to
merit coverage from the property insurer that, in return for premium dollars
(sometimes years of premium dollars), promised to indemnify the policyholder from
property loss and attendant business revenue loss.
Although one can argue that this was a correct reading of Michigan law, we
are not convinced in that there appears to be no controlling Michigan precedent
requiring this approach, which essentially denies coverage unless property is
crushed.1 66 Consequently, although not compelled to take a more nuanced view of
the loss-or-damage requirement, the Gavrilides Management judge could (and in
our view should) have done so.
Rose's 1, LLC v. Erie Insurance Exchange,167 is disturbing in that, as that
court acknowledges, the policyholder proffered definitions of the terms "loss" and
"damage" that supported its position. But the court essentially ignored these
definitions and adopted definitions it prepared-refusing to recognize that
reasonable alternative constructions of a term or provision create ambiguity
requiring resolution against the insurer. This is certainly true at the pleading stage.
Although Rose 's 1 was a summary judgment decision, we think the same caution in
terminating a case in the face of reasonable conflicting constructions of a policy
should govern.
It appears that despite the summary judgment posture of the case, the record
before the court did not include any extrinsic or discovery-unearthed evidence
illuminating the meaning of policy language. Rather, the parties appear to have
briefed the case based on textual argument alone, making the posture of the case
akin to a 12(b)(6) motion. But instead of deferring to the facts as alleged and
resolving any reasonable doubts against the nonmovant, the Rose 's 1 court granted
summary judgment after it concluded-based on nothing we can discern-that
"loss" requires "a direct physical intrusion on to the insured property."1 68 As we

Although there are federal trial court cases requiring structural change to property to
constitute sufficient physical loss or damage, there does not appear to be state court precedent
binding on the Gavriladescourt. But see Universal Image Prod. v. Chubb Corp., 703 F. Supp.
2d 705 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (finding that intangible harms such as odor or mold contamination
insufficient to constitute physical loss or damage even though property was rendered
unusable).
167 No. 2020-CA-002424-B, 2020 WL 4589206 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2020) (granting
summary judgment for insurer on restaurant's claims of lost business caused by coronavirus
closure
orders because there was no direct physical loss to property).
168 Id. at *7.
166
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hope we have demonstrated, government orders limiting or forbidding use of
physical facilities constitute a physical loss to the owner.
Diesel Barbershop, LLC v. State Farm Lloyds1 69 displays a similarly
disturbing approach to textual analysis. The court, like others finding for insurers,
collapses what should be the distinct terms "loss" and "damage" and despite the
many dictionary and thesaurus entries supporting a reading of the policy favorable
to policyholders, selects the entries most favorable to the insurer contention
requiring tangible and rather substantial, long-lasting, structural and character
altering injury before there can be coverage. Likewise, the real loss of a physical
facility due to COVID-spurred government restriction is given short shrift. To be
fair, the Diesel Barbershop court recognizes cases that "some courts have found
physical loss even without tangible destruction to the covered property." 7 0
However, "[e]ven so," Diesel Barbershop found "that the line of cases requiring
tangible injury to property are more persuasive here."'7 ' That was in essence the
scope and depth of the court's "analysis."
The problem with the court's conclusion is that it was to a large degree not
the court's decision to make if it was following the rules of insurance policy
construction. Because ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the policyholder
that did not draft the language at issue, a policyholder that proffers a reasonable
construction of disputed language (such as "loss" or "damage") is entitled to the
benefit of the doubt-at least regarding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion where another wellestablished "rule" is that the allegations of plaintiff policyholder's complaint must
be accepted as true. Discovery may later provide information refuting those
allegations and supporting the defendant insurer. But until such time as such
discovery takes place, the factual universe upon which the court decides is supposed
to be limited to the complaint.
Although research (such as reading dictionaries or cases) may bring
extrinsic material into the inquiry, the policyholder need not shoulder the ultimate
burden of persuasion at this stage of the litigation. It need only set forth a reasonable
construction of the policy language that supports its claim for coverage.
Policyholders seeking COVID coverage have done that. They may ultimately lose
No. 5:20-CV-461-DAE, 2020 WL 4724305, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2020)
(granting a motion to dismiss because the coronavirus did not cause a direct physical loss,
and "the loss needs to have been a 'distinct, demonstrable physical alteration of the
169

property."') (citing Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 181 F.App'x
465, 470 (5th Cir. May 25, 2006)).
17011d. at *14-15.
171 Id. at *15-16 (concluding that "the other cases [finding loss or damage] are

distinguishable.").
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due to further factual development establishing lack of loss or damage or due to
application of a virus exclusion or other factors. But they should not lose on the
loss/damage issue at this stage of litigation.
These and other decisions1 72 in which courts are willing to declare as a
matter of law that the words "direct physical loss or damage" require structural
See, e.g., Mark's Engine Co. No. 28 Rest., LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co.
of Conn.,
No. 2:20-cv-04423-AB-SK, 2020 WL 5938689 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2020) (applying California
law) (involving a restaurant that claimed losses due to orders requiring take-out or delivery
service only); Promotional Headwear Int'l v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-2211-JAR-GEB,
2020 WL 7078735 (D. Kan. Dec. 3, 2020) (applying Kansas law) (citing both Source Food
and Mama Jo's to hold that physical alteration of property required for coverage to attach);
Infinity Exhibits, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, No. 8:20-cv-1605-T30AEP, 2020 WL 5791583 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2020) (applying Florida law); Hillcrest
Optical, Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., No. 1:20-CV-275-JB-B, 2020 WL 6163142 (S.D. Ala. Oct.
21, 2020) (applying Alabama law); Raymond H Nahmad DDS PA v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co.,
No. 1:20-cv-22833-BLOOM/Louis, 2020 WL 6392841 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2020) (applying
Florida law); Palmer Holdings & Invs., Inc. v. Integrity Ins. Co., No. 4:20 -cv-154-JAJ, 2020
WL 7258857 (S.D. Iowa) (applying Iowa law); T&E Chicago LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co.,
No. 20 C 4001, 2020 W16801845 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2020) (applying Illinois law); Whiskey
River on Vintage, Inc., v. Ill. Cas. Co., No. 4:20-cv-185-JAJ, 2020 WL 7258575 (S.D. Iowa
Nov. 30, 2020) (applying Iowa law); Zwillo V, Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 4:20-00339CV-RK, 2020 WL 7137110 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 2, 2020) (applying Missouri law); Water Sports
Kauai, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-03750-WHO, 2020 WL 6562332 (N.D.
Cal Nov. 9, 2020) (applying Hawai'ian law); Long Affair Carpet & Rug, Inc. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., No.: SACV 20-01713-CJC(JDEx), 2020 WL 6865774 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2020)
(applying California law); Michael Cette, Inc. v. Admiral Indem. Co., 20 Civ. 4612 (JPC),
2020 WL 7321405 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2020) (applying New York law); Real Hosp., LLC v.
Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., No. 2:20-cv-00087-KS-MTP, 2020 WL 6503405 (S.D. Miss.
Nov. 4, 2020) (applying Mississippi law); Henry's Louisiana Grill, Inc. v. Allied Ins. Co. of
Am., No. 1:20-CV-2939-TWT, 2020 WL 5938755 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 2020) (applying
Georgia law); Newchops Rest. Comcast LLC v. Admiral Indem. Co., No. CV 20-1869, 2020
WL 7395153 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2020) (applying Pennsylvania law); Brian Handel DMD,
PC v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 20-3198, 2020 WL 6545893 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2020) (applying
Pennsylvania law); Hajer v. Ohio Security Ins. Co., No. 6:20-cv-00283, 2020 WL 7211636
(E.D. Texas Dec. 7, 2020) (applying Texas law); Terry Black's Barbecue, LLC v. State Auto.
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:20-CV-665-RP, 2020 WL 7351246 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2020)
(applying Texas law); Santo's Italian Cafd LLC v. Acuity Ins. Co., No. 1:20-cv-01192, 2020
WL 7490095 (N.D. Ohio) (applying Ohio law); Graspa Consulting, Inc. v. United Nat'l Ins.
Co., No. 20-23245-CIV-WILLIAMS, 2021 WL 199980 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2021) (applying
Florida law); S. Fla. ENT Assocs, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 20-23677-CivWILLIAMS/TORRES, 2020 WL 6864560 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2020) (applying Florida law);
Plan Check Downtown III, LLC v. AmGUARD Ins. Co., No. Cv 20-6954-GW-SKx, 2020
172
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alteration of the property only reflect judges succumbing to false consensus biasthe tendency of humans to be overconfident that others see things as they do.
Significant research suggests this is a particular problem in the interpretation of
contracts and other writings. For example, in one study, respondents were given
contract language to read and construe. They then were asked whether they thought
other readers could reach a different interpretation.1 3
Overwhelmingly, they expressed confidence that others would agree with
their reading of the words and that there was no significant interpretive issue as to
the document's meaning. Overwhelmingly, they were wrong. The same contract
language was being read by other respondents who were reaching a different
conclusion as to the meaning of the words.
This tendency, which also accords with cognitive traits such as self-serving
bias (the tendency for people to think they are better at things than is actually the
case),1 4 can be particularly pernicious in judges who by job description need to be
decisive (and move on to the next case), and are consistently the object of deference
or even adulation (e.g., more likely to be invited to be graduation speakers or faculty
in residence than all but a few celebrity lawyers), and who by definition in an
adversary system have half the disputants praising each decision.
The net result can often be a brusque, reductionist, insufficiently reflective
approach to reading documentary text, including but not limited to statutes,
regulations, rules, exhibits, and contracts in addition to insurance policies. The
judge, despite frequently reading the text in a vacuum without background
contextual information, the aid of a linguist, or more than the closest dictionary or
those cited by counsel, quickly determines that she "knows" what the disputed
language means. More troublingly, the judge "knows" this so well that she dispenses
with further inquiry and dismisses the case.

WL 5742712 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2020) (applying California law); Kirsch v. Aspen Am. Ins.
Co., No. 20-11930, 2020 WL 7338570 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 14, 2020) (applying Michigan law);
Mortar & Pestle Corp. v. Atain Specialty Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-03461-MMC, 2020 WL
7495180 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2020) (applying California law). But see, e.g., Seifert v. IMT
Ins. Co., No. 20-1102 (JRT/DTS), 2020 WL 6120002 (D. Minn. Oct. 16, 2020) (applying
Minnesota law) (holding that Minnesota law does not require a showing of structural damage
to qualify for coverage).
173 See Lawrence Solan, et al., False Consensus Bias in ContractInterpretation, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1268 (2008).
174 See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining BargainingImpasse: The
Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 109 (1997) (describing phenomenon
and its impact in prompting disputants or negotiating parties to overvalue their own skills,
conduct, and position in transactions or litigation).
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Although this is troubling to us in any case, it is particularly troubling in the
insurance context, where the ground rules of adjudication discussed below, if
properly followed, are essentially designed to give policyholders the benefit of the
doubt. To borrow a baseball term, "ties" are supposed to "go to the runner." But like
the umpire whose right thumb jerks upward if the ball is in the vicinity of first base
before the runner has clearly planted a foot, courts taking an aggressively selfreverential view about the meaning of policy language bend the rules in the opposite
direction.
In a world where reasonable people may debate the meaning of "direct
physical loss or damage" in various contexts, courts should be reluctant to declare
meaning as a matter of law. In view of the differing dictionary definitions and case
outcomes, such an approach ordinarily amounts to error in COVID claims.
We realize of course that where controlling law provides a clear precedent,
it must be followed. If, for example, the Supreme Court of State X has declared in
no uncertain terms that both "loss" and "damage" in the property insurance setting
always requires tangible, permanent (unless repaired by more than cleaning) injury
to the structure or character of property, that precedent must be followed by trial
courts no matter how much a trial judge thinks it incorrect. But where case law is
mixed, unclear, or absent, trial courts should be taking the more modest approach to
perceived certainty of textual meaning.
To be fair, many, perhaps even most, of the courts dismissing policyholder
COVID claims have at least considered caselaw taking the broader view of "direct
physical loss or damage." But they have then quickly pivoted to the narrower view
certainty unwarranted in light of the dictionary definitions favoring the broader
view. Couple this with the established insurance policy interpretation principles
favoring policyholders that have been given short shrift by courts dismissing
COVID coverage claims and the result is error-at least on the questions of whether
loss or damage has occurred (and most certainly at the motion to dismiss stage of
litigation).
Depending on the specifics of each case, insurers may prevail on any
number of other defenses to coverage such as the virus exclusion or non-COVID
defenses such as misrepresentation or intentional destruction or insurers may limit
their liability based on calculation of lost business income as well as policy limits or
sub-limits. But they generally should not be prevailing on the loss/damage question
to the extent reflected in opinions to date. A brief review of a few important
insurance concepts underscores this assessment.
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Consider policyholder and insurer expectations of coverage for pandemicrelated losses. If there is rampant confusion as to the scope of coverage such that
litigation is arriving at mixed results, perhaps there is a more insidious problem with
what is driving that litigation. The reasonable policyholder likely expected that a
product marketed and labelled as "business interruption insurance" or "civil
authority coverage" would extend coverage to the policyholder's income stream in
the event the policyholder was unable to access or reasonably use its business
premises. The reasonable policyholder purchasing an "all risk" policy likely would
not have thought that such coverage would hang on how the damage-if any-to
the property occurred. Rather, their focus would likely be on their income loss due
to either virus contamination or prevention of use of their property due to
governmental orders.
Particularly in the case of civil authority coverage, few policyholders would
likely expect that, in many instances in order to trigger coverage, there would have
to be some physical damage to adjacent property that would prompt a civil authority
to restrict access to the policyholder's property. Policyholders may ironically be
better off if their property or adjacent property had burned down, rather than
operations ceased by a virus, strange though it may seem. By the mere label of the
product alone-"business interruption insurance"-there are likely many
policyholders who simply believe that the insurance insures their profit stream. The
impetus for that belief may well, in the end, rest with issues of misleading
nomenclature by insurers and misleading sales by brokers and agents.
From an insurer's standpoint, the reasonable insurer may well not have
meant nor expected to cover losses relating to a pandemic like COVID-19 in the
contexts of business interruption insurance included in commercial property
policies. By its nature, a pandemic is a clash event that has the potential to seriously
strain insurer resources. Yet surely the industry had modelled a pandemic because it
has already seen the effects of SARS, MERS, Ebola, H1N1, swine flu, and
HIV/AIDs. And there were products on the market specifically designed to cover
pandemic-related losses. The existence of related products like event cancellation
insurance makes the generalized insurer contention of "whoever would have
predicted COVID-19?" a bit strained.
The more compelling insurer response to pandemic-related losses is perhaps
to assert that the business interruption product was never meant to be "guaranteed
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profit insurance.""' It is an insurance add-on coverage to property insurance. There
surely must be some risks in commerce that are not covered by a property policy.
For example, no one would expect business interruption coverage for profit losses
in a nuclear war (though of course there are exclusions for nuclear causes of loss).
But what of, say, a zombie apocalypse or alien invasion, that required governments
to issue "stay at home" orders or risk being eaten by green beings? Would the
standard business interruption coverage tied to commercial property policies kick in
then? Is there then a direct physical loss of or damage to property? Likely not. There
are zombies or aliens running about. The property is likely just fine. But again,
property owners may have difficulty accessing their property or even be barred from
it due to civil authority orders or otherwise.
Some insurers included a virus exclusion in their policy wording before the
pandemic struck. Does that mean that those insurers without a virus exclusion did
not mean to exclude such losses? Is the virus exclusion itself a rock-solid denial of
coverage, under all loss scenarios?
Perhaps instead the business interruption (and by corollary, the civil
authority) insurance product needs to be retooled and re-messaged to communicate
precisely what is and what is not meant to be covered. Otherwise, in the insurance
world, if coverage is unclear, ties go to the policyholder-or at least they should.
The insurer must provide coverage until new policy language is drafted in new
versions of insurance policies.
3. Causation, Civil Authority Coverage and the Virus Exclusion
The trigger of coverage for civil authority business interruption losses rests
largely on arguments of insurance causation. Policyholders continue to allege that a
civil authority order caused their pandemic-related business interruption losses by
restricting their access to their property. To date, courts have perhaps incorrectly
declined coverage because they have held that the cause of the policyholder's losses
is not the order and that no physical loss or damage occurred to prompt the order in
the first place.
It is important to keep in mind how causation works in the insurance law
context and how it is different than principles of tort causation. In assessing
insurance causation in a property loss context, one should work backward from the
A notion picked up by the court in Real Hosp., LLC v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of
Am., No. 2:20-cv-00087-KS-MTP, 2020 WL 6503405, at *8 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 4, 2020)
(emphasis omitted) (applying Mississippi law), which held that "this is a commercial
property policy, not a stand-alone business interruption policy-Plaintiff's operations are not
what is insured-the building and the personal property in or on the building are."
17
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loss claimed (here, the loss of profit) and ask what external force affected the
property to result in the loss and thus potentially trigger the coverage claimed? The
analysis is not a temporal one (i.e. last in time) but rather one of effect: what "hurt"
the policyholder such that it suffered the loss claimed? For property claims, the
answer to insurance causation questions is usually straightforward: what external
force damaged the property? The insurance causation analysis does not involve
analyzing chains of causation, as one might do in a tort analysis. Fault, blame, or
responsibility play no part in insurance causation. Instead, a court is to determine
what external force "hurt"the policyholder such that it triggered the particular loss
claimed. The inquiry is decidedly contractual.
The loss to the policyholder is the lost profit from an inability to operate the
business. The "hurt," so to speak, in the civil authority coverage case, is actually
arising from the order of the civil authority restricting access to the property
(whether employee or customer access). The virus did not need to touch any of the
policyholder's property to result in the economic loss that affected the policyholder.
Even the threat of the virus is not necessary. The cause of the loss is thus the civil
authority order which restricted access to the policyholder's property.
In a jurisdiction that adheres to the proximate cause doctrine of insurance
causation, the proximate cause of the loss in this scenario-for civil authority
coverage insurance purposes-is the governmental order. It is analytically incorrect
to chase down what made the governmental authority issue the order in the first
place-unless the coverage provisions specifically require such a causal inquiry.
In some cases, such an inquiry is necessary if-and only if-the coverage
grant requires a finding that the loss must flow from a covered cause which results
in direct physical loss or damage to adjacent property. Only if the coverage granting
language specifically asks for such an analysis should a court attempt to ask "why"
a governmental order was issued. And even then, it should only ask the simple
question: was the order issued due to a covered cause which resulted in direct
physical loss or damage to property adjacent to the policyholder?
In the case of a civil authority coverage case where there is a virus exclusion
in the policy, the causation analysis is a bit more nuanced. If the coverage grant for
civil authority insurance does not require direct physical loss or damage to property,
but merely the restriction of access to the property, then the virus exclusion has no
effect on coverage for the policyholder. The cause of the loss is the governmental
order, not the virus.
While the prevention of the virus was the impetus for the order, coverage
cannot be ousted simply because the "topic" of the order was "about" the COVID19 virus. The topic did not harm the policyholder, nor did the virus; the actual effect
of the order did. Policyholders should not lose coverage because of the topic of the
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times behind a governmental order or even the reasoning behind the order. Coverage
should only be ousted when the order did not cause the harm claimed.
However, if the coverage grant for civil authority insurance requires direct
physical loss or damage to property, then the policyholder would apparently need to
prove that the reasoning behind the civil authority order was indeed related to
property damage which occurred. Such can be alleged with the COVID-19 virus by
indicating the virus was present in frankly any adjacent property that was in an area
affected by COVID-19, so long as that jurisdiction will consider that the presence
of the virus can constitute direct physical loss or damage.
The issue is, of course, less clear if the property policy contains a virus
exclusion. Some virus exclusions have an anti-concurrent cause clause such that
coverage is ousted as long as virus contamination played some role in the ensuing
loss. One can argue that the virus did not play a concurrent role in the loss (although
it may have been a reason for the order-but the exclusion does not ask about the
'story' behind the order-its focus is the cause of the loss claimed for insurance
purposes).
An example of such a scenario occurred when the policyholder massage spa
in ElegantMassage, LLC v. State FarmMutual Automobile Insurance Company1 6
was forced to close due to a specific governmental order that mandated the closure
of spas and massage services due to the inability of those particular businesses to
maintain safe social distancing in a time of particularly serious virus spread. The spa
and massage business was thus forced to close as a direct result of this specific order.
The spa also voluntarily closed even after the order was lifted, because it could not
maintain the required social distancing measures and still conduct its business. The
policyholder argued the order, not the virus, caused its losses. The court agreed,
because the policyholder's specific type of business was targeted by the order-it
was not just a general health measure. The court also noted that Virginia does not
support anti-concurrent causation clauses; insurers must draft specific language to
oust coverage and there must be a direct connection between the exclusion and the
loss (not some tenuous connection anywhere in the chain of causation).
The catch-22 is realized when a coverage grant tied to direct physical loss
to property is coupled with a virus exclusion. In that instance, alleging that the civil
authority coverage is a result of virus contamination may well trigger the virus

exclusion.'7
176

No. 2:20-cv-265, 2020 WL 7249624 (E.D. Va. Dec. 9, 2020) (applying Virginia law).
177 Professor Dan Schwarcz has been quoted as taking the view that where a policy has
a virus exclusion, the case against coverage is "open and shut." Caroline Glenn, InsurersAre
Telling Businesses Their Policies Don't Cover Coronavirus Shutdown. John Morgan
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4. Ambiguity in Property Coverage for Pandemic-related Losses
It may well be that the coverage clause "direct physical loss of or damage
to property" is by now so tortured and unpredictable in caselaw as to be rendered
ambiguous in terms of insurance policy construction. Indeed, three courts have
found just that.
In Elegant Massage, LLC v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company,178 the court noted that the coverage clause does not overtly require
structural damage for coverage to attach. Because there was such a "spectrum" of
meanings of "direct physical loss of or damage," the court interpreted the clause in
a light most favourable to the policyholder. If the property (here, a spa which
requires close contact with, and touching of, patrons) was deemed uninhabitable,
inaccessible and dangerous to use as a result of governmental orders because of the
high risk for spreading COVID-19, then the policyholder suffered direct physical
loss. The court drew analogies to those cases where the policyholder could not use
its property due to toxic gasses from drywall or odor or asbestos.
In North State Deli, LLC v. The Cincinnati Insurance Co.,1?9 the court
scoured the wide variety of dictionary definitions and determined that "loss" can
equate to the loss of a full range of rights and advantages of property use. It held the
coverage clause was ambiguous and thus settled on a reasonable definition which
favours coverage: that "direct physical loss" can mean loss of use or access, even if
the property is not structurally altered.
Finally, in Hill and Stout PLCC v. Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance
Company,180 the court held that physical "loss" must mean something different than
physical "damage." "Loss" could mean "deprivation." The dental practice at issue
in that case had direct physical deprivation of its premises as a result of the
https://www. orlando sentinel.com/coronavirus/jobs-economy/os-bz-coronavirus-insuranceAlthough
denials-morgan-lawsuits-20200504-pbrpq6z7ofbevau67cpgg4nzqi-story.html.
one of us (Stempel) tends to agree that coverage is probably inapt in most such cases, the
other (Knutsen) is hesitant. In any event, we think the issue is closer than commonly thought
because of the long history of causation doctrine that tends not to look beyond the immediate
cause of loss if the cause is a sufficiently dominant factor in bringing about the loss. See
Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for Catastrophic
Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 957 (2010); Peter Nash Swisher, Insurance CausationIssues: The
Legacy ofBird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2 NEV. L.J. 351 (2002).
178 2020 WL 7249624 (E.D. Va. Dec. 9, 2020) (applying Virginia law).
179 North State Deli, LLC v. The Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 20-CVS-02569, 2020 WL
6281507 (N.C. Super. Oct. 9, 2020) (Trial Order).
180 No. 20-2-07925, 2020 WL 6784271 (Wash. Super.) (Trial Order).
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governmental order stopping dental visits because the practice could not see patients
or practice dentistry. To that end, because the pleadings were silent about the
meaning of "loss," the court held that physical "loss" is an ambiguous phrase, and
the case could proceed.
A review of the various dictionary definitions above for these terms
certainly should be leading other courts to also consider ambiguity. In some cases,
asbestos contamination is a direct physical loss. In others, it is not. In some cases,
prevention of access to property by a government order is a direct physical loss. In
others, it is not. Under the doctrine of contraproferentem, a finding of ambiguity
leads to the policy terms being interpreted in favor of the policyholder. If
policyholders and insurers alike-and clearly courts-cannot predict the meaning
of the phrase and what it is supposed to do as the main coverage trigger for perhaps
the most prevalent insurance product on the market, and if so much litigation is
produced resulting from this confusion, then ambiguity of the coverage clause may
be a reasonable conclusion for courts to make.
C.

THE POTENTIAL FOR COVID INSURANCE COVERAGE CASES AS A
BLUEPRINT FOR BETTER DECISION-MAKING

A few cases (three decided by the same Western District of Missouri court)
have found coverage for COVID-related losses, albeit in a motion to dismiss context
and without a full factual record: Studio 417, Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance
Company,18 ' KC. Hopps v. CincinnatiInsurance Company,182 Blue Springs Dental
Care v. Owners Insurance Company,183 and ElegantMassage, LLC v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.18 4 The other cases denying coverage have
attempted to distinguish these cases on a number of grounds primarily related to the
specific facts plead by the policyholders (i.e. the presence of a virus-specific
exclusion or the specific allegations of virus particles actually physically present on
insured property).
No. 20-cv-03127-SRB, 2020 WL 4692385 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 12, 2020) (applying
Missouri law).
182 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144285 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 12, 2020) (applying Missouri law).
K C. Hopps v. Cincinnati is a short opinion that incorporates the Court's analysis in Studio
417 because that case "involves the same Defendant, similar insurance provisions, and
similar factual allegations as those asserted in this case. Defendant also moved to
dismiss Studio 417 under Rule 12(b)(6) based on similar legal arguments that it presents in
this case." Id. at *2.
183 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172639 (W.D. Mo. Sep. 21, 2020).
184 2020 WL 7249624 (E.D. Va. Dec. 9, 2020) (applying Virginia
law).
181
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The Studio 417 and ElegantMassage cases remain the most analytically
satisfying decisions to date,1 85 as they most thoroughly deal with competing
precedents and convey a broader understanding of the importance of insurance as a
risk-based commercial product packaged to commercial policyholders. The other
decisions denying coverage, in the main, tend to resort to a restrictive line of case
precedents that narrow insurance recovery based largely on a purely textual parsing
of insurance policy language, on a "know it when I see it" basis. Those decisions do
not convey a broader understanding of what the coverage clause or property policies
generally are meant to do in the consumer marketplace.
The Studio 417 case more fully accounts for the historical caselaw
interpreting the "direct physical loss or damage" coverage clause-both for and
against coverage. The case also demonstrates the most doctrinally defensible
analysis of the insurance causation elements of the claim. The policyholders in that
case operated restaurants and hair salons. They claimed for pandemic-related losses
under their business interruption and civil authority coverage contained in their allrisk property policies. Their claims were denied. The policy in question provided
coverage for a "direct loss," which is defined as "accidental physical loss or
accidental physical damage." Notably, there was no virus exclusion in this policy.
The policyholders alleged that customers and employees were infected with
COVID-19 and the insured property became contaminated with the virus as a result.
They argued that the virus is a physical substance that is active on tangible surfaces,
and renders property unsafe and unusable. This quality of the virus forced the
policyholders to suspend operations or at least reduce them. The policyholders also
alleged that civil authorities in Missouri and Kansas issued orders that required
suspension of businesses at various places, including closure orders. The
policyholders alleged that both the presence of COVID-19 on the property plus the
government closure orders resulted in direct physical loss or damage to the property
and denied the policyholders the full use of the property.
The court found that there is a possibility of coverage despite the fact that
the virus could be cleaned from physical surfaces or dies naturally within a few days.
The fact that access to the property was prohibited or severely restricted was enough
to find a possibility of coverage at this stage. In this regard, the court relied on the
GregoryPackaging, Inc. v. TravelersPropertyand Casualty Co. ofAmerica 8 6 case,
This is not said in derogation of Blue Springs Dental v. Owners Ins., which unlike
K.C. Hopps contains extensive discussion and analysis. Although Blue Springs Dental
involved somewhat different policy language and business activities, its analysis is heavily
shaped by Studio 417, discussed at length in this section.
186 No. 2:12-cv-04418 (WHW)(CLW), 2014 WL 6675934, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2014)
(applying New Jersey law).
185
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where ammonia contamination at a juice packaging plant triggered insurance
coverage because the manufacturer's buildings were uninhabitable due to the
contamination. Even though the policyholders in Studio 417 likely could not prove
that COVID-19 was specifically on their premises, the fact that the virus was so
widespread was enough to obviate the issue for the court.
The court held that COVID-19 is a physical substance which lives on
surfaces and is transmitted through the air. COVID-19 makes property unsafe and
unusable, resulting in "direct physical loss of or damage to" property. One does not
need to prove tangible physical alteration of property to trigger coverage.
The court also held that loss of use of property is different than "damage;'
otherwise, the word "damage" would be rendered superfluous in the coverage
clause. The fact that the property could not be used due to COVID-19 was enough
for the court to hold the policyholders had suffered a potential loss of the property.
The court distinguished the line of cases that require policyholders to prove a
tangible physical alteration to the property in order to trigger the coverage clause.
The court distinguished the Source Food Technology, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity
Guarantee Company1 87 case, which granted summary judgment to an insurer who
denied coverage when the policyholder's meat could not cross the Canadian border
due to meat infection concerns. The Studio 417 court held that the policyholders'
allegations posit contamination of the property with a physical substance: the
COVID-19 virus. This was therefore a different situation than the Source Foods case
where there was no evidence the beef was actually contaminated by mad cow
disease.
The policyholders also had potential coverage under a claim for civil
authority insurance. According to the court, government orders affected hair salons
by forcing their closure and affected restaurants by not allowing diners to dine inside
the premises. Only drive-through or pick-up or delivery orders were allowed for
restaurants. This was sufficient for the court to find that access was prohibited to
such a degree as to trigger the civil authority coverage. The court held that the virus
was physically present in property other than the policyholder's, because it was
"everywhere" and therefore that satisfied the "direct physical loss or damage"
coverage requirement.
The court specifically held that the civil authority coverage clause required
access to be prohibited but the language did not mandate that all access had to be
fully prohibited. The fact that access to the policyholders' property was impeded to
a significant degree was sufficient for coverage to attach. Along the same logic, the
court held that the policyholders also had potential coverage under the property
policy's ingress and egress, dependent property, and sue and labor provisions.
187

465 F.3d 834, 835 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying Minnesota law).
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The same federal court denied an insurer's motion to dismiss the claims of
policyholder dental clinics in Blue Springs Dental Care v. Owners Insurance
Company188 The dental clinics claimed business interruption and civil authority
losses when Missouri and corresponding counties issued 'stay at home' orders to
quell the virus spread. Three dental clinics completely closed and one remained open
only for essential and emergency dental cases. The policyholder pled that its
property was damaged because of the presence of COVID-19 on and around its
property such that it had to either end or reduce its operations due to actual
contamination. It also alleged that employees, customers, and other visitors likely
were infected with the coronavirus and thus operations were suspended to prevent
physical damage to property and to the people on it. The 'stay at home' orders and
general fear of infection or spreading COVID-19 on the property itself meant that
customers could not access the property.
The insurer in this case argued that the fact that the one clinic was offering
some services meant that its operations were not suspended within the meaning of
coverage under the policy. The insurer also argued that the policyholder's clinics
suffered no "direct physical loss of or damage to" property. As was the case in Studio
417, there was no exclusion for pandemics or communicable diseases in the
applicable policy. 8 9
The court found that COVID caused the policyholder's alleged physical loss
in that the virus physically occupied and contaminated the dental clinics. This
deprived the policyholder of use of the clinics, making them unsafe. The court also
held that the policyholder necessarily suspended its operations to prevent physical
damage from COVID. The COVID virus was the cause of the suspension and
implicated business interruption coverage.
The court also held that the policyholder would be entitled to civil authority
coverage because the orders by the state and counties do not need to be directed
specifically at insured property or property adjacent to it in order to trigger coverage.
The court cited Studio 417 with approval, reiterating that policyholders do not need
to completely lose all access to property-coverage could be had for partial impeded
access. In this case, although three of the clinics closed entirely and the other had
only limited dental services for emergency patients, access was prohibited to such a

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172639.
Nor was there a virus exclusion in the policies at issue in K.C. Hopps v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144285 (W.D. Mo. 2020). It thus appears that Cincinnati
sold a significant number of policies without a virus exclusion and may face significant
coverage responsibility in cases where courts take a similar view of the "direct physical loss
or damage" requirement and where government orders mandated closure.
188
189
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degree as to trigger coverage. The court left open the question as to the effect of the
order that targeted essential versus non-essential businesses.
The important factor in the Studio 417 and Blue Springs Dental Care cases
is that the policyholders alleged specific physical damage through the presence of
COVID-19 virus on the insured property in question. That allowed the court to find
a direct physical loss, and thus the potential for coverage. The fact that
contamination was not permanent was not an issue restricting the coverage analysis.
The court also held that direct physical loss could be had through loss of use of the
property. The court also had little issue with connecting the causal chain of the
presence of COVID-19 virus on property, its prevalence in the community, and the
inability of the policyholders to use their property as a result of governmental orders
arising directly from the presence of COVID-19.
The court in ElegantMassage granted coverage to a massage spa when the
spa was forced to close due to governmental orders. The spa's business model
required the touching and close proximity to customers which was the very risk the
orders were trying to quell in prevention of the virus. After the mandatory closure
order ended, the spa still voluntarily closed as it was exceedingly difficult to comply
with the mandated physical distancing requirements and still provide massage
services. As mentioned above, the court found the coverage clause "direct physical
loss of or damage to property" ambiguous because the clause does not specifically
require distinct, structural damage for coverage to attach. If the insurer wished such
a requirement, it could have added that language. Therefore, by interpreting the
clause in a fashion most favorable to the policyholder, the court held that the loss of
use of the policyholder's property qualified as a "direct physical loss." The court,
however, denied civil authority coverage to the policyholder as it would not show a
causal link between any damaged surrounding properties and its own. Simply put,
there was no structural damage to the policyholder's premises-only loss of use and
access.
V.

CASELAW AND THE VIRUS EXLCUSION

As is by now clear, we are concerned, perhaps to the point of being
dismayed, that so many courts have so credulously embraced the view that as an
absolute matter of law viral infection of premises cannot be physical loss or damage
to insured premises and that there is no coverage even where government authorities
have deprived policyholders of use of their property. This reading of policy
language-especially its cocksure construction that refuses to recognize alternative
reasonable reading of the words-poses significant potential problems not only for
COVID coverage cases but for property insurance disputes generally.
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That said, this first wave of cases may be an example of erroneous judicial
reasoning that nonetheless arguably reaches a correct result, at least in many
instances. Of the COVID coverage decisions made as this article was written, all but
a handful had favored insurers. In nearly all of these cases granting insurer dismissal
motions on the basis of what we regard as incorrect application of the physical-lossor-injury trigger, the policies at issue also contained a virus exclusion. As discussed
below, the standard ISO virus exclusion is broadly drafted and was intended by
insurers to preclude coverage for certain virus-related losses. In some cases, drafting,
communication, or claims-handling errors of an insurer may make a virus exclusion
ineffective. Or there may be particular facts of a claim that negate the virus
exclusion, like issues of causation. 90
As discussed below, despite the apparent clarity of the virus exclusion, it
may well be ineffective in some loss situations. In addition, the prevalence of virus
exclusions in policies is unclear. As noted above, in the decisions to date, a fourth
of the policies at issue lacked a virus exclusion. A preliminary study of liability
insurance policies suggests that the majority of these policies lack a virus
exclusion.' 9' Regarding property insurance, however, insurers contend that eighty
percent or more of the policies contain virus exclusions. Although that figure that
accords with the polices in court decisions to date,1 92 it is a sufficiently high
percentage that we harbor concerns that may be overstated. For example, the policies
of Cincinnati Insurance Company, involved in nearly 200 cases filed, tend not to
have a virus exclusion.1 93
Prior to the SARS tragedy of the early Twenty-first Century, insurance
policies did not contain virus exclusions, although many did have bacteria, fungus,
or mold exclusions. And there is, of course, the pollution exclusion that we think has
no application to infection-related loss but that insurers continue to occasionally
push as a defense to coverage. Insurers effectively accepted that their policies of the
pre-SARS era did not exclude-at least not with sufficient clarity-viral infection
losses and responded by drafting a rather comprehensive virus exclusion.
The exclusion and its rationale were presented to regulators in a 2006 ISO
circular.194 The key operative phrase of the exclusion reads: "We will not pay for
See, e.g., Elegant Massage, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No.
2:20-cv-265,
2020 WL 7249624 (E.D. Va. Dec. 9, 2020) (applying Virginia law) (finding no direct
connection between exclusion and loss; governmental order, not virus, direct cause of loss;
and exclusion inapplicable).
191 See Baker, supra, note 10.
192 See id. (identifying 174 cases filed against Cincinnati as of Oct. 21, 2020).
190

193 Id.
194

ISO VIRUS EXCLUSION, supra note 25.
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loss or damage caused by or resulting from any virus, bacterium or other
microorganism that induces or is capable of inducing physical distress, illness or
disease."1 95 Some virus exclusions also contain an anti-concurrent cause clause,
which attempts to exclude coverage regardless as to whether the damaged
complained of is concurrently caused with another non-virus-related cause or not.1 96
In particular, the circular stated:
While property policies have not been a source of recovery for
losses involving contamination by disease-causing agents, the
specter of pandemic or hitherto unorthodox transmission of
infectious material raises the concern that insurers employing such
policies may face claims in which there are efforts to expand
coverage and to create sources of recovery for such losses, contrary
to policy intent.197
Case law to date has supported application of the ISO virus exclusion to
exclude coverage for COVID-related losses in a near-automatic fashion, without
subjecting the exclusion to any meaningful analysis.1 98 The virus exclusion has been
195Id.
196 See, e.g., the policy at issue in Diesel Barbershop, LLC v. State Farm Lloyds, No.
5:20-cv-461-DAE, 2020 WL 4724305 F.Supp.3d (W.D. Tex. 2020) (applying Texas law).

.

1. We do not insure under any coverage for any loss which would not
have occurred in the absence of one or more of the following excluded
events. We do not insure for such loss regardless of: (a) the cause of the
excluded event; or (b) other causes of the loss; or (c) whether other causes
acted concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded event to produce
the loss; or (d) whether the event occurs suddenly or gradually, involves
isolated or widespread damage, arises from natural or external forces, or
occurs as a result of any combination of these:..
j. Fungi, Virus Or Bacteria
(2) Virus, bacteria or other microorganism that induces or is
capable of inducing physical distress, illness or disease.
Id.
197 ISO VIRUS EXCLUSION, supra note 25.
198See, e.g., Seifert v. IMT Ins. Co., No. 20-1102 (JRT/DTS), 2020 WL 6120002 (D.
Minn. Oct. 16, 2020) (applying Minnesota law) (holding that losses resulted from order, not
virus, but anti-concurrent loss provision in virus exclusion ousts coverage because virus is
part of causal chain of loss); Founder Inst. Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-04466VC, 2020 WL 6268539 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2020) (applying California law) (rejecting
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policyholder argument that governmental orders were about spread of saliva and respiration
droplets, not virus; virus exclusion applies); Border Chicken AZ LLC v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., No. CV-20-00785-PHX-JJT, 2020 WL 6827742 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2020) (applying
Arizona law); Chattanooga Prof. Baseball LLC v. Nat'l Cas. Co., No. CV-20-01312-PHXDLR, 2020 WL 6699480 (D. Ariz. Nov. 13, 2020) (applying Arizona law); Franklin EWC,
Inc. v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 20-cv-04434 JSC, 2020 WL 5642483 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 22, 2020) (applying California law); Mark's Engine Co. No. 28 Rest., LLC v. Travelers
Indem. Co. of Conn., No. 2:20-cv-04423-AB-SK, 2020 WL 5938689 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2,
2020) (applying California law); Raymond H Nahmad DDS PA v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co.,
No. 1:20-cv-22833-BLOOMILouis, 2020 WL 6392841 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2020) (applying
Florida law); W. Coast Hotel Mgmt., LLC v. Berkshire Hathaway Guard Ins. Co., No. 2:20cv-05663-VAP-DFMx, 2020 WL 6440037 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2020) (applying California
law); Palmer Holdings & Invs., Inc. v. Integrity Ins. Co., No. 4:20-cv-154-JAJ, 2020 WL
7258857 (S.D. Iowa) (applying Iowa law); Whiskey River on Vintage, Inc., v. Ill. Cas. Co.,
No. 4:20-cv-185-JAJ, 2020 WL 7258575 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 30, 2020) (applying Iowa law);
Natty Greene's Brewing Co. v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:20-CV-437, 2020 WL
7024882 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 30, 2020) (applying North Carolina law); Wilson v. Hartford Cas.
Co., No. 20-3384, 2020 WL 5820800 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2020) (applying Pennsylvania law);
N&S Rest., LLC v. Cumberland Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 20-05289 (RBK/KMW), 2020 WL
6501722 (D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2020) (applying New Jersey law); Long Affair Carpet & Rug, Inc.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No.: SACV 20-01713-CJC(JDEx), 2020 WL 6865774 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 12, 2020) (applying California law); Real Hosp., LLC v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of
Am., No. 2:20-cv-00087-KS-MTP, 2020 WL 6503405 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 4, 2020) (applying
Mississippi law); Newchops Rest. Comcast LLC v. Admiral Indem. Co., No. CV 20-1869,
2020 WL 7395153 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2020) (applying Pennsylvania law); Brian Handel
DMD, PC v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 20-3198, 2020 WL 6545893 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2020)
(applying Pennsylvania law); Hajer v. Ohio Security Ins. Co., No. 6:20-cv-00283, 2020 WL
7211636 (E.D. Texas Dec. 7, 2020) (applying Texas law); Vizza Wash, LP v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 5:20-cv-00680-OLG, 2020 WL 6578417 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2020)
(applying Texas law); Terry Black's Barbecue, LLC v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:20CV-665-RP, 2020 WL 7351246 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2020) (applying Texas law); AFM
Mattress Co. v. Motorists Com. Mut. Ins. Co., 2020 WL 6940984 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2020)
(applying Illinois law); Boulevard Carroll Ent. Grp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. 2011771 (SDW)(LDW), 2020 WL 7338081 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2020) (applying New Jersey law);
Santo's Italian Cafd LLC v. Acuity Ins. Co., No. 1:20-cv-01192, 2020 WL 7490095 (N.D.
Ohio) (applying Ohio law); 1210 McGavock St. Hosp. Partners, LLC v. Admiral Indem. Co.,
No. 3:20-cv-694, 2020 WL 7641184 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 23, 2020) (applying Tennessee law);
Boxed Foods Company, LLC v. Cal. Capital Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-04571-CRB, 2020 WL
6271021 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2020) (applying California law); LJ New Haven LLC v.
AmGUARD Ins. Co., No. 3:20-cv-00751 (MPS), 2020 WL 7495622 (D. Conn. Dec. 21,
2020) (applying Connecticut law); Mortar & Pestle Corp. v. Atain Specialty Ins. Co., No.
20-cv-03461-MMC, 2020 WL 7495180 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2020) (applying California law).
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held to oust coverage because courts have found that, even though some
policyholders lost business income due to governmental orders closing or limiting
access to their buildings, that access was lost because the governmental orders were
issued due to a virus. In short, the courts link the causal chain back to the virus, an
excluded cause. Courts summarily find no coverage in those cases where the virus
exclusion has an anti-concurrent cause clause (and such a clause is permissible in
that particular state).
We are not so certain the application of the virus exclusion to COVID-19related cases is as straightforward as these court decisions suggest, especially those
involving losses caused by governmental orders.1 99 We are reminded of the similar
path taken by courts first interpreting another seemingly impenetrable exclusion: the
absolution pollution exclusion. 20 We might suggest that a more nuanced, contextual
approach to the ISO virus exclusion is at least warranted, paying attention to drafting
and underwriting history and what was meant in that 2006 ISO circular sent to
insurance regulators. No court to date has examined what insurers actually meant to
exclude in 2006 and how that plays out-or not-in the property insurance context
of the 2019-2020 COVID pandemic. Keep in mind-the 2006 ISO virus exclusion
was drafted in response to the SARS crisis, a very different disease scenario without
the marked and intermittent governmental closures of the COVID-19 pandemic. It
may be that, after such an analysis, the exclusion does exclude most if not all
COVID-19-related business interruption losses. But we think it is at least
intellectually honest to run the gauntlet with it, as was done with the absolute
But see Elegant Massage, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 2:20-cv-265, 2020
WL 72496234 (E.D. Va. Dec. 9, 2020) (applying Virginia law) (holding virus exclusion not
applicable because cause of loss for massage spa is government closure order, not virus);
Taps & Bourbon on Terrace, LLC v. Underwriters at Lloyds London, No. 20093025, 2020
WL 6380449 (Pa. Com. Pl. Oct. 26, 2020) (Trial Order) (refusing to dismiss case at pleadings
stage, even though virus exclusion at issue).
199 At least one court appears to have had the same concerns, although in a context where
the complete insurance policy was not supplied to the court. In Urogynecology Specialist of
Fla., LLC v. Sentinel Ins. Co., No. 6:20-cv-1174-Orl-22EJK, 2020 WL 5939172 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 24, 2020) (applying Florida law), the court allowed the policyholder's case to proceed,
despite the presence of a virus exclusion, because the court surmised that COVID-19 may be
different than other "virus"-type claims and perhaps it may be inappropriate to lump it in
with other environmental pollutants like fungi, bacteria, or dry rot.
200 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pollution: CorrectlyConstruing the "Absolute"
Pollution Exclusion in Context and in Accord with Its Purpose and Party Expectations,
34 TORT & INS. L.J. 1 (1998); Jeffery W. Stempel, Unreason in Action: A Case Study of the
Wrong Approach to Construing the Liability Insurance Pollution Exclusion, 50 FLA. L.
REv. 463 (1998).
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pollution exclusion before it (recall that exclusion was eventually found wanting,
and certainly did not merit as broad an application as insurers enjoyed in the early
years of the exclusion).
However, incredibly, a number of courts have dismissed cases at the
pleadings stage because of a cursory read of the virus exclusion and, in so doing,
also denied specific policyholder requests for discovery about the ISO virus
exclusion and its genesis. 20' After raising what appear to be reasonable queries about
what the ISO circular was meant to do, policyholders are apparently faced with a
door slammed shut about further factual discovery on the issue. Still other courts
have preferred instead to offer-without the assistance of any evidence or context
beyond pleadings-their own guesses as to what the boundaries of the exclusion
surely must be. 202
Most noteworthy perhaps is this question: if a policy does not include a virus
exclusion, must that then be taken to mean that it covers virus-related losses? 20 3 Such
virus exclusion language has been available since 2006, in direct response to the
SARS pandemic. If an insurer has not specifically excluded viruses as a cause of
loss, then pandemic-related losses resulting from virus contamination or civil
authority orders attempting to quell virus spread would appear to be within the
concept of covered losses (as long as the policyholder can prove there was a "direct
physical loss of or damage to" covered property).
A.

CASES WITHOUT A VIRUS EXCLUSION

In those cases without a virus exclusion, courts did not outright dismiss the
policyholder's claim and instead at least inquired about the potential for "physical
loss or damage." Unlike the policyholders in Studio 417, the policyholder inMudpie,
Inc. v. Travelers CasualtyInsurance Company. ofAmerica20 ' did not allege the virus
See, e.g., Mortar & Pestle Corp. v. Atain Specialty Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-03461-MMC,
2020 WL 7495180 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2020) (applying California law) (denying restaurant
policyholder leave to discover genesis of ISO form and circular); Boxed Foods Co. v. Cal.
Capital Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-04571-CRB, 2020 WL 6271021 (US Dist. Ct., N.D. Cal.)
(applying California law) (denying discovery request about ISO circular and virus exclusion
genesis on dismissal).
202 See, e.g., LJ New Haven LLC v. AmGUARD Ins. Co., No. 3:20-cv-00751 (MPS),
2020 WL 7495622 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2020) (applying Connecticut law) (citing ISO circular
policyholder submits that exclusion likely limited to "on contact" or "on surface"
contamination only; court disagrees and chastises policyholder for importing what is not in
the policy (despite clause being an exclusion!)).
203 See French, supra note
4.
204 2020 WL 5525171 (applying California
law).
201
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entered the property. Its business interruption claim rested solely on the
governmental "stay at home" order in effect. Thus, the policyholder's putative class
action was dismissed. The court held that the lead plaintiff policyholder, a children's
clothing store, did not lose its property nor did it have that property damaged by the
virus.

The court took a broad view of "direct physical loss of or damage to"
property, in that it would consider loss of functionality as triggering coverage
without requiring physical alteration of the property. However, to qualify for
coverage, a policyholder would have to prove some intervening physical force made
the premises uninhabitable or unusable (as was the case in Gregory Packagingwith
the ammonia).
The court did not accept that loss of property functionality or access due to
governmental orders equated to "direct physical loss;" the policyholder could go
back to its property after the "stay at home" order ended. Loss of use was thus held
to be not a direct physical loss in this instance. The court distinguished this claim,
based solely on the governmental order causing a loss of use, from that in Studio
417 where the claimants had alleged actual physical virus microbes damaged the
inside of their premises, rendering it unusable.
The court also denied coverage under the civil authority provisions of the
store's policy because it found no causal link between any damage to adjacent
property and the subsequent denial of access to the store. Because the "stay at home"
orders were preventative, and did not involve actual physical damage, there was no
causation between the policyholder's business losses and the government closure
order.
The policyholder restaurant in Malaube, LLC v. Greenwich Insurance
Company2 0 alleged that Miami's order to close all restaurants to indoor dining (and
thus permit only takeout and delivery) as a result of COVID-19, plus the Florida
governor's statewide executive order closing all dining on-site restaurants, both
resulted in prohibited access to its restaurants and thereby interrupted its business
income. The policyholder argued that the full use of its property was limited by the
government orders. The case did not survive a motion to dismiss.
The court cited Mama Jo's, Inc. and Source Foods and held that, under
Florida law, an actual, tangible change in insured property must accompany a claim
for coverage for "direct physical loss of or damage to" insured property. It
distinguished the Studio 417 case because, in that case, the policyholders alleged the
actual presence of virus microbes on the property. The only allegations of loss in
Malaube involve losses arising from the two Florida emergency orders. Because
205

law).

No. 20-22615-CIV, 2020 WL 5051581 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 2020) (applying Florida
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there was no physical intrusion of the property that resulted in an actual physical
change to the property, under the Mama Jo's/Source Foods line of authority, the
court held there was no potential for coverage and the claim was dismissed.
A similar result was reached in Rose 's 1 LLC v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 2 06
on a motion for summary judgment in the Superior Court ofthe District of Columbia.
Some DC restaurants were seeking business interruption coverage based on the DC
mayor's order that closed all non-essential businesses (which included the
restaurants) and told residents to stay inside except for essential reasons. The court
held that there were no cases in this jurisdiction where a government edict, standing
alone, is considered a direct physical loss, thereby triggering coverage, unless there
was some physical damage to property. The court relied on Brothers., Inc. v. Liberty
Mutual Fire Insurance Company 20' a case where coverage was denied after a
curfew was imposed in DC following riots after Martin Luther King's assassination.
The curfew was held to be preventative in nature, and not a result of any physical
damage to property. In fact, the point of the curfew was to prevent physical damage
to property, so coverage could not possibly be triggered, according to the court.
The San Diego barbershop policyholder in Pappy's Barber Shops, Inc. v.
Farmers Group, Inc. 2 0 ' had its claims for business interruption and civil authority
coverage dismissed. The policyholder alleged that the local order banning nonessential gatherings plus then the state-wide "stay at home" order resulted in direct
physical loss of or damage to their insured property. The policyholder argued that
the precautionary measures taken by the government were the cause of the loss, not
the actual presence of virus on any physical surface. The court held that the
governmental orders did not prohibit access to the policyholder's place of business
and the orders were not issued due to direct physical loss of or damage to either the
policyholder's property or other property. Because there were no allegations of what
the court considered were direct physical loss or damage, the claim was dismissed.
The overarching pattern is that cases without a virus exclusion at least
prompt the courts to grapple with whether or not coverage is to be had for "direct
physical loss of or damage to property." Nearly all cases which did not feature a
virus exclusion have denied coverage if the policyholder did not allege actual
physical loss on the premises. 209 And of course most right-thinking policyholders
2020 WL 4589206 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2020).
207 268 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1970).
208 No. 20-CV-907-CAB-BLM, 2020 WL 5500221 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2020) (applying
California law).
209
See, e.g., Infinity Exhibits, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, No. 8:20cv-1605-T-30AEP, 2020 WL 5791583 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2020) (applying Florida law)
(relying on Mama Jo's court requires actual physical damage for coverage; case dismissed
206
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could not allege such loss because to do otherwise would bring the claim squarely
within the virus exclusion. So, the common route taken by policyholders-if
unsuccessful to date-has been to argue that the governmental orders closing or
limiting property access are the cause of the business interruption loss, and not the
virus.
B.

CASES WITH A VIRUS EXCLUSION

As stated, insurers have been successful in having those cases that featured
a virus exclusion dismissed by courts. In probably the earliest claim focusing on
pandemic-related losses, a Michigan state court granted the insurer's motion to
dismiss the policyholder's claim for business interruption losses in Gavrilides
Management Company v. Michigan Insurance Company210 The policyholder in that
case owned two restaurants and alleged that it lost revenue due to COVID-19 related
closure orders and restrictions. The court held that, because the restaurants only
alleged loss of use of their facilities, and not physical loss or damage, the restaurants
did not suffer any covered loss. The virus exclusion in the policy operated to oust
coverage regardless of whether there had been direct physical loss or damage to
property.

as no facts plead to show physical property damage); Uncork & Create LLC v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., No. 2:20-cv-00401, 2020 WL 6436948 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 2, 2020) (applying West
Virginia law) (distinguishing Studio 417 as there was alleged virus contamination in that
case; however, court goes on to state that even if virus was present, coverage would likely
not attach as premises can be cleaned); Oral Surgeons, PC v. The Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 220-CV-222-CRW-SBJ, 2020 WL 5820552 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 29, 2020) (applying Iowa law)
(finding no allegations of direct physical loss); Promotional Headwear Int'l v. Cincinnati Ins.
Co., No. 20-cv-2211-JAR-GEB, 2020 WL 7078735 (D. Kan. Dec. 3, 2020) (applying Kansas
law) (declining to accept allegations that virus contaminated property court cites to Source
Food and Mama Jo's to require physical alteration); Water Sports Kauai, Inc. v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-03750-WHO, 2020 WL 6562332 (N.D. Cal Nov. 9, 2020)
(applying Hawai'ian law) (distinguishing Studio 417 and Mudpie, where actual threats of
contamination were alleged, court finds no actual exposure at stores in this case); Terry
Black's Barbecue, LLC v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:20-CV-665-RP, 2020 WL
7351246 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2020) (applying Texas law) (finding no allegations of virus on
property; assuming virus there, it does not cause physical loss and can be cleaned); S. Fla.
ENT Assocs, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 20-23677-Civ-WILLIAMS/TORRES, 2020
WL 6864560 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2020) (applying Florida law) (finding no allegations of
virus presence); Kirsch v. Aspen Am. Ins. Co., No. 20-11930, 2020 WL 7338570 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 14, 2020) (applying Michigan law) (finding no allegations of virus on property).
210 No. 20-000258-CB (Mich. Cir. Ct., Ingham Cty. July 1, 2020).
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In Diesel BarbershopLLC v. State Farm Lloyds, 21' a U.S. District Court in
the Western District of Texas dismissed the policyholder barbershop's claims for
pandemic-related losses. The policy featured a fungi, virus or bacteria exclusion,
which had an anti-concurrent cause clause:
1. We do not insure under any coverage for any loss which would
not have occurred in the absence of one or more of the following
excluded events. We do not insure for such loss regardless of:
(a) the cause of the excluded event; or
(b) other causes of the loss; or
(c) whether other causes acted concurrently or in any
sequence with the excluded event to produce the loss; or
(d) whether the event occurs suddenly or gradually,
involves isolated or widespread damage, arises from natural or
external forces, or occurs as a result of any combination of these:

j. Fungi, Virus Or Bacteria
(2) Virus, bacteria or other microorganism that induces or is capable of
inducing physical distress, illness or disease.
The policyholder sought business interruption coverage for COVID-related losses
due to the state and county orders restricting access to, or closing altogether of, nonessential businesses. The court preferred the line of cases requiring a direct tangible
injury in order to trigger property coverage for a "direct physical loss." It held that
Texas law would mandate there be a tangible injury for coverage to be triggered.
The policyholder did not allege that the virus was physically on its property and
caused tangible harm. Rather, it alleged that the cause of its loss was the
governmental orders restricting access to its properties. This was not sufficient to
create the potential for coverage as no direct physical loss or damage was alleged,
according to the court.
Regardless as to the issue of direct physical loss, the court found that the
virus exclusion and its anti-concurrent cause clause would prohibit both business
interruption and civil authority coverage for the policyholder. The underlying root
cause of the alleged losses was the virus-an excluded cause-according to the court
because the virus was the reason for the orders to be issued by the state and county
in the first instance.
211 No. 5:20-CV-461-DAE, 2020 WL 4724305, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2020)
(applying Texas law).
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The key to the court's reasoning in Diesel Barbershopwas the view that the
virus exclusion negated any possibility for coverage for COVID-19 related losses.
The court also preferred to interpret "direct physical loss" as requiring not only a
tangible injury to the property in question but a physical injury of sufficient
magnitude that the property had been permanently structurally altered-an injury
not alleged by the policyholder in that case.
A similar result to Diesel Barbershopwas reached in Turek Enterprises,Inc.
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company2 12 in a motion to dismiss
heard in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. In that case, a
chiropractic clinic's claim for business interruption coverage was dismissed. The
clinic claimed for losses due to its inability to access its property as a result of
governmental "stay at home" orders. Like DieselBarbershop, the property policy in
Turek had a similar virus exclusion with an anti-concurrent cause clause. The
policyholder clinic specifically argued that COVID-19 virus particles did not attach
to or damage any property (presumably to get around the virus exclusion). The court
found that this case was similar to the Source Food case, in that there was no
contamination of the insured property and therefore no possibility of coverage.
The court in Turek distinguished Studio 417 and preferred the reasoning of
Diesel Barbershop and Gavrilides Management Company LLC v. Michigan
Insurance Company213 in holding that Michigan law required a tangible injury to
property to trigger the "direct physical loss or damage" coverage clause. The court
did not accept the policyholder's argument that COVID-19 was not the proximate
cause of the loss and the virus exclusion was only limited in its applicability to the
costs of decontamination. Instead, the court held that the governmental orders
preventing property access were not the sole cause of the policyholder's loss-the
virus was also a cause, thus triggering the anti-concurrent cause portion of the virus
exclusion. The court made this holding despite the policyholder raising the fact that
the 2006 ISO virus exclusion circular submitted to insurance regulators indicated
that the exclusion was meant to preclude losses due to contamination by diseasecausing agents.

212

No. 20-11655, 2020 WL 5258484 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 3, 2020) (applying Michigan

law).

213 No. 20-000258-CB (Mich. Cir. Ct., Ingham Cty. July 1, 2020) (holding
that, when a
city order prevented customers from dining in the restaurant, it did not suffer a direct physical
loss because there was no physical alteration or tangible damage to the integrity of the

building).
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Similarly, in IOE, LLC v. Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut,214
a restaurant in downtown Los Angeles had its claim for business interruption and
civil authority-related losses dismissed on motion after it alleged that the Los
Angeles Mayor's public health restrictions prohibiting in-person dining at
restaurants resulted in lost income. The insurance policy in this case had an
exclusion for losses due to virus and bacteria.2 1 s
The court held that there was no direct physical loss or damage triggering
coverage as nothing physically changed in the property. Under California law, the
court held that losses from inability to use property do not amount to "direct physical
loss of or damage to property." A distinct, demonstrable physical alteration to the
property is required for coverage to attach. Furthermore, the court held that
temporary impairment to property does not equate to direct physical loss. The
policyholder's civil authority claim was dismissed because the virus exclusion
ousted coverage for COVID-19 related losses. The government-ordered dining
restrictions were entirely attributable to the virus, an excluded cause. Additionally,
the court found that no particular adjacent property was damaged so the civil
authority coverage could not be triggered in the first place.
The court in Martinez v. Allied Insurance Company ofAmerica 216 dismissed
a dental office's claim for business interruption insurance because the policy
contained a virus exclusion. 217 The policyholder claimed that the COVID-19 virus
and Florida's emergency shutdown orders, including orders limiting non-essential
dental procedures, caused the interruption of its income stream. It also alleged
damages due to decontamination of its office. The court dismissed the claim solely
on the language of the virus exclusion by holding that all of the office's losses were
related to the virus, an excluded cause of loss. This is, in fact, the predominant
pattern of courts faced with the virus exclusion when deciding pandemic-related
coverage issues: a knee-jerk dismissal.
In perhaps the most shocking example of all, the United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri in Zwillo v. Corporation.v. Lexington Insurance
No. 2:20-cv-04418-SVW-AS, 2020 WL 5359653 (C.D. Cal. Sept 2, 2020) (applying
California
law).
215
Id. at * 1 (noting that the policy reads, "We will not pay for loss or damage caused by
or resulting from any virus, bacterium or other microorganism that induces or is capable of
inducing physical distress, illness or disease.").
216 No. 2:20-cv-00401-FtM-66NPM, 2020 WL 5240218 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2020)
(applying Florida law).
217 Id. at *3 (noting that the exclusion was for loss or damage caused "directly or
indirectly," by "[a]ny virus, bacterium or other microorganism that induces or is capable of
inducing physical distress, illness or disease.").
214
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Company218 dismissed a policyholder's claim based on an extremely broadly worded
pollution exclusion which included the word "virus" in a long list of possible
pollutant contaminants. The court distinguished the Studio 417, KC Hopps, and Blue
Springs Dental cases-cases in its own district!-on the basis that the word "virus"
was here in an all-encompassing pollution exclusion and not a stand-alone "virus"
exclusion. The court did not accept the policyholder's arguments that this pollution
exclusion was obviously aimed at environmental or industrial pollution, not
pandemic-related losses.
Where cases to date have ruled in favor of an insurer based on knee-jerk
embrace of a faulty concept of direct physical loss or injury, the courts may
nonetheless have blundered toward the right result in some situations involving the
virus exclusion-if insurers win the causation battle. We think that is a big "if' but
realize courts may decide to the contrary. If that becomes the majority rule, observers
will tend to minimize the significance of judicial decisions construing the physical
loss or injury trigger, at least where there is a virus exclusion. Notwithstanding this,
we remain critical of the "no direct physical loss or damage" decisions even if they
can be defended on the "no harm, no foul" grounds of a more persuasive basis such
as the virus exclusion.
But it is far from clear how many policies at issue actually contain a virus
exclusion or how that exclusion operates in all loss scenarios. Insurers have
promoted the view that nearly all policies contain the exclusion but a quarter of the
case law to date involves policies with no such exclusion. Consequently, better
juridical reasoning regarding loss and damage may make thousands of policies and
millions of dollars in coverage available to policyholders.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Insurers have won the bulk of the early COVID coverage battles, with
analysis in too many of these early decisions that mangles fundamental insurance
policy interpretation doctrine. Fortunately, there is a cluster of better reasoned cases
that one hopes will be persuasive to the appellate courts that will ultimately
determine the outcome of the COVID coverage war.
The insurance industry's media thrust at the early stages of the COVID
pandemic which pushed the no-coverage-for-COVID message appeared to set the
stage for the early salvo of claim dismissals from courts across the country. Whether
due to media influence or simple subpar analysis, many court decisions fall short in
that they have, in varying degrees:
218 No. 4:20-00339-CV-RK, 2020 WL 7137110 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 2, 2020) (applying
Missouri law).
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c)

d)

e)
f)

g)

h)

i)

Vol. 27

ignored or wrongfully rejected state law precedents regarding
the "direct physical loss or damage" coverage trigger;
read pro-insurer precedents too broadly, failing to distinguish
the ubiquity, reach, and impact of COVID as compared to the
more distant and non-physical loss of these precedents;
ignored or summarily distinguished similarly analogous cases
of insurance coverage for contaminating substances, precedents
which would have provided helpful guidance on the insurance
coverage issue for COVID-related losses;
artificially distinguished insurance policy wording from the
wording in past precedents when, in fact, the relevant policy
wording is identical to the cases at hand;
provided no reasoning as to why one line of coverage cases is
preferred over another;
fallen into a hyper-literalist dictionary-based argument which
cherry-picks only certain dictionary definitions and ignores
others which run counter to the conclusions reached;
refused to even consider insurance policy term ambiguity in the
wake of conflicting dictionary definitions and case precedents,
thereby failing to invoke the policyholder-friendly tools of
insurance policy interpretation: contra proferentem and
reasonable expectations;
refused to read pleading allegations at face value and as
presumptively true, as required at the motion to dismiss stage
of litigation; and,
dispensed with policyholder claims without any further factual
findings or discovery, at the pleadings stage, in a context where
factual knowledge of the COVID-19 virus is evolving on a
near-daily basis, and where allegations should be enough to get
the policyholder in the door of the litigation system.

In response to this list, insurers would certainly argue that the presence of a
virus exclusion in the cases on which they have prevailed validates dismissal 219 even
And, as reflected in the tally of decisions to date, courts are receptive to this insurer
argument. See Baker, supra note 10; Erin Ayers, InsurersPrevail in Two More COVID-19related
BI
Lawsuits,
ADVISEN,
(last
visited
Jan.
25,
2020)
https://www.advisen.com/tools/fpnproc/fpns/articles new_1/P/376369872.html?rid=37636
9872&list id= 1 (discussing Tracker findings); Mike Curley, Travelers Ducks Counterclaims
219
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if judicial analysis of the loss or damage questions has been unduly abrupt and
reductionist. We reject a "no harm, no foul" justification because there is harm when
courts warp prevailing contract and insurance law in a rush to judgment.22 o In
particular, the collapsing and narrowing of the concepts of directness, physicality,
loss and damage sets unwise precedent sure to wrongfully deprive policyholders of
coverage in future non-COVID cases. If the virus exclusion is conclusive, bully for
insurers-but if that is the case, decisions should be made on the basis of this express
exclusion rather than tortured reasoning about loss and damage.
The judiciary's excessively textual focus-cum-myopia also unnecessarily
raises doubts about the correctness of the decisions. If it is fact correct that there
cannot be loss or damage without structural change in tangible property or that the
concept of damage requires a particularized showing of viral contamination of
specific surfaces, one would expect supporting evidence in the drafting history of
property policies or similar materials providing context and illuminating the policy
purpose and coverage intent. But overconfident hermeneutics-lite decisions in favor
of insurers deprive policyholders, the judicial system, and society of access to
materials that can determine whether a court's reading of policy verbiage is correct.
Ironically, this type of background information might support the insurer
position. The drafting history of the standard ISO virus exclusion, for example, does
strongly suggest that insurers were seeking to avoid contamination liability,
although the case against civil authority shutdown is less clear. 221 We understand
that insurers, who think they can consistently win drafting wars, are reluctant to
concede the usefulness of contextual materials and undermine future arguments
seeking to restrict court consideration to only policy text. But the insurers' long term
in
Geragos COVID-19
Suit,
LAw360,
(last visited
Jan.
25,
2020)
https://www.law360.com/articles/1321151/travelers-ducks-counterclaims-in-geragoscovid-19-suit (California federal district court finds "a virus exclusion in [law firm] policy
bars coverage.").
220 In addition, it appears that many insurance policies lack a virus exclusion. See Baker,
supra note 10 (last visited Oct. 21, 2020) (noting that in cases with decisions, one-fifth of
policies lack virus exclusions); Josh Czaczkes, et. al., Why We Don't Need COVID-19
Immunity
Legislation,
BALKINIZATION
(Sept.
26,
2020),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/09/why-we-dont-need-covid-19-immunity.html
(noting
that the majority of general liability insurance policies lack virus exclusion). In the rush to
enact limitations on liability for COVID claims, state legislatures appear not to have
investigated the prospect that such limitations on liability inure to the benefit of insurers
rather than policyholders, at least in the short term. Insurers would presumably argue that in
the absence of such legislation, they will be force to raise premiums or restrict coverage.
221 See ISO VIRUS EXCLUSION, supra note
25.
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agenda should not strangle immediate judicial decision-making. Courts interested in
correctly deciding COVID coverage cases would presumably be interested in seeing
this material rather than making it moot through a Rule 12 dismissal.
Apart from its possible (we think probable) infection of the judiciary, the
insurance industry's public relations narrative is troubling. The insurance industry
claims that COVID coverage is a death knell even though it also claims that nearly
all policies provide only four weeks of civil authority coverage while all policies of
course have policy limits and perhaps even other sub-limits on business interruption
coverage or applicable exclusions as well as conditions that policyholders may fail
to meet. In light of the liability limiting tools at their disposal, the insurer claims of
imminent poverty if COVID is covered seems melodramatic.
The insurer claim of disaster rings particularly hollow in light of the
European experience more receptive to coverage. While insurer profitability may
have declined for the moment, the insurance industry remains alive and well in both
the E.U. 222 and the U.K., where a key test case went well for policyholders. 223 And
in the U.S., insurers appear to be doing just fine in spite of-or in some cases because
of-the pandemic. 224

222

See Munich Re Reports

E800Mof COVID-19-RelatedLosses During Q3, INS. J. (Oct.

21, 2020), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2020/10/21/587446.htm.
Although 800 million euros is of course a good deal of money, it is not the hundreds of
billions of dollars American insurers claim they will lose (allegedly each month) if COVID
business interruption claims must be paid. The Munich Re experience thus suggests that
policy limits, sub-limits, and specific exclusions give carriers substantial economic
protection eve if their defenses of no-direct-physical-loss-or-damage are rejected by courts.
223 See Carolyn Cohn & Kirstin Ridley, London CourtRules Some Insurers Should Not
Have Denied Business Interruption Claims,
INS. J.
(Sept.
15,
2020),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2020/09/15/582641.htm
(describing
Financial Conduct Authority v. Arch Insurance (UK) Ltd, [2021] UKSC 1.
224 See Leslie Scism & Allison Prang, TravelersMore Than Doubles QuarterlyIncome,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/travelers-profit-rose-in-thirdquarter-11603192181 (noting Traveler's $827 million third quarter profit compared to $396
million in 2019, which included $400 million in subrogation revenue from claims against
Pacific Gas & Electric in connection with California fires; and how Travelers stock rose by
$3.12 per share). Travelers was also aided in that its auto insurance business did better than
usual because of pandemic-stimulated reductions in driving and hence in collisions. We
realize that property insurance is expected to have a less successful 2020 than auto or liability
insurance but note that insurers have multiple means of enduring difficult times and profiting
over the proverbial long-haul, where their longevity records is considerably better than that
of their small business policyholders.
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Meanwhile, business policyholders appear to be experiencing the type of
debacle insurers claim they face if coverage claims succeed. Insurers seem to sing
this tune with ease when threatened. We have heard it before regarding asbestos,
pollution, product liability, bad faith, and punitive damages claims. But even the
massive asbestos mega-tort, Superfund, and other pollution claims-not to mention
the credit swap defaults of the Great Recession-did minimal long-lasting damage
to insurers and their ability to accumulate capital and regain profitability. In times
of such stress, many more policyholders than insurers fail.
Although insurer claims of industry-wide doom tend to ring hollow, their
means of survival is not without collateral consequence. The asbestos, pollution, and
Superfund coverage wars produced broad exclusions in standard policies and made
coverage more expensive and difficult (but not impossible) to obtain. COVID-19
will surely spur restrictions of coverage and increases in premiums-but this is
likely even if insurers prevail in today's coverage battles.
The immediately relevant question is whether today's policyholders seeking
coverage under policies issued prior to the pandemic-particularly those lacking a
virus exclusion-are entitled to coverage. Too many initial decisions on the issue
have implicitly embraced a flawed insurer narrative in abruptly turning
policyholders away.

